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Abstract 
Conspiracy theories are an ever more prominent part of modem social and political 
discourse. While an increasing amount of psychological research has been devoted to 
investigating the determinants of conspiracism, there is no overarching theoretical 
perspective that can unify the field's disparate findings. In the present thesis, we 
develop and test a novel theoretical framework that we call extended monological 
belief system theory. The theory, based on well-established models of cognitive 
consistency and parallel constraint satisfaction, proposes that beliefs in conspiracy 
theories are best understood as fairly vague outward manifestations of broader 
underlying beliefs and attitudes which together serve to construct a conspiratorial 
worldview. In a series often empirical studies we demonstrate that contradictory 
conspiracy theories are correlated in belief, that these correlations are at least partially 
explained by higher-order beliefs, and that the correlations are not reliably found for 
conventional explanations; that conspiracists prefer to make arguments based on 
refuting official narratives rather than proposing specific alternatives; and that 
interpersonal suspicion appears to be a natural outcome of reading pro-conspiracist 
persuasive texts. Moreover, connectionist models built on the architecture of the 
model accurately predicted behavioural responses to fictitious conspiracy scenarios. 
The results indicate that the degree to which someone believes in a conspiracy theory 
is determined less by the details of the theory and more by the degree to which the 
theory matches that person's higher-order beliefs. Based on these results and on the 
current state of the literature on the psychology of conspiracism, we propose that 
extended monological belief system theory can be used as a framework for 
understanding the contributions of beliefs, attitudes, individual-difference variables, 
and various other contributors to beliefs in conspiracy theories. 
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Chapter 1: Conspiracies and Connectionism 
Abstract 
Conspiracy theories are an important force in the popular understanding of science, 
history, religion, and politics. In spite of the increasing relevance of these theories in the 
electronic age, relatively little is known about the determinants of conspiracy belief. The 
vast majority of previous research is correlational and questionnaire-based, and focuses 
largely on individual differences. Chapter 1 reviews the relevant scientific literature to 
date regarding beliefs in conspiracy theories, from the initial flurry of interest following 
the John F. Kennedy assassination to the advent of the electronic age, and proposes a 
novel theory that can unify many of the disparate findings in the field. Extended 
monological belief system theory proposes that conspiracy beliefs form a more or less 
coherent worldview that is held together by various higher-order beliefs, and is 
amenable to computational modelling via feedforward connectionist network models 
such as those used in the explanatory coherence theory of cognitive consistency. 
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In the past half-century, and particularly since the emergence of the internet as a 
medium for mass communication, conspiracy theories (hereafter CTs) in the West have 
become a cultural force to be reckoned with. Reliable online information on the safety 
and efficacy of childhood vaccines is dwarfed by discussion of shadowy conspiracies by 
pharmaceutical corporations to exaggerate their benefits and cover up their harmful 
effect, skewing internet discourse against the consensus of medical science (Downs, 
Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2008; Kata, 2012). Social movements based around CTs, 
such as the 9/11 Truth Movement, seek to recruit outsiders by manufacturing doubt 
about every aspect of their chosen targets (e.g. Kay, 2011). As will be shown later, this 
is particularly evident in news website comments. These theories are not harmless -
they affect people's opinions even without their knowledge (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), 
and can decrease engagement with politics, society, and the environment (Butler, 
Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995; Jolley & Douglas, in press). Further, CTs are still not 
well understood: despite an intensification of research efforts in the past two decades 
(Swami & Coles, 2010), the findings are generally disparate and unconnected with one 
another. There is no unifying framework under which research is conducted, other than 
a widespread interest in individual differences. Indeed, there is substantial disagreement 
regarding how CTs should even be defined (Brotherton, 2012; Coady, 2006). 
In the present thesis we seek to remedy this deficiency by proposing and testing 
a theory of conspiracist belief that can work as a unifying framework for many of the 
various findings in the field. The current chapter summarises the current research 
literature on the psychology of beliefs in CTs and presents a specification of the theory 
itself as a potential avenue for contextualising the various strains of research that have 
resulted from attempts to understand conspiracism. Finally, we outline the principles of 
a computational connectionist network model that will be used to test the theory's 
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predictions in several of the empirical studies that follow. 
Definitional issues 
Before commencing an investigation of the nature of conspiracy belief, it is 
necessary to come up with a sensible definition of the term. The word conspiracy comes 
from a Latin phrase meaning 'to breathe together', and in the legal sense has come to 
signify two or more people secretly plotting to commit an illegal act. In the broadest 
sense, a CT could simply be the proposition that a conspiracy lies behind a particular 
event. Under this definition, a prosecutor seeking to convict two gang members of 
robbing a bank together and a politician blaming a bombing on a terrorist group would 
be advocating CTs. As Coady (2006) noted, however, in the modern context this 
definition is perhaps too broad given the emotional baggage of the term - the film 
Conspiracy Theory, for instance, is about a paranoid man spinning wildly implausible 
theories of secret plots and government persecution (Donner, 1997), and if asked to 
name a CT the average person would probably say something about the John F. 
Kennedy (JFK) assassination being a set-up or 9/11 being an inside job. 
Many philosophers have attempted to come to grips with this conflict between 
the literal meaning given by the constituent words of the phrase and the common usage 
(e.g. Coady, 2006; Keeley, 1999; Pigden, 2007). Keeley (1999) distinguished warranted 
CTs from unwarranted ones - a warranted CT is something along the lines of the 
Watergate affair or the idea that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by a Middle Eastern 
terrorist group, while unwarranted CTs necessarily run counter to official or 'obvious' 
accounts, tie together events with no obvious relation, are deeply shrouded in mystery 
and secrecy, depend largely upon 'errant data' for support, and invariably work toward 
nefarious ends. In a similar vein, Brotherton (2012) drew a distinction between CTs and 
'theorised conspiracies'. The latter are akin to Keeley's warranted CTs, while the 
former hew more closely to the unwarranted CT mold and are distinguished from their 
warranted cousins by a complex collection of necessary and sufficient criteria. 
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The research presented in this thesis will focus exclusively on the CTs that 
would be generally referred to as such under Brotherton's (2012) definition and 
classified by Keeley (1999) as unwarranted. This captures the most common usage of 
the term, and is also in line with the definitions used in the majority of previous 
psychological work on the subject (e.g. Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 
1999; Bale, 2007; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011). ACT, 
therefore, is defined as a proposed plot by powerful people or organisations working 
together in secret to accomplish some (usually sinister) goal. Popular contemporary 
examples include the idea that the 9/11 attacks were planned and carried out by 
elements within the American government (Kay, 2011), the allegation that doctors and 
medical researchers are conspiring to cover up the fact that HIV and AIDS are unrelated 
(Smith & Novella, 2007), and the idea that evidence of a causal link between autism and 
childhood vaccination is being suppressed by an unscrupulous medical industry 
(Goertzel, 2010). 
What do we know about the psychology of conspiracy belief (and disbeliet)? 
CTs have been a topic of interest to psychologists since at least the John F. 
Kennedy assassination, and to the general public for many years before. As alluded to 
above, the existing research on CTs is relatively sparse, and can be generally grouped 
into a few distinct categories: the consequences of conspiracy belief, trait-like individual 
differences between conspiracists and non-conspiracists, states and beliefs which can 
serve as antecedents to conspiracy belief, and the issue of what makes a good (i.e. 
plausible) CT. As will be seen, an understanding of all of these is an essential element 
in understanding the phenomenon of conspiracism. In each case, however, the bulk of 
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the existing research into the topic is strictly correlational, and there has been almost no 
investigation into interventions that predispose people toward conspiracism or anti-
conspiracism. 
Consequences of conspiracist belief 
Research in the psychological and medical spheres has con finned the 
importance of understanding conspiracy beliefs. Bogart and colleagues (Bogart, Galvan, 
Wagner, & Klein, 2011; Bogart & Thorburn, 2005) have shown that belief in CTs 
regarding the origin of AIDS negatively predicts prophylactic use, increasing the risk of 
HIV transmission. Fears of vaccines, fuelled by CTs about phannaceutical corporations, 
have caused a dramatic drop in immunisation rates and prompted outbreaks of easily 
preventable diseases (Poland & Jacobson, 2011; Roxby, 2011). Butler e/ al. (1995) 
demonstrated that viewing the pro-conspiracist film JFK led not just to increased 
conspiracy belief, but also to feelings of helplessness and a decreased willingness to 
participate in the political process. Exposure to climate-science CTs makes people less 
likely to attempt to reduce their carbon footprint (Jolley & Douglas, in press). CTs can 
be used by opportunistic politicians to stir up anger against minority groups, as with 
suspicions about Jewish bankers in Nazi Gennany or the publication of the bogus 
Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion in Tsarist Russia (Poliakov, 1987), or to 
encourage belief in revisionist history via propaganda, as in the case of Holocaust denial 
(Yelland & Stone, 1996). Even when CTs arise organically, they can lead to an 
escalation of existing conflicts between rival groups (Pruitt, 1987). 
This is not to say that conspiracy belief is universally a bad thing. Darwin, 
Neave, and Holmes (2011) have proposed that conspiracy beliefs may be an outgrowth 
of a more suspicious thinking style that is adaptive in many circumstances. Moreover, 
CTs are sometimes accurate: the idea that President Nixon orchestrated a burglary at the 
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headquarters of the Democratic National Committee would seem like an outlandish CT 
if it had not been shown to be true (Bale, 2007). However, conspiracy theories, even 
when wrong, are notoriously resistant to falsification, and can take on the appearance of 
a 'degenerating research program' (Clarke, 2002, p. 136), with new layers of conspiracy 
being added to rationalise each new piece of disconfirming evidence (Keeley, 1999). 
Traits and demographics 
The bulk of existing research into the psychology of CTs has been in the area of 
individual differences. There are certain traits and trait-like variables that predispose 
people to be more or less sceptical of CTs. This line of research has provoked 
unfavourable reactions from conspiracy advocates, who feel unfairly targeted and 
suspect that such research is an effort to pathologise and suppress alternative 
worldviews (Lewandowsky, Cook, Oberauer, & Hubble, 2013). Even from within 
academia there has been some criticism of such efforts: Bratich (2008) has characterised 
mainstream responses to conspiracy theorising as a sort of moral panic aimed at 
enforcing intellectual orthodoxy. 
Perceptions of the motivations of such research aside, some of the most reliable 
results in conspiracy psychology have come from the examination of individual 
differences. In an influential essay, 1I0fstadter (1964) drew upon this idea in 
characterising 'political paranoia' as having its roots in a 'persistent psychic complex ... 
a style made up of certain preoccupations and fantasies' (p. 86) to which people adhere 
to a greater or lesser extent. Empirical evidence of individual differences was soon to 
follow. Four years after 1I0fstadter's seminal article, Hamsher, Geller, and Rotter (1968) 
found that men with an external locus of control were more likely than other men to 
believe that the JFK assassination was the result of a secret government conspiracy. 
This finding was replicated three decades later by Abalakina-Paap, Stefan, Craig, and 
Gregory (1999) for a wider variety of CTs and for both men and women. This finding 
makes theoretical sense; those with an extemallocus of control seem obviously more 
likely to believe in powerful external forces influencing events. 
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Hamsher et aT. (1968) also found a correlation between interpersonal trust and 
JFK conspiracy belief, such that people who are dispositionally less trustful of others 
are more likely to believe in a conspiracist account of Kennedy's death. Ten years later, 
this finding was replicated in reference to a different conspiracy - this time, a veridical 
one: the Watergate affair. In the midst of the developing scandal, Wright and Arbuthnot 
(1974) examined the determinants of suspicion toward the government. Their results 
were in line with those of Hamsher et aT. (1968): interpersonal trust was negatively 
related to perceptions of conspiracy, such that less trustful people suspected a greater 
degree of official involvement in the Watergate burglary. Abalakina-Paap et aT. (1999) 
were able to replicate the connection between conspiracy belief and interpersonal trust, 
along with Simmons and Parsons (2005). Similarly, Yelland and Stone (1996) found 
that while most people were persuaded to some extent by Holocaust denialist 
arguments, high-trust participants could also be persuaded that the Holocaust was real 
while low-trust participants were unaffected by the anti-conspiracy manipulation. 
Research into the effect of mistrust continued into the 1980s, albeit with a shift 
in focus from the interpersonal to the institutional. Swami and colleagues (Swami et aT., 
2010; Swami et at., 2011) have demonstrated a correlation between mistrust in the 
institutions of society and conspiracy belief. A related construct, anomie, defined as a 
sense of alienation from and ambivalence toward society and its norms, has also been 
shown to be positively associated with conspiracy belief (Goertzel, 1994b; Abalakina-
Paap et at., 1999; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007a; Swami et at., 2011). Following Swami 
and colleagues, Inglehart (1987) found that mistrust of institutions such as government 
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and courts positively predicted conspiracy belief. lie proposed that this was in part due 
to political extremism: people at the extremes of the political spectrum are likely to be 
opposed in their goals by the relatively centrist majority, both at the individual and 
govemmentallevels, and characterise this opposition as a sort of deliberate persecution 
by the power elite. Others have expanded on the idea that political extremism can be an 
important precursor to conspiracy beliefs - for instance, Willman (2002) drew a parallel 
between conspiracism and fascism, noting the similarity between the fascist conception 
of a near-Edenic default state of society before a Fall precipitated by the intrusion of 
some corrupting foreign influence and the conspiracist tendency to scapegoat the 
conspirators for all of the evils of society. A rather extreme example of this tendency 
comes from David Icke, one of the more popular British conspiracists of the early 21 st 
century, who proposes that the world was a literal paradise before a celestial catastrophe 
created by the extra-dimensional reptilian conspirators who currently control the world 
(Icke, 2012). 
Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, and Blaine (1999) found that blaming the system 
for one's disadvantages is a strong predictor of conspiracy belief, especially among 
racial minorities. In fact, being a member of a racial minority itself contributes to beliefs 
in conspiracies, and this effect is even more pronounced in young people (Goertzel, 
1994b). However, little research has directly compared majority and minority groups on 
conspiracy belief. Some biomedical research has examined beliefs in II IV -related 
conspiracies among majority versus minority ethnic groups, but these CTs usually 
allege that AIDS is an attempt at viral genocide of the minority groups involved and 
may therefore constitute a special case (e.g. Russell et af., 2011). 
In recent years, researchers have paid more attention to Big Five personality 
traits (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Openness to experience was identified as an early 
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candidate for correlation with belief in conspiracies, given that CTs usually exist as an 
alternative to mainstream explanations. It would therefore make sense that people with a 
high degree of openness would be more likely to expose themselves to (and therefore 
believe in) alternative accounts of events. Similarly, it would make sense for 
agreeableness to show a negative correlation with conspiracy belief: highly agreeable 
people would be more likely to accept received wisdom at face value. Both of these 
predictions were supported to varying degrees in a series of studies by Swami and 
colleagues (Swami et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2012). Low 
agreeableness was associated with 9/11 conspiracy belief (Swami et at., 2010), but not 
with belief in a moon landing hoax CT (Swami et at., 2012). The effect of openness was 
equally unclear: in the 2010 study it had an indirect effect on conspiracy belief via 
exposure to CTs, but in the 2011 study there was no significant relationship with 9/11 
CT belief when other predictors were taken into account (Swami et at., 2011), and the 
2012 study showed no relationship at all with moon landing CT belief (Swami et al., 
2012). Research in this area is ongoing. 
A once-popular explanation for beliefs in CTs was the idea that they serve as a 
simplifying filter in life, providing simple explanations for complex events that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult to understand. However, this idea has not received 
much empirical support. For example, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) examined the 
correlation between conspiracy belief and a number of measures that should be 
associated with a dispositional desire for simplification: attributional complexity, need 
for cognition, and tolerance for ambiguity. None of these variables showed a significant 
correlation with either attitudes toward CTs in general or with measures of specific 
conspiracy belief. In a similar vein, Leman and Cinnirella (2007a) found that conspiracy 
belief was unrelated to dispositional need for cognitive closure (NFCC). A manipulated 
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decrease in situational NFCC did succeed in lowering the degree of congruence between 
previously held conspiracy beliefs and conspiracist attribution in a novel scenario, but 
there was no simple effect of the NFCC manipulation on conspiracy belief. 
More recently, Machiavellianism has emerged as a predictor of conspiracy 
belief. The more Machiavellian someone is, the more likely they are to believe CTs to 
be true (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). This is thought to be due to psychological projection: 
if someone can picture themselves making the same decisions as the alleged 
conspirators, they will find the CT more plausible. Grzesiak-Feldman and Izrycka 
(2009) demonstrated a positive correlation between right-wing authoritarianism (RW A) 
and conspiracy thinking about other nationalities, which could also be interpreted as a 
consequence of projection given the authoritarian tendency toward intergroup 
aggression (Altemeyer, 2006). Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) also found that 
authoritarians are more likely to believe in CTs, YeHand and Stone (1996) found that 
participants high in RWA were amenable to persuasion that the Holocaust was a 
conspiratorial hoax while those low in R W A were not, and Swami (2012) showed a 
significant positive correlation between RWA and beliefs in a Jewish conspiracy among 
a Malaysian sample. The evidence regarding RWA as a predictor of conspiracy beliefs 
is mixed, however: Leman and Cinnirella (2007b) found no relationship between 
authoritarianism and general conspiracy beliefs, and Mel Ioskey (1995) found a 
marginal trend toward the opposite effect - participants high in authoritarianism were 
more likely to believe the official story of the JFK assassination. Similarly, Swami et al. 
(2010) obtained a positive correlation between anti-authoritarian attitudes and beliefs in 
9/11 conspiracies. 
The crucial difference may lie in the types of CTs examined: most of the studies 
which found a positive correlation with R W A examined scapegoating-type 
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conspiracies, in which a minority (usually the Jews) is accused of orchestrating the ills 
of society at large (Grzesiak-Feldman & Izrycka, 2009; Swami, 2012; Yelland & Stone, 
1996). In contrast, studies that found no effect or the opposite focused on CTs 
surrounding particular events such as terrorist attacks and high-profile assassinations 
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2007b; McHoskey, 1995; Swami, 2010). These different classes 
of CTs may therefore be psychologically distinct from one another, a tendency that has 
been noted by previous authors: Barkun (2006) distinguished between event 
conspiracies (JFK, 9/11) and systemic conspiracies (Jewish control of the banking 
system), Kruglanski (1987) considered scapegoating and conspiracy theorising to be 
completely separate phenomena, and Byford (2002) drew a line between pseudo-
mystical classical conspiracism, which includes anti-Jewish and anti-Masonic CTs, and 
more banal world-elite theories which focus on malevolent (but still earthly) ambitions. 
Finally, there has been a small amount of investigation into the role of 
intelligence in conspiracy belief. Swami et al. (2011) conducted two studies involving 
intelligence. In the first, they found no reliable correlation between self-assessed 
intelligence and conspiracy belief; however, the second study revealed a significant 
negative correlation between intelligence and belief in conspiracies relating to the Red 
Bull energy drink. The findings of the second study should be interpreted with caution, 
however; many of the 'conspiracy' items did not involve conspiracies at all, and could 
be more accurately classified as myths or rumours (e.g. 'The slogan "Red Bull gives 
you wings" is used because in animal experiments, rats grew rudimentary wings'). 
Further complicating the interpretation of the findings regarding intelligence, Goertzel 
(1994b) found no significant association between education level and conspiracy belief. 
Considering the substantial shared variance between intelligence and education level, 
this result casts doubt on the validity of the connection suggested by Swami et al. 
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(2011). Most recently, in the spirit of Hofstadter's (1964) invocation of a paranoid 
personality as a possible reason for conspiracy beliefs, Darwin et al. (20 II) and Swami 
et al. (2012) found reliable correlations between conspiracy beliefs, paranoid ideation, 
and subclinical schizotypy, particularly the cognitive-perceptual deficit subscale. 
States and beliefs 
The third major area of research into the psychology of conspiracy belief 
concerns cognitive or affective states, as well as other beliefs held by the perceiver, 
which make conspiracies seem subjectively more or less likely. Perhaps the most robust 
finding in this category is a strong correlation among beliefs in different CTs: the more 
CTs someone believes in, the more likely they are to believe in other, unrelated 
conspiracies as well (for a review, see Swami et al., 2010). Swami and colleagues 
(Swami et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011), as well as Goertzel (1994b), have 
characterised this tendency as evidence that conspiracism constitutes a monological 
belief system: a closed network of mutually consonant beliefs that resist falsification 
and provide support for one another. Deeply embedded within this system is an abiding 
distrust of authority, an intuitive thinking style, and a preference for alternative 
narratives, 'which may explain the strong correlation between conspiracy belief and 
other forms of unconventional thinking such as superstitious or paranormal beliefs 
(Swami et al., 2011; Darwin et al., 2011). 
The relationship between conspiracy belief and superstition may be an indirect 
one, however. Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found that inducing a feeling of lacking 
control significantly increased both superstition and conspiracist thinking, even when 
controlling for negative affect. In a similar vein, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found a 
correlation between perceived powerlessness and conspiracy belief. However, Crocker 
et al. (1999) were unable to find any relationship between conspiracy belief and feelings 
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of political powerlessness. This apparent discrepancy may be due to the measures used; 
while Crocker et al. examined political powerlessness in particular, Abalakina-Paap et 
al. (1999) used a more generalised measure of powerlessness. The idea that CT belief 
can stem from a general feeling of powerlessness is consistent with many philosophical 
writings on the subject, which characterise conspiracy belief as the result of agency 
panic - an oversimplified cognitive mapping of a social landscape that, with the 
progress of technology, is increasingly unmappable (Melley, 2002; Willman, 2002). 
CTs restore the perception that the world is not a random and capricious place, but one 
governed by agency - even if that agency is a malevolent one (Bale, 2007; Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Zukier, 1983). 
Feelings of powerlessness are no doubt associated to some degree with self-
esteem, yet another variable found to predict beliefs in CTs. Those with lower sclf-
esteem are more likely to find conspiracies plausible (Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et 
al., 1999; Swami et al., 2011). Whether this relationship has any causal significance 
remains unclear. It may simply be an artefact of correlations between conspiracy belief 
and other variables relevant to psychological well-being, such as perceived 
powerlessness, social alienation, job-related pessimism (Goertzel, 1994), and 
interpersonal trust. Similarly unclear is the nature of the relationship between 
conspiracy beliefs and belief in an unjust world (Douglas, 2012) - perhaps CTs make 
the world seem unjust, or maybe CT belief somehow acts as a palliative against the 
uncertainty and discomfort provoked by unjust-world belief. 
One relatively neglected area of research is the role of anger. Abalakina-Paap et 
al. (1999) found that people who show signs of anger and hostility are more likely to 
believe in CTs. However, this work is strictly correlational and it is not clear, if a causal 
relationship does indeed exist, which way the direction of causation goes. Both options 
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are plausible: a belief that the world is controlled by malevolent conspirators could well 
provoke a certain amount of anger, but anger or dispositional hostility could also affect 
attributional style via projection. Hostile affect may lead to the assumption that others 
are equally hostile and thus more likely to conspire (cf. Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
Research in this area could be valuable given the bombastic rhetorical style of 
prominent CT advocates such as radio host Alex Jones, who seek to incite popular anger 
at what they see as an imminent takeover of the world by the forces of evil. This 
approach may prove to be extremely effective, though at this point there is insufficient 
evidence to support such a claim. 
Content and presentation 
Not all CTs are created equal. Some, like the theories about the death of Princess 
Diana, maintain a hold on the public consciousness for years after they are first 
proposed (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), while others never achieve anywhere near the same 
level of popularity. What makes some theories more popular than others? Most of the 
research in this area concerns the perceived characteristics of the alleged conspirators 
themselves. Grzesiak-Feldman and Suszek (2008; see also Kofta & Sedek, 2005) found 
that CTs are considered to be more plausible if the perceiver sees the proposed 
conspirators as a highly entitative group. Entitativity, or 'groupiness', is the degree to 
which a group is able to function as a single unit, with a high degree of cohesion, 
homogeneity, and shared goals. This relationship makes sense: a group low in 
entitativity would probably find much less success in an attempt to conspire than a 
highly entitative one would. 
One idea that was advanced in the wake of the JFK assassination proposes that 
people seek to explain large, important events by recourse to equally large, important 
causes - essentially an attempt at making the world seem consistent. There is an 
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uncomfortable incongruity in proposing that a president can be killed by a lone gunman 
(Leman and Cinnirella, 2007b). In a Bayesian analysis, McCauley and Jacques (1979) 
found that this is essentially a rational position to take: conspiracies are generally 
considered to be more competent than individuals, so the conditional probability of a 
conspiracy given a successful assassination is judged to be higher than the conditional 
probability of a lone gunman given a successful assassination, while the opposite is true 
for unsuccessful assassination attempts. However, many CTs concern events that are, 
according to official narratives, accidents: the death of Princess Diana, for instance, or 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In other cases, the conventional explanation holds that 
the cause of an event is a conspiracy in the sense that there were multiple perpetrators, 
such as the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 bombings. The Bayesian reasoning of McCauley 
and Jacques may apply well to incidents like the JFK assassination, but its applicability 
is questionable outside the boundaries of the 'caused by single person versus caused by 
a conspiracy' scenario. A better generalisation to draw from this body of research may 
be that event-related CTs are more plausible when the event is disproportionately large 
compared to the perceived power ofthe parties implicated in the official explanation. 
This is exemplified by the common 9/11 conspiracist claim that it is implausible that 
"nineteen men in a cave" (TruthMove.org, 2007) could have caused such a large 
catastrophe. 
Summary 
The psychology of conspiracy belief is a relatively young field. The majority of 
investigations so far have constitutional correlational studies of individual-difference 
variables via questionnaire methods, without much in the way of theoretical work to 
unify the disparate results. However, some patterns have begun to emerge in the 
literature that raise the possibility of further theoretical development. Conspiracist belief 
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appears to be undergirded by a series of beliefs and attitudes that seem to agree with one 
another in how they view the world: mistrust of authority and public institutions, 
political cynicism, anomie, belief in an unjust world, a feeling of lacking control, 
system blame, low self-esteem, and a worldview that incorporates elements from 
beyond the intellectual mainstream such as superstition and the paranormal. The most 
consistent themes are a generalised suspicion of others, a distaste for the mainstream, 
and a feeling of being lied to. 
While this is not an especially flattering cluster of traits, it is important to note 
that psychological research into conspiracy belief is mainly a phenomenon of the last 
twenty-five years. The reliance on correlational methods leaves us largely in the dark in 
terms of the exact nature of the relationships among these different variables. Many of 
these relationships have plausible rationales for different directions of causation. For 
instance, a lack of interpersonal trust might lead to suspicions of conspiracy, but at the 
same time the belief that others are engaged in sinister conspiracies would certainly 
undermine interpersonal trust. It seems likely that there is some degree of positive 
feedback, which causes a conspiracist to progressively withdraw his or her trust from 
society as more and more conspiracies come to light. There is still much work to be 
done in this area, either through direct experimentation or longitudinal studies. We now 
turn to one framework which may prove useful for such investigations, and which will 
ultimately form the theoretical basis for the present research. 
Extended monological belief system theory 
In a tract attempting to apply formal systems theory to the psychology of belief, 
Goertzel (1994a) drew a distinction between two types of belief systems: monological 
and dialogical. A dialogical belief system is amenable to change from outside and 
engages in continual readjustment to fit the demands of external reality, while a 
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monological belief system (hereafter MBS) is self-contained and self-sustaining, and 
works to filter out information from the outside world that may threaten it. Goertzel 
(1994b) drew upon this distinction in an attempt to explain the extremely consistent 
observation that conspiracy belief is a nearly unitary construct: beliefs in different CTs 
are highly correlated with one another, even when the theories are apparently unrelated 
(Swami et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011). In Goertzel's (1994b) view, CTs can form the 
basis for an MBS because they support one another - that is, they have some degree of 
mutual coherence, such that 'each of the beliefs serves as evidence for each of the other 
beliefs' (p.741). A conspiracist belief system therefore arises from beliefs in many 
different CTs, which through their mutual agreement make CTs in general seem more 
plausible. Conspiracy thus becomes the dominant mode of explaining events, and 
seemingly contradictory evidence can be dismissed as having been planted or fabricated 
by the conspirators (c.f. Keeley, 1999). 
Observers of the conspiracy world have made informal observations that agree 
with the view of conspiracist belief systems as being essentially monological. Locke 
(2009), for instance, noted the unfalsifiable nature of many CTs, a hypothesis echoed by 
Buenting and Taylor's (2010) praise of their nearly unlimited explanatory power. 
Likewise, Clarke (2002) noted the tendency of CTs to respond to disconfirmation not 
with structural changes, but with layers of epicycles and ad-hoc hypotheses designed to 
insulate the core of the theory from disconfirmation. 
It is important at this juncture to note that not all conspiracy belief is necessarily 
part of an MBS; Goertzel (1994a) explicitly acknowledged that conspiracy beliefs can 
be dialogical as well as mono logical. Though CTs do tend to intercorrelate, many 
people believe injust one or two and do not take the rest very seriously. The difference 
lies in how the beliefs are modified (or not) with changing contexts and with the 
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presentation of new evidence. 
In the present thesis, we propose an extended version of MBS theory that we 
believe provides a more accurate representation of conspiracist thought. This theory, 
hereafter referred to as extended MRS theory, proposes that conspiracy belief is best 
represented as a network of more general higher-order beliefs that bind together a sub-
network of CTs which may on its own have a relatively low degree of internal 
coherence. That is, the reason beliefs in CTs tend to intercorrelate is not because of a 
direct coherence between them, but because of an indirect coherence via broader beliefs 
and attitudes about the world. These broader beliefs could encompass many variables 
previously found to be correlated with conspiracy belief. For instance, interpersonal 
mistrust could be seen as a generalised higher-order belief that others are untrustworthy 
(Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974). This belief could be a strong component of a conspiracist 
worldview: the less trustworthy others seem, the more plausible the idea that they are 
likely to engage in conspiracies. Likewise, the research on perceived entitativity of 
potential conspirators (Grzesiak-Feldman & Suszek, 2008; Kofta & Sedek, 2005) could 
be reinterpreted within the extended MBS framework as a demonstration of the 
relevance of higher-order beliefs regarding potential conspirators. Applied in this way, 
extendcd MBS thcory could provide a unifying framework for much of the disparate 
research into conspiracy belief of the last 40 years. The theory can be outlined as 
follows: 
1. Beliefs can be represented as nodes in a feedforward connectionist network. 
2. Belief in a particular CT has excitatory and inhibitory connections with beliefs 
in other CTs and conventional (non-conspiracist) explanations: contradictory 
beliefs inhibit one another, while those that directly support each other are 
bridged by excitatory connections. 
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3. Beliefs in individual explanations also share connections with higher-order 
beliefs: broader assumptions and ideas about how the world works in general. 
These higher-order beliefs can constitute any general approach or opinion, such 
as a negative perception of a particular group, a generalised mistrust of people, 
or the idea that conspiracies are common. 
4. Higher-order beliefs generally playa more important role in binding together 
conspiracist beliefs than beliefs in individual theories do. 
Consistent with points 3 and 4, some recent research has moved in the direction 
of acknowledging the relevance of higher-order knowledge structures in conspiracy 
belief. Darwin et al. (2011) found that conspiracist ideation was reliably associated with 
beliefs in the paranormal and other unusual beliefs consistent with high levels of trait 
schizotypy. Newheiser, Farias, and Tausch (2011) examined the effects of congruent 
and incongruent worldviews on beliefs in CTs relating to alleged descendants of Jesus 
Christ and secret codes hidden in the works of Leonardo da Vinci. Consistent with the 
idea that higher-order beliefs are relevant to individual differences in conspiracy belief, 
they found that Christian religiosity negatively predicted beliefs in the (rather 
subversive to conventional Christian theology) CT while New Age orientation 
positively predicted such beliefs. The latter result was replicated by Swami el al. (2012) 
in reference to beliefs in moon landing CTs. Moreover, a further experimental study by 
Newheiser et al. (2011) revealed that counterevidence against the CT was only effective 
among those participants whose belief systems were already somewhat incongruent 
with the CT. However, the researchers did not examine specifically conspiracist belief 
systems - only mainstream and pseudo-mainstream belief systems that had some degree 
of coherence or incoherence with this specific CT. Extended MBS theory essentially 
proposes that there is a cluster of higher-order beliefs that make CTs in general, as well 
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as specific ones, more plausible. 
The studies cited above show an interesting pattern: they have all demonstrated 
that conspiracy belief is specifically associated with non-mainstream beliefs. In a 
similar vein, Inglehart (1987) found that conspiracism is more prevalent among people 
whose political opinions place them on the fringes of society. Taken together, this 
seems to indicate that being outside of the mainstream in some sense might be 
extremely important for much CT belief. The sociologist Colin Campbell characterised 
the intellectual and mystical fringes of society as a cultic milieu - an eclectic assortment 
of beliefs that encompasses 'the worlds of the occult and the magical, of spiritualism 
and psychic phenomena, of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost 
civilizations, of faith healing and nature cure' (Campbell, 1972, p. 122) - and, we argue, 
of conspiracism. Like new religious movements and countcrcultural mysticism, 
contemporary Western conspiracism places itself in opposition to mainstream belief and 
purports to hold hidden truths that only dedicated seekers might divine (Barkun, 2006). 
An opposition to officialdom may therefore be an important part of the conspiracist 
worldview, and we will examine this idea further in Chapter 2. 
There is, then, some initial support for the third and fourth points of extended 
MBS theory, as well as a clear framework for further investigation. For a more detailed 
explanation of the first and second points of the theory, and for the purposes of 
illustrating (and even analysing a priori) the relationships among beliefs - coherence, 
contradiction, or the lack of any connection at all- we tum now to a description of the 
explanatory coherence framework, first put forward by Thagard (1989). 
Explanatory coherence theory 
The explanatory coherence framework (ECHO) is a connectionist network 
model that seeks to explain how people come to accept certain explanations for events 
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and pieces of knowledge over others. More generally, it can be viewed as a system by 
which the relationships among propositions and bits of knowledge can be 
conceptualised. Originally proposed and formalised by Thagard (1989), it is a theory of 
abduction, or inference to the best explanation; in other words, it is a framework for 
determining which explanation best fits an available set of data, premises, or initial 
assumptions through a process of parallel constraint satisfaction. Thus it is in essence a 
model of cognitive consistency, owing much of its approach to dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957) and the work of Fritz Heider (1958; Farr, 1987). 
Architecture and previous applications 
In explanatory coherence theory, each proposition or piece of knowledge is 
represented as a node in a connectionist neural network. There are three possible 
relationships that propositions and pieces of evidence can have: they can cohere with 
one another, meaning that there is some explanatory relationship between them (i.e. one 
explains the other, or their conjunction explains something else); they can incohere, 
meaning that they contradict one another or are otherwise incompatible; and they can be 
unrelated - that is, the truth value of one proposition has no direct bearing on the other. 
In connectionist terms, this amounts to an excitatory connection between nodes, an 
inhibitory connection, or no connection, respectively. Activation in the connectionist 
network propagates from evidence nodes to the propositions with which they cohere, 
and from there throughout the network. This process continues iteratively until the 
system reaches a stable equilibrium, at which time a decision is considered to have been 
reached: the nodes with the highest activation are considered to have 'won', and are 
accepted as explanations (Thagard, 1989). 
As a natural consequence of this architecture, explanatory coherence networks 
instantiate several principles of logical reasoning. Explanations are favoured when they 
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explain many different pieces of evidence, since they draw activation from many 
different sources. An explanation which can itself be explained is at an advantage as 
well. Simple explanations enjoy a privileged position: a smaller set of mutually coherent 
explanations for a certain amount of evidence will be favoured over a larger one. 
Analogy is instantiated as well; if the relationship between two nodes can be explained 
by way of an analogy with two other nodes, it will have an advantage over rival 
explanations. Finally, higher-order knowledge structures are represented in the network 
as well. An explanation is more likely to be accepted if it is in broad agreement not just 
with facts and evidence, but also with more general ideas about how the world works, 
including social knowledge such as ideas about the goals and traits of the actors 
involved (Read, 1987; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004; Thagard, 1989). 
Explanatory coherence theory has been used successfully in the past to simulate 
human decision-making and likelihood judgements. One common application is to legal 
reasoning, simulating the deliberation of a real or mock jury (Read & Miller, 1993; 
Thagard, 1989; Thagard, 2004). Others have applied the theory to social reasoning 
problems, inferring motive and goal information from the actions of others (Read & 
Marcus-Newhall, 1993), and to scientific reasoning, finding that explanatory coherence 
can replicate both expert-level reasoning (Thagard, 1989) and the thought processes of 
young children (Samarapungavan & Wiers, 1991) with respect to scientific 
controversies, such as the question of whether stomach ulcers are caused by stress or by 
bacteria. Modified versions of the ECHO model have also been shown to incorporate 
covariation information in a manner consistent with human reasoning (Read & 
Montoya, 1999). ECHO models are generally instantiated through computer programs, 
the most accessible of which is the web-basedjavaECHO (Thagard, 1994). Each 
proposition or piece of evidence in a network is represented by a name chosen by the 
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user, and lines of code are entered to explain the relationships among the different 
nodes. When the simulation is run, activation propagates from the evidence nodes 
throughout the network by way of excitatory and inhibitory connections, and the output 
consists of the final node activations (positive or negative) once the network reaches a 
stable equilibrium. Comparing the equilibrium node activations allows conclusions to 
be drawn about the network's decision. For example, consider the case of a murder trial 
in which the following two pieces of evidence are known: 
El. The defendant was seen in the same part of town as the victim around the 
time of the murder. 
E2. The murder weapon was identified as belonging to the defendant. 
E I and E2 are the two evidence nodes for the model, and are therefore represented by 
entering the line 'data(El ,E2)' into javaECHO. Declaring nodes El and E2 to be data 
gives them some initial activation, which, when the model is run, will propagate 
through the network. To explain this evidence, the prosecutor puts forward a 
straightforward explanation: 
PI. The defendant killed the victim. 
PI explains (or in the language of ECHO, coheres with) both EI and E2. If the 
defendant killed the victim, that would explain why the defendant was seen near the 
scene of the crime and why the murder weapon belonged to the defendant. These 
relationships are conveyed to javaECIIO as 'explain«PI),EI), and 'explain«PI),E2)'. 
The defence accounts for the evidence using two different arguments: 
D 1. The defendant was in the area for an unrelated reason. 
D2. The murder weapon was stolen from the defendant by the real murderer. 
If the defendant had some other reason to be in the area, that would explain why he or 
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she was seen near the scene of the crime. Therefore, D 1 explains E 1, or in the language 
ofjavaECHO, 'explain«D1),E1)'. Similarly, a theft would explain why the defendant's 
weapon was used in the murder, so D2 explains E2, or 'explain«D2),E2)' .. 
However, there are contradictions between the prosecution's argument and the 
defence's. If the defendant was near the scene of the crime for some reason besides 
murder, that implies that the defendant did not kill the victim - in other words, PI 
contradicts (or, in the language of ECIIO, incoheres with) D 1. Similarly, the defendant 
could not have killed the victim without the murder weapon, which implies that it was 
not stolen; in other words, PI contradicts (incoheres with) D2. These relationships 
would be represented by 'contradict(P1,D1), and 'contradict(Pl,D2)" respectively. The 
full script to represent this scenario in javaECHO would therefore be: 
data(E 1 ,E2) 
explain«P 1 ),El) 
explain«Pl),E2) 




When the javaECHO simulation is run using this input, the final activations for the three 





This pattern of activations indicates that the prosecution's argument has won out, as the 
final activation of PI is both positive and higher than either of the defence's arguments. 
In this case, the defence lost because their argument was less parsimonious than the 
prosecution's: in ECHO, as in intuitive human reasoning, arguments which make fewer 
assumptions tend to win out over more complex ones (Thagard, 1989). The conclusion 
might be reached more quickly or decisively if congruent higher-order goal or trait 
knowledge were also available. For example, knowing that the defendant is an 
aggressive person and had a motive for murder would make the decision even easier. 
Relevance to the extended MBS theory of conspiracism 
As a tool for illustrating systems of competing or coherent beliefs and 
explanations, the utility of the explanatory coherence approach for examining the 
validity of extended MBS theory is clear. Given that CTs are essentially social 
explanations for events, they can be conceptualised as propositions within an 
explanatory coherence framework, in direct competition with other explanations 
(conspiracist or non-conspiracist) for the same pieces of evidence. As is the case with 
any other explanation, CTs also conflict or cohere with various higher-order knowledge 
structures about the world. For instance, the theory that Princess Diana was assassinated 
by a conspiracy between MI6 and the royal family might draw support from the idea 
that people are basically evil and opportunistic, but would be inhibited by a general 
belief in incompetence in government. Activation also runs the other way: the more CTs 
one believes, the more one's higher-order knowledge structures shift toward conspiracy-
friendly positions (c.f. Simon et af., 2004). Together, these two processes explain the 
reliable correlations in beliefs in unrelated CTs (Goertzel, 1994b): a beliefthat 
conspiracies are commonplace is highly coherent with an external locus of control 
(Hamsher et af., 1968), a tendency to mistrust others (Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974), and 
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so on. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a conspiracist MBS under the original formulation 
by Goertzel (1994b). The system is sustained by coherence among the individual 
conspiracy beliefs. Some of these CT seem to fit together - for instance, the idea that a 
sinister Jewish conspiracy controls the world's banking system is at first glance 
obviously coherent with the idea that the Jews also control the media, thanks to the 
instantiation of the principle of analogy in the explanatory coherence framework: just as 
they control the media, so too do they control the banks. (Thagard, 1989). Other 
connections are not as apparent, however. Why is the idea that the moon landings were 
fake in any way connected to the 9/11 attacks? What does either of these have to do 
with the Jews? It would be an exaggeration to say that Goertzel's (1994b) MBS theory 
requires that all possible CTs must cohere with one another, but the majority of the 
theories in this example appear to have no direct relationship with one another. 
Figure 1. A hypothetical visualisation of a problematically structured monological 
belief system, represented by coherence relationships among beliefs in various CTs. 
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The original MBS framework makes the most sense when all of the CTs 
involved can be subsumed under a unifying theory - what Barkun (2006) called a 
superconspiracy, a theory that several conspiracies are orchestrated by the same group 
for more or less the same purposes. These arguments proceed by analogy (which, 
according to Thagardian principles of coherence, spreads activation throughout the 
belief system): just as the Jews control the banks, they control the media too. Just as the 
white medical establishment conspired against African-Americans in the Tuskegee 
syphilis study, they are now doing the same thing with HIV/AIDS. When such a 
framework is not in place, however, or when a CT falls outside of the boundaries of the 
superconspiracy, the hypothesis of mutual coherence becomes more difficult to justify. 
Figure 2 shows a multi-level belief system following the specification of 
extended MBS theory. This network is different in several important ways. First, in 
addition to CTs, it includes several nodes representing broader worldviews that are 
generally consonant with CTs. These range from opinions about particular groups (e.g. 
'The Jews are up to something' or 'The government is corrupt') to general views about 
how the world works (e.g. 'Conspiracies are common' or 'People are untrustworthy'). 
These higher-order beliefs serve as intermediate links between many otherwise 
unrelated CTs, and serve to increase the overall connectedness of the network. 
Which ofthese networks more accurately portrays the structure of conspiracist 
belief systems? It could be argued that Goertze1 (l994b) and others who have worked 
on MBS theory (e.g. Swami et al., 2011) never explicitly argued that the coherence ofa 
conspiracist MBS stems from direct agreement between CTs. While there may be some 
truth to this, no other source of coherence has been specified. This, of course, may 
simply be because the MBS theory has until now been rather vaguely defined. The 
original MBS theory is therefore at a disadvantage in a direct, quantitative comparison, 
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because the version which takes more information into account will in general explain 
more as well. This asymmetry is inevitable, though, as the original MBS theory of 
conspiracist belief as laid out by Goertzel (1994b) is somewhat vague and is likely to be 
supplanted by more heavily elaborated versions at some point or another. In addition, 
the proposed extended MBS architecture makes specific quantitative and qualitative 
predictions about the nature of the connections among conspiracy beliefs. It is these 
predictions which we examine in the empirical component of the present thesis. 
Figure 2. Proposed architecture of a conspiracist extended MBS. Lines represent 
coherence relationships, rectangles represent higher-order beliefs, and circles represent 
individual CT beliefs. 






Overview of studies 
People are 
untrustworthy 
In Studies 1 and 2, we investigate the utility of the extended MBS framework by 
exploring the nature and consequences of higher-order knowledge structures that result 
in beliefs in CTs. Specifically, we expand on the findings of Goertzel (1994b) and 
29 
Swami et al. (2010) regarding correlations between beliefs in different CIs, 
hypothesizing that we could find such a correlation even between beliefs in 
contradictory theories. One higher-order knowledge structure which could produce such 
a correlation is a belief in motivated deception by authority, an element present in 
nearly all contemporary CIs. Studies 3 and 4 provide experimental confirmation of the 
role of higher-order beliefs in the conspiracy worldview, and illustrate the complexity of 
the mental representations elicited even by even fairly simple CIs. 
In Study 5, we take a dialogical and archival approach to the question of how 
conspiracist belief systems are structured. A systematic coding and analysis of 
conspiracy-related persuasive comments on news websites not only replicates previous 
results concerning mistrust and intercorrelations among conspiracy beliefs, but also 
shows important differences in how ideas are presented by those arguing for CIs and by 
those attempting to debunk them. 
Study 6 concerns the effect of varying levels of complexity and detail on the 
plausibility of CIs. Conspiracist beliefs are generally alternative in nature: they are 
usually adhered to by a minority (Goertzel, 1994b), run counter to official narratives, 
and exist on the periphery of what constitutes acceptable belief (Barkun, 2006). Due to 
their non-mainstream status, they may suffer from a degree of incoherence with socially 
acceptable higher-order beliefs such as trust in the institutions of society. It may be 
beneficial to avoid providing specific details of a CI when attempting to convince 
someone of its truth, so that the details do not have an opportunity to produce further 
incoherence between the theory and existing beliefs about the world. Finally, Studies 7, 
8,9, and 10 examine the consequences of the suspicion and mistrust provoked by pro-
conspiracist rhetoric, demonstrating that generalised suspicion can be a disadvantage for 
CI persuasion as well as an advantage. 
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Together, these studies represent an effort not just at linking together the 
respective literatures on conspiracy belief and explanatory coherence, but also at 
developing a coherent theory of conspiracy belief that is amenable to testing via 
computational modelling in addition to direct empirical investigation. Future 
investigations can use extended MBS theory as a theoretical basis for novel research 
including investigations into conscious versus unconscious higher-order biases and 
experimental manipulations. A more ambitious but still important line of future research 
could involve assembling (and subsequently comparing) ECHO models of individual 
belief networks by participants with varying views on the subject of CTs. 
Chapter 2: Contradictions 
Abstract 
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Chapter 2 presents four studies that investigate the psychology of conspiracy belief 
from a connectionist perspective. Based on a prediction from extended monological 
belief system theory, Studies 1 and 2 investigated the relationships among contradictory 
beliefs about the same CTs, and as expected, found that beliefs in contradictory CTs 
were positively correlated. Study 3 used ECHO to model a belief network substructure 
and found that its predictions were a good match to the empirical data, and Study 4 
modelled interactions between contradictory conventional explanations as well as 
contradictory CTs. The results indicate that connectionist representations of the 
hypothesised belief system structure accurately model empirical data, that mutual 
coherence with higher-order knowledge structures allows seemingly contradictory 
hypotheses to intercorrelate, and that while this pattern manifests under certain 
conditions in conventional theories as well, it is more prevalent among CTs. We argue 
that this reflects a unique quality of conspiracist belief systems - that conspiracism is 
less about beliefs in specific theories and more about a generalised opposition to 
authority and official narratives. 
Studies 1 and 2 appear in: Wood, MJ., Douglas, K.M., & Sutton, R.M. (2012). Dead 
and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and 
Personality Science, 3, 767-773. 
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As outlined in Chapter 1, previous research has shown that there is a great deal 
of individual variation in the degree to which people believe CTs (e.g. Goertzel, 1994b), 
and also in the higher-order knowledge structures which are relevant to conspiracy 
belief - feelings of control, New Age orientation, or a lack of traditional religiosity, for 
instance (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Newheiser et ai., 2011). While some people 
generally hold a rather conventional, non-conspiracist worldview, others are deeply 
embedded in a belief system that holds conspiracy to be the driving force in history. The 
mono logical belief system theory of conspiracism, devised by Goertzel (1994b) and 
elaborated upon by Swami and colleagues (Swami et ai., 2010; Swami et ai., 2011) 
characterises conspiracist belief systems as organised according to connections and 
mutual support among the individual theories involved. 
However, some CTs emphatically do not support one another; indeed, many 
provide mutually contradictory explanations for the same event. These contradictions 
among related theories are the focus of Studies 1 through 4. For instance, the CTs 
surrounding the death of Princess Diana vary widely; some claim that she was killed by 
MI6, while others allege that she was killed by Mohamed AI-Fayed's business enemies, 
and still others propose that she faked her own death. Likewise, the CTs surrounding the 
9/11 attacks vary considerably - while the majority of individuals in the 9111 Truth 
Movement believe that the Twin Towers were destroyed by controlled demolition (Kay, 
2011), a vocal minority finds it more likely that they were destroyed by orbital energy 
weapons (Wood, 2009). How does a conspiracy-believing observer reconcile the 
presence of these competing, mutually contradictory accounts? 
In the original formulation of the conspiracist MBS (Goertzel, 1994b), it is 
implicit that the reason for intercorrelations among conspiracist beliefs is their mutual 
coherence. In a situation with contradictory CTs, there is no mutual coherence - there is 
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no reason to suspect that people who believe Diana was killed by MI6 would be any 
more likely to believe that she faked her own death. However, extended MBS theory 
would not necessarily make this prediction. In the extended framework, the mutual 
support among CIs derives from a set of higher-order beliefs that, by the nature of their 
coherence with many different CIs, emerge as a central component of the belief system 
over time (Read et al., 2003; Simon et al., 2004). For instance, the idea that authorities 
are naturally malevolent and deceptive, and that they therefore cannot be trusted, would 
cohere with almost every conspiracy theory. For someone deeply invested in 
conspiracism, it may well be the case that the activation of this and other higher-order 
beliefs is high enough that the activation received by each CI will dwarf the inhibition 
from contradictory CIs, causing a seemingly paradoxical situation in which 
contradictory CIs positively correlate in belief. We argue, in other words, that a natural 
consequence of the extended MBS theory is an instantiation of the principle 'the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend'. 
Some literature on stereotyping suggests that coherence with strongly held 
worldviews may well be sufficient to overwhelm contradictions at the local level. 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) found strong positive 
correlations in endorsement between contradictory negative stereotypes of Jews, such 
that highly prejudiced participants found them to be both too isolated from the rest of 
society and too eager to participate in it. Adorno et al. proposed that the paradoxical 
perception that Jews are 'both extremely seclusive and aloof and at the same time too 
intrusive and prying' (p. 75) has its roots in 'a relatively blind hostility which is 
reflected in the stereotypy, self-contradiction, and destructiveness' of anti-Jewish 
stereotyping (p. 76). In spite oftheir contradictory nature, both the seclusive and 
intrusive stereotypes drew enough credibility from their one common element - an 
extremely negative perception of Jewish people - to end up with a strong positive 
association. The same may well be true of contradictory CTs; conspiracy advocates' 
distrust of official narratives may be so strong that many alternative theories are 
simultaneously endorsed in spite of any contradictions between them. 
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This chapter will focus on the relationships among contradictory theories, both 
conspiracist and conventional. Extended MBS theory predicts that contradictory CTs 
will nevertheless be positively correlated with one another: nearly any theory which 
includes deceptive and malevolent officialdom as explanations for a world event and 
stands in opposition to the official story will garner some agreement, such that people 
who believe in a world governed by conspiracy are likely to endorse contradictory CTs 
about the same topic. In other words, we expect to see positive or neutral relationships 
between endorsement of contradictory CTs about the same event. For example, the 
more a participant believes that an allegedly dead person at the centre of a CT, such as 
Princess Diana or Osama Bin Laden, is still alive, the more they will also tend to 
believe that the same person was killed in some secretive manner that differs from the 
official story told to the public at large. 
Study 1 serves as a replication of the previously established finding that 
unrelated CTs tend to be correlated, while also demonstrating that CTs about the death 
of Princess Diana are positively correlated even when they contradict one another. 
Study 2 explores the reason underlying this correlation, showing that one higher-order 
belief, the belief that something is being covered up, can account for much ofthe 
relationship between two contradictory theories about the apparent death of Osama bin 
Laden. Study 3 examines the applicability of Thagard's (1989) model of explanatory 
coherence to conspiracist belief systems, using a simplified model of the beliefs and 
propositions surrounding the death of a fictional journalist to predict participants' 
responses to the existence of multiple, contradictory CTs about the true cause of the 
incident. Finally, Study 4 investigates the difference between contradictory CTs and 
contradictory conventional (non-conspiracist) explanations for the same event, and 
proposes that asymmetries in the correlations among these theories are attributable to 
differences in the architecture of conspiracist and non-conspiracist belief systems. 
Study 1 
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In Study 1, we examined the relationships between contradictory CTs regarding 
the same event by asking about several rival accounts of Princess Diana's death. The 
methods used here are similar to those employed by Douglas and Sutton (2008) in a 
previous study ofCTs surrounding Princess Diana's death. Though we could have 
simply analysed the original data set, the 2008 study involved an experimental 
manipUlation in which half of the participants read about several potential CTs before 
responding. Participants who read about the theories in advance displayed a generally 
higher level of conspiracy belief. In order to prevent any spurious inflation of 
correlations based on this group difference (and to obtain a larger sample size than 
would be obtained by analysing each group separately), we elected to analyse a new 
data set instead. Here, we predicted that in addition to the usual correlations among 
unrelated CTs (e.g. Goertzel, 1994b), there would also be significant positive 




Study 1 was a reanalysis of existing data originally collected by the primary 
supervisor (Karen Douglas). One hundred and thirty seven undergraduate psychology 
students (83% female, mean age 20.4) were recruited from a second-year research 
methods class at the University of Kent. Participation was voluntary and no 
compensation was given. 
Materials and procedure 
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For the purposes of the present study, we used the CT belief scale previously 
used by Douglas and Sutton (2008). The questionnaire was 17 items long, used a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = 'strongly disagree' 7 = 'strongly agree') and asked about a 
variety of different CTs, including 9/11 as an inside job, global warming as a hoax, and 
the idea of a fake moon landing. Crucially, there were five items regarding the death of 
Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; a = .83): 
1. One or more rogue 'cells' in the British secret service constructed and carried 
out a plot to kill Diana. 
2. There was an official campaign by MI6 to assassinate Diana, sanctioned by 
elements of the establishment. 
3. Diana faked her own death so that she and Dodi could retreat into isolation. 
4. Business enemies of Dodi and his father Mohamed Al Fayed assassinated Dodi, 
with the death of Diana a cover-up for the operation. 
5. Diana had to be killed because the British government could not accept that the 
mother of the future king was involved with a Muslim Arab. 
Not all of these items are mutually contradictory. Diana might conceivably have learned 
of a plot to kill her and faked her own death in response, so #3 and #2 do not necessarily 
contradict one another. #1 and #2 differ quite subtly in the degree to which the operation 
to kill Diana was sanctioned by the government, and not all participants would 
necessarily pick up on that difference. Likewise, #5 indicates the existence of a plot to 
kill Diana but does not specify whether it was successful, so it does not explicitly 
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contradict any of the other theories. However, there are some unambiguous 
contradictions. #1, #3, and #4 all propose different accounts of Diana's apparent death: 
either she was killed by a rogue cell of the British secret service (#1) or by business 
rivals of the Fayeds (#4), or she faked her own death and is still alive somewhere (#3). 
Ihese three theories are mutually incompatible, and will be the focus of analysis in 
Study 1. A sample questionnaire is included in Appendix B. 
Results and discussion 
We first performed an exploratory principal components analysis to investigate 
the factor structure of the scale. Based on a scree plot, we extracted two unrotated 
factors that together accounted for 46.9% of scale variance. All items had loadings of at 
least .35 on the first factor in the unrotated solution, suggesting that it represents generic 
conspiracy belief; the second factor drew loadings only from the 5 items concerning 
climate change CIs, and thus appears to be related to beliefs in these conspiracies in 
particular. 
In line with this factor structure, and with previous findings of high correlations 
among beliefs in different CIs, the scale showed reasonable reliability (a = .78). Most 
of the items were significantly correlated with one another despite covering different 
topics; for instance, a belief that a rogue cell ofMI6 was responsible for Diana's death 
was correlated with belief in theories that IllY was created in a laboratory (r = .39), that 
the moon landing was a hoax (r = .34), and that governments are covering up the 
existence of aliens (r = .23; allps < .01). 
As can be seen in Table 1, the correlations in endorsement with the idea that 
Diana faked her own death appear much lower than the rest, to the point that the only 
non-significant correlation involves that theory. We believe this to be due to a floor 
effect rather than any sort of response to contradiction; endorsement of the faked-own-
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death theory was extremely low in this sample, with a mean of only 1.52 on a 1-7 scale. 
This level of endorsement was significantly lower than that of the other theories, for 
which agreement ranged from a mean of2.51 (business rivals) to 2.98 (rogue cell) (all 
ps < .001). In line with this general pattern, there was a network of significant positive 
relationships among the majority of the Princess Diana CTs (see Table 1). People who 
believed that Diana faked her own death were marginally more likely to also believe 
that she was killed by a rogue cell of British Intelligence (r = .15, p = .08) and 
significantly more likely to also believe that she was killed by business enemies of the 
Fayeds (r = .25, p < .01). Similarly, participants who found it likely that the Fayeds' 
business rivals were responsible for the death of Diana were highly likely to also blame 
a rogue cell (r = .61,p < .001). To eliminate the possibility that these correlations are 
artefacts of a large subgroup which rejects all CTs, we performed a subsequent analysis 
which excluded all 17 participants who professed total disbelief in any Diana CT (i.e. 
their response to all Diana questions was 1, Strongly Disagree. While the correlations 
were attenuated somewhat, as might be expected, most remained significant (see Table 
1). 
In line with our hypothesis, the results show mostly clear positive correlations in 
endorsement of contradictory CTs. Intuitively, this does not make sense. One would 
think that there ought to be a negative correlation between beliefs in contradictory 
accounts of events-the more one believes in a particular theory, the less likely rival 
theories will seem. One possible alternative explanation for these results is acquiescence 
bias: Participants may have simply replied in the same way to every question, reSUlting 
in positive correlations across the scale, regardless of the questions' content. However, 
the scale included a reverse-coded Diana conspiracy item that read, 'The death of 
Princess Diana was an accident'. Contrary to the acquiescence hypothesis, this item was 
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consistently negatively correlated with the rest ofthe scale, most notably r = -.75 with 
the rogue-cell item and r = -.65 with the MI6 item (both ps < .001). 
Table J. Matrix of correlations in endorsement of different Princess Diana conspiracy 
theories. Figures without parentheses represent correlations across the entire sample; 
figures in parentheses exclude those participants who expressed complete disbelief in 
any Diana conspiracy theory. 
Official MI6 Killed by AI- Diana had to die Diana faked 
campaign to kill Fayeds' business to stop her from her own death 
Diana enemIes marrying an Arab 
Killed by rogue .749 *** 
cell (.686 ***) 
Official MI6 





























Note. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05, t p < .10. Correlations between mutually 
contradictory items are bolded. All correlation coefficients are Pearson r. 
This result suggests that those who distrust the official story of Diana's death do 
not tend to settle on a single conspiracist account as the only acceptable explanation; 
rather, they simultaneously endorse several contradictory accounts, in accordance with 
the predictions of extended MBS theory and contrary to what would be expected from 
the original formulation. In Study 2, we set out to conceptually replicate these findings 
in another setting, and also to detennine whether higher-order beliefs can explain the 
simultaneous endorsement of contradictory CTs. 
Study 2 
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On May 2nd, 2011, it was reported in the news media that Osama bin Laden had 
been killed in an American raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. CTs 
surrounding this event immediately started to propagate throughout the internet and 
even traditional media, mostly alleging that bin Laden had not actually been killed in 
the raid. Proponents claimed that their suspicions were aroused by several actions of the 
Obama administration, including a refusal to release pictures of bin Laden's body and 
the decision to bury him at sea shortly after the raid. 
The CTs surrounding the death of Osama bin Laden can be divided into two 
major categories: those which propose he was already dead at the time of the raid, and 
those which propose he is still alive (Kingsley & Jones, 2011). The fonner seems to 
have currency among the 9/11 conspiracist Truth Movement; many 'Truthers' allege 
that bin Laden died in 2000 or even earlier, and that his video appearances since then 
were in fact staged productions made with a body double. The latter theory varies; some 
people believe that he is still at large, while others think that he was captured alive and 
is being secretly held for interrogation by the CIA. Naturally, these two theories are 
irreconcilable; bin Laden cannot be both alive and dead at the same time. However, as 
in Study 1, we predicted that belief in the two CTs would be positively correlated. 
Further, in order to test the idea that a higher-order belief in perceived deception 
by authorities might underlie the positive correlation between contradictory CTs, we 
asked participants to what degree they found the American government's actions 
surrounding the raid to be indicative of a cover-up. This was intended to operationalise 
one higher-order belief that may contribute to the coherence of the conspiracist MBS: 
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the idea that authorities are engaged in motivated deception. If higher-order beliefs such 
as the suspicion of a cover-up are indeed responsible for the positive association 
between contradictory CTs, controlling for one such belief should cause the correlation 
between the contradictory theories to disappear (or at least reduce substantially). 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and two undergraduate students (58% female, mean age 21) at the 
University of Kent were recruited to participate in the study between one and six weeks 
after the announcement of bin Laden's death. In exchange for their participation they 
received a randomised prize of either a snack or a small monetary reward (£ 1 -£2). 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were directed to read a brief summary of the official story of bin 
Laden's death, including the details regarding the refusal to release pictorial evidence 
and the burial at sea, followed by a short paragraph explaining that some people doubt 
the official story. They were then asked about their opinion the official story, followed 
by three conspiracy items: 
1. Osama bin Laden was killed in the American raid. 
2. Osama bin Laden is still alive. 
3. When the raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already dead. 
4. The actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some 
important or damaging piece of information about the raid. 
After each of these statements participants were asked to rate their agreement, as well as 
to what degree they found the statements plausible, convincing, worth considering, 
interesting, and coherent (see also Douglas & Sutton, 2011). Ratings took the form of 
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Likert scales ranging from 1 ('not at all') to 7 ('extremely'). A sample questionnaire 
(including measures that were not used in the final analysis) can be seen in Appendix C. 
Results and discussion 
The idea that bin Laden was killed in the raid enjoyed a high level of agreement 
(M= 4.97, SD = 1.47), compared to much lower ratings for the idea that bin Laden is 
still alive (M= 2.54, SD = 1.45) or was already dead (M= 2.74, SD = 1.47). However, 
many participants found the Obama administration's actions to be suspicious (M= 4.70, 
SD = 1.74). 
Following Douglas and Sutton (2011), in order to obtain a unitary measure of 
endorsement for each ofthe two conspiracy items and the cover-up item, we took the 
mean of agreement, plausibility, convincingness, coherence, and worthiness of 
consideration. There is no contradiction in finding two rival theories equally interesting, 
so we excluded interestingness from this composite measure in order to obtain a purer 
measure of endorsement and avoid artificially inflating the relevant correlations. Using 
this metric, we found a significant positive correlation between ratings of the two 
contradictory theories, r = .21, p = .04 (although it should be noted that the two theories 
were neither positively nor negatively correlated in terms of agreement alone, r = .07, p 
= .53). 
We next examined the contribution of belief in a cover-up to the positive 
relationship between the two contradictory theories using a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis. Composite endorsement scores on the cover-up item significantly 
predicted endorsement of the 'bin Laden is still alive' theory, fJ = .373, 1(97) = 4.04, p 
< .001. Adding endorsement of the contradictory theory 'bin Laden was already dead' 
to the regression equation, however, explained no additional variance (!'J.R2 = .006), and 
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the rival CT was not a significant predictor, fJ = .086, /(96)= 0.86, p = 040. 
This indicates that the correlation in endorsement of the two contradictory 
theories is explainable entirely by their connection with belief in a deceptive cover-up 
by authority. The degree to which someone believes in a cover-up helps determine their 
endorsement of the official story, and of both CTs as well. This result is in line with our 
predictions and supports the idea that CTs are defined not by adherence to a particular 
alternative account, but by opposition to the official story and a belief that deception is 
taking place. 
In order to further examine the obtained correlation between endorsement of the 
"already dead" and "still alive" theories, we performed an additional analysis that 
excluded all participants who gave a composite endorsement score of 1 for both CTs. 
This amounted to excluding only one participant, but still reduced the magnitude of the 
correlation from .21 to .19. Moreover, the revised correlation was only marginally 
significant (p = .065). Given the tenuous nature of the obtained correlation, the 
foregoing analyses should be treated with some caution. 
In order to confirm the applicability of extended MBS theory to this situation, 
we modelled the scenario usingjavaECHO (Thagard, 1994), a Java-based instantiation 
of Thagard's (1989) ECHO model. The two CTs were represented as two separate 
propositions, Cl and C2: 
Ct. Osama bin Laden was already dead at the time of the American raid. 
C2. Osama bin Laden is still alive. 
These two contradict one another, as well as the official explanation 0 I: 
01. Osama bin Laden was killed in the raid. 
There was one evidence node E 1 which essentially summarises the evidence of the 
event in question: 
EI. The American government claims to have killed bin Laden in a raid, but 
acted somewhat strangely. 
The final node UI represented the existence of a cover-up: 
VI. The American government is hiding something. 
Cl, C2, and 01 all explain El and contradict each other, Cl and C2 both cohere with 
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Entering this system of nodes and relationships into javaECHO leads to an equilibrium 
solution in which Cl, C2, and Ul all have positive activation while 01 has negative 
activation (see Appendix A). The results of the simulation therefore show that the 
perception of a cover-up and both contradictory CTs are accepted, while the 
conventional explanation is discarded. 
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Together, the findings of Studies 1 and 2 bring initial support to the extended 
MBS theory of conspiracist belief. While it has been known for some time that belief in 
one CT is associated with belief in others, only now do we know that this can even 
apply to CTs that are mutually contradictory. We propose that this counterintuitive 
result is explainable via extended MBS theory. CTs do not support one another directly; 
rather, they help to shape beliefs about the world and other social actors, bringing one's 
higher-order beliefs more in line with the view that conspiracy is a major force in 
history. The correlations among beliefs in different conspiracies may therefore be a 
consequence of higher-order beliefs about the world: in particular, we have 
demonstrated here that perceived deception by authority appears to render CTs in 
general plausible, and may indeed more important to a conspiracist belief system than 
any individual CT. In connectionist terms, the global activation a CT receives from this 
central belief is sufficient to overwhelm the local inhibition it receives from competing 
CTs. Thus, almost any account of events which opposes the official version, and which 
includes motivated deception by officialdom, is likely to garner some endorsement by 
adherents of a conspiracist worldview. This explanation parallels Adorno et al. 's (1954) 
account of contradictory anti-Semitic stereotypes in that local contradictions are 
dwarfed by coherence with a broad worldview. The specifics of a CT do not matter as 
much as the fact that it is a CT at all. 
In any case, the data we have gathered in Studies 1 and 2 is broadly consistent 
with the extended MBS theory of conspiracism. In this formulation, the belief system is 
centered around higher-order beliefs such as the idea that authorities and officials 
engage in organised deception of the public to achieve their malevolent goals. 
Connectivity with broad, central beliefs such as this one can lend support to many 
individual CTs, even to the point that mutually contradictory theories are positively 
correlated in belief. Believing that Osama bin Laden is still alive is apparently no 
obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years. 
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The regression analysis in Study 2 was basically a simplified instantiation of the 
conspiracist MBS - a microcosm showing two conflicting CTs and a single shared 
higher-order belief that explained the variance that the two had in common. Ilowever, 
real CTs such as those surrounding the death of Osama bin Laden can be highly 
complex and involve many elements that are not captured in such a simplified model 
(Barkun, 2006), such as competing non-conspiracist explanations and different 
perceptions of evidence relating to the incident. To more closely model conspiracy 
beliefs in a way that can be analysed by the explanatory coherence framework (Thagard, 
1989), we conducted a study examining conspiracy beliefs in the context of a fictional 
scenario containing two different CTs, an official non-conspiratorial explanation, a 
higher-order belief that united the two CTs, and a body of evidence that varied 
systematically between conditions. With the absence of any further lower-order 
information that could affect participants' judgements, it was possible to manipulate the 
support for different elements of the network and examine how activation propagated 
throughout. 
Study 3 
To this end, Study 3 was designed around a predetermined network architecture. 
The general outline of the scenario was as follows: a journalist was found dead, and 
there were three competing explanations for his death. Either he committed suicide. he 
was killed by a governmental conspiracy, or he was killed by a corporate conspiracy. In 
addition to this basic structure there were several different conditions: a control 
condition in which no additional information was given, an anti-conspiracy condition in 
which the official explanation was supported by evidence, two distinct pro-conspiracy 
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conditions in which one CT or the other was supported by evidence, and a cover-up 
condition in which there was evidence that the truth of the matter was being suppressed 
by authorities. All of these scenarios were then translated into ECIIO networks as in 
Study 2 and run through the javaECHO programme (Thagard, 1994) to predict what 
responses they might elicit from participants (see Appendix A for the full model code 
and simulation results for each condition). 
Figure 3 shows a visual representation of the ECHO network representing one of 
the two pro-conspiracy conditions. The two CTs are linked through mutual coherence 
with the proposition that a cover-up is taking place. The network initially contains one 
evidence node, representing the body of evidence seen by all participants. Each non-
control condition adds an additional evidence node to the network, which coheres with 
one proposition and has no direct relationship to the rest of the network. In this case, the 
government conspiracy condition includes an incriminating memo suggesting that the 
city's mayor may have ordered the journalist killed. This coheres with the proposition 
that the government was responsible for his death and has no direct relationship with the 
other propositions. 
Based on the results of Studies 1 and 2 and on the extended MBS theory of 
conspiracism, we predicted that in all conditions, beliefs in contradictory CTs would be 
positively correlated. We also predicted that the equilibrium activations from each 
condition's ECHO model would correctly predict the rank ordering of participants' 
agreement with each explanation of the journalist's death. 
Figure 3. Explanatory coherence network representing the government conspiracy 
condition in Study 3. Solid lines represent coherence relationships, dotted lines 
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Two hundred and thirty-one undergraduate participants (63% female) took part 
in Study 3 in exchange for course credit. Of these, twenty-nine were eliminated due to 
taking less than two minutes to complete the questionnaire, which was thought to be 
indicative of random responding. The stimulus materials and questionnaires were 
reasonably long and we deemed it unlikely that the students who responded in such a 
short time had engaged with the material in an effective way, although the exact cut-off 
point was determined post-hoc on the basis that the response times contained a group of 
unusually quick participants clustered around 60-90 seconds and tapering off by 120 
(see Figure 4). This left 202 participants with analysable data. 
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Figure 4. Truncated histogram of questionnaire completion times in Study 3 (excludes 
highest response times for the sake of readability). Labels on the horizontal axis 
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Design 
Participants were divided into five groups. One was a control group and 
received no additional information beyond the basic scenario. Another received 
information supporting the verdict of suicide. A third group was given information that 
indicated the existence of a cover-up without specifically implicating either possible 
culprit. Finally, two more groups each received additional information supporting one 
of the possible CTs. Participants were then asked about their agreement with the suicide 
verdict, with each CT, and with the existence ofthe cover-up, giving Study 3 a 5 
(condition; between-subjects) x 4 (explanation; within-subjects) mixed factorial design. 
Materials and procedure 
Each participant was first provided with a fictional written scenario describing 
the death of an investigative journalist. The journalist was said to have been found dead 
by apparent suicide. While the police maintained their verdict of suicide, a friend of the 
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journalist thought his death was a murder, and proposed that the police were conspiring 
with the murderer to make it look like a suicide. Two possible culprits were identified 
as having a motive to kill the journalist: an unscrupulous pharmaceutical corporation 
and a corrupt politician. After reading through the text, participants completed a brief 
Likert scale questionnaire (the same composite endorsement scales as in Study 2) 
asking about their agreement with various interpretations of the scenario: that the 
journalist committed suicide, that he was killed by a corporate conspiracy, that he was 
killed by a government conspiracy, and that some nonspecific cover-up existed. A 
sample questionnaire can be found in Appendix D. 
Results 
ECHO predictions 
The ECHO models for all conditions converged to equilibrium as expected. The 
results were generally in line with what might be expected given the results of Studies 1 
and 2 (see Appendix A). For the control condition, the cover-up ranked highest, 
followed by the two CTs in a tie, and the suicide explanation in last place. The cover-up 
condition gave a very similar result. Both pro-conspiracy conditions showed the cover-
up with the highest activation, followed by the supported CT, then the unsupported one, 
with the suicide theory coming in last with the lowest activation. Finally, and 
interestingly, the model predicted that in the anti-conspiracy condition the suicide 
theory would still be rejected, with the cover-up the highest and the two CTs with equal 
activation in between suicide and cover-up. 
Based on the modelling results, we extracted three patterns of interest to 
examine in the empirical data in addition to the contradictory correlations: the continued 
rejection of the suicide explanation in the anti-conspiracy condition, the pattern in the 
pro-conspiracy conditions of the unsupported CIs still garnering more agreement than 
the conventional explanation, and the cover-up being the most highly activated 
hypothesis in every condition. 
Empirical results 
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All reported results below use agreement rather than the composite measure used 
in Study 2 - agreement is more immediately interpretable, and all correlational analyses 
which resulted in statistically significant relationships in agreement gave the same 
results when the composite endorsement measure was substituted. 
As predicted, condition-by-condition analysis showed that the two contradictory 
CTs were positively correlated in agreement in the anti-conspiracy condition, r = .38, p 
= .02; in the control condition, r = .49, p < .01; in the government conspiracy condition, 
r = .38,p = .01; and in the cover-up condition, r = .61,p < .001. In the condition where 
the evidence supported a corporate conspiracy, however, the correlation did not reach 
significance, r = .24, p = .13. 
We performed hierarchical regression analyses for each condition following the 
pattern established in Study 2, predicting agreement with the government CT using the 
cover-up in the initial step and the corporate CT in the second step. This allowed an 
estimation of the degree to which the relationships between the contradictory CTs were 
attributable to their shared variance with the broader belief that something about the 
situation was being covered up. In all cases, the cover-up was a significant initial 
predictor of agreement with the government CT (all ps < .05). In the anti-conspiracy 
condition, adding the corporate CT to the regression equation did not improve the 
model fit, /1R
2 < .01, F(I,38) = .16,p = .69. The same was true in the government CT 
condition, /1R
2 = .03, F(I,41) = 1.83,p = .18, and in the corporate CT condition, /1R2 
< .01, F(1,38) = .10,p = .75. However, adding the rival CT to the regression equation 
did increase the proportion of variance explained in the control condition, /::.R2 = .17, 
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F(l,37) = 8.90, p < .01 , and in the cover-up condition, M 2 = .12, F( I,33) = 6.68 , p 
= .01. 
Participants ' mean agreement with each potential explanation in each condition 
is shown in Figure 5. A 5 (condition; between-subjects) x 4 (explanation; within-
subj ects) mixed ANOVA revealed no main effect of condition, F( 4,197) = 1.8 1, MSE 
= .892, p = .13, '12 = .04, but a significant main effect of explanation, F(2.37 , 460.58) = 
59.44, MSE = .840, p < .001 , '12 = .24, and a significant interaction, F(9.46, 465 .87) = 
4.23, MSE = .840, p < .001 , 1'/2 = .08 (Huynh-Feldt df correction used due to violation of 
the sphericity assumption; Mauchly's W = .65, 1 = 85.33,p < .001). This interaction 
was qualified by several simple main effects. 
Figure 5. Mean agreement with each potential explanation across conditions in Study 3. 
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In the anti-conspiracy condition, there was no simple effect of explanation, 
indicating that all possibilities were agreed with about as much as one another , 
F(2 .09,83 .77) = .303 , MSE = 83 .77 p = .77, partial '12 = .01 , though the control 
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condition did show a simple effect of explanation, F(2.60, 1 0 1.50) = 8.82, MSE = .81, p 
< .001, partial Yf2 = .21. Here, post-hoc tests using the Least Significant Difference 
(LSD) error correction revealed that a cover-up showed higher agreement (M= 3.63) 
than the possibility of suicide (M= 2.60), the government CT (M= 3.13), and the 
corporate CT (M= 3.33) (allps < .05). Participants agreed with the possibility of 
suicide less than either the government CT (p = .01) or the corporate CT (p < .01), and 
the two CTs showed no significant difference (p = .16). 
When the evidence suggested that the mayor was the most likely culprit, there 
was a simple effect of explanation, F(2.36,101.56) = 33.18, MSE = .73,p < .001, partial 
Yf2 = .44. Post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the idea that the mayor was behind a 
conspiracy to kill the journalist garnered more agreement (M = 3.57) than suicide (M = 
2.36) and the corporate CTs (M= 3.23), but less than the idea that there was a cover-up 
behind events (M = 3.89) (all ps < .05). Consistent with our prediction, the corporate CT 
was still seen as more plausible than suicide, p < .001. 
In the condition where evidence pointed to the pharmaceutical corporation, there 
was also a significant simple effect of explanation, F(2.40,95.88) = 13.61, MSE = .84,p 
< .001, partial Yf2 = .25. Participants agreed with the corporate conspiracy (M= 3.34) 
more than the verdict of suicide (M = 2.54), p < .01, but less than with the presence of a 
cover-up (M= 3.66),p = .04. There was not a significant difference in agreement 
between the corporate conspiracy and the mayoral conspiracy (M = 3.22), p = .39. As in 
the mayoral condition, the incongruent government CT was still preferred over the 
suicide verdict, p < .01. 
When the manipulated evidence suggested a cover-up, there was once again a 
simple effect of explanation, F(2.40,83.88) = 27.80, MSE = .73, p < .001, partial Yf2 
= .44. Participants agreed that there was a cover-up (M == 3.83) more than they agreed 
that the mayor had conspired to kill the journalist (M = 3.19), p < .00 I, or that the 
journalist committed suicide (M= 2.28),p < .001, but their agreement with the 
corporate CT was only marginally lower (M = 3.53), p = .06. 
Further post-hoc LSD comparisons revealed that CTs in conditions where a 
contradictory CT was supported (i.e. the corporate conspiracy in the government 
conspiracy condition and the government conspiracy in the corporate conspiracy 
condition) did not seem to benefit or suffer from the manipulation. Participants agreed 
with the corporate conspiracy no more or less in the government conspiracy condition 
(M = 3.23) than they did in the control condition (M = 3.33), p = .60. Likewise, in the 
corporate conspiracy condition, agreement with the government conspiracy was no 
different from in the control condition (M= 3.22 versus M= 3.13),p = .60. 
Discussion 
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The correlations between contradictory CTs in Study 3 largely adhered to the 
pattern set by Study 2, conflIII1ing the predictions of extended MBS theory. In all 
conditions but one, the more someone agreed with the proposition that the journalist 
was killed by a vindictive local politician, the more they also agreed that he had been 
killed by an unscrupulous pharmaceutical corporation. The strongest correlation 
between the two rival CTs was in the cover-up condition, which makes sense given our 
rationale for the correlation in Study 2: increasing the activation of the cover-up node in 
the belief network makes each CT seem more plausible. The more participants 
subscribed to the uniting higher-order belief in the inadequacy of the official story and 
the presence of something beyond public view, the more tolerant of contradictions 
between individual CTs they became. Also consistent with the results of Study 2, belief 
in a cover-up was a significant predictor of conspiracy beliefs, in some conditions so 
much so that it entirely explained the correlations between contradictory CIs that had 
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been found to exist. 
In accordance with the predictions of connectionist ECHO models based on 
extended MBS network architecture, in the two pro-conspiracy conditions, the 
unsupported CTs (Le. the government CT in the corporate CT condition and the 
corporate CT in the government CT condition) were still preferred over the non-
conspiracist explanation of suicide. In fact, these incongruent CTs showed no decline in 
agreement from the control condition in spite of evidence suggesting that an entirely 
different conspiracy was responsible for the incident in question. The ECIIO models 
also correctly anticipated that in each condition (except for the anti-conspiracy 
condition, which we examine in further detail below), the existence of a cover-up would 
be agreed with more highly than any other explanation. 
There are two main areas in which our empirical results did not match up with 
the predictions of extended MBS theory and with the output of the ECHO models 
designed to represent the scenarios presented in Study 3. Firstly, participants had a 
slight general preference for the corporate CT over the governmental CT. This might be 
due to beliefs about the relative competence of the proposed conspirators (cf. McCauley 
& Jacques, 1979) or some difference in how convincing the arguments in favour of each 
seemed. However, this preference does not seem to have interacted in any complex way 
with the other effects in the study. Secondly, the anti-conspiracy condition showed no 
differences in agreement between any of the different possibilities. This is in contrast to 
ECHO's prediction that the cover-up would be the preferred explanation, followed by 
the two CTs and suicide. Importantly, however, this was the only condition in which the 
suicide theory was on roughly equal footing with the other possibilities - in the other 
conditions, including the control condition, the participants agreed significantly more 
with the CTs. This matches up well with the differing activation levels of the suicide 
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node across different simulations: when the anti-conspiracy model reached equilibrium 
the suicide node had an activation of -.56, higher than in any of the other models. 
Alternatively, this result may be due to a complex interaction between the beliefs 
represented in the network and other higher-order beliefs that are outside its scope. For 
instance, CTs are well known for their ability to adapt to any conflicting information 
and assimilate it as part of the conspiracy (Keeley, 1999). The way in which this 
tendency could interact with such belief networks is not yet clear. 
These issues aside, the main findings of Study 3 support the predictions of 
extended MBS theory. We have replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 regarding 
correlations betwecn contradictory theories, and regression analyses provided further 
support for the role of higher-order knowledge structures in uniting CTs with one 
another. Moreover, we constructed explanatory coherence network models according to 
the tenets of extended MBS theory, and the resulting activations in the javaECHO 
output matched the data well. What deviations that existed appear to have been an effect 
of initial biases one way or another; in general, the qualitative predictions of the model 
were fulfilled. Not only does extended MBS theory explain pre-existing belief patterns, 
it is also able to accurately predict the effects of targeted manipulations of belief. 
While the predictions of extended MBS theory appear to hold in Study 3, it is 
not clear to what extent these patterns are really unique to conspiracist belief. It could be 
the case that any two beliefs that contradict one another directly but nevertheless agree 
on some broad points of interpretation will be positively correlated in endorsement. 
Study 4 was designed to investigate this possibility while preserving the basic 
architecture of the scenarios used in Study 3. 
Study 4 
Studies 2 and 3 both pitted a pair of contradictory CTs against a single non-
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conspiracist explanation. In some sense this parallels reality - CTs are generally devised 
in opposition to a mainstream or received narrative. While there are many different CTs 
regarding how John F. Kennedy was killed, with theorists blaming everyone from the 
Cubans to the CIA to the Pope (Hofstadter, 1964), there is only really one non-CT: the 
conclusion reached by the Warren Commission, that Oswald acted alone (Barkun, 
2006). However, whether the tolerance for contradictory explanations is something 
inherent to CTs themselves or a result of the unitary nature of the official accounts to 
which they find themselves in opposition is an important distinction. To investigate this 
issue, Study 4 was designed with a symmetrical network in mind: rather than multiple 
CTs and a single official explanation, we constructed a scenario with two competing 
CTs and two competing non-conspiracist explanations, with separate conditions 
containing different pieces of evidence that supported each explanation in tum, along 
with a nonspecific cover-up and a separate control condition. In accordance with the 
results of Study 3, we predicted that beliefs in contradictory CTs would be positively 
correlated in the control and cover-up conditions, while beliefs in conventional theories 
would not. We also expected that in pro-conspiracy conditions, participants would 
prefer incongruent CTs over conventional explanations, and that an ECHO model of the 
scenarios would generally be a reliable predictor of participants' responses. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 221 undergraduate participants for Study 4. Of these, 22 were 
eliminated from analysis for taking less than two minutes to complete the questionnaire, 
leaving 199 useable data points. 
Design 
Like Study 3, Study 4 followed a mixed factorial experimental design. 
58 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six groups, each of which received a 
different version of a purportedly real news article and then completed a questionnaire 
regarding the likely cause of the events therein. Four of the groups received evidence 
implicating one of four different causes for an apparent terrorist attack. Of these four, 
two contained evidence supporting contradictory CTs and two contained evidence 
supporting contradictory conventional explanations. The fifth group was presented with 
evidence suggesting a nonspecific cover-up, and the sixth was a control group with no 
additional evidence. The questions at the end asked about the four groups that might 
have carried out the attack, making this a 6 (evidence group; between-participants) x 4 
(possible cause; within-participants) mixed design. 
Materials and procedure 
The mock news articles used in Study 4 described a release of poisonous gas at 
an administrative government building in the United States. Authorities blamed the 
attack on one of two groups: either a nativist right-wing paramilitary group calling itself 
Free Knights of the Cross or an Islamic radical organisation called AI-Sharuq. 
Conspiracy theorists alleged that the incident was either a false-flag attack meant to 
justify increased security or an accident at a secret chemical weapons facility located 
within the building. The six different conditions presented different pieces of evidence: 
the two conditions supporting the different terrorist attacks each proposed that a bomb 
had been found with a note from the relevant group, the chemical weapons condition 
included an interview with a resident who claimed to have seen large amounts of 
chemical equipment being moved out of the building, the false-flag condition featured 
testimony by workers that government agents had recently installed mysterious devices 
in the building's ventilation system through which the gas was subsequently released, 
and the control condition described the forcible confiscation and destruction of nearby 
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businesses' CCTV tapes by mysterious government agents. 
The questionnaire at the end comprised four statements regarding who was 
responsible for the incident. Each was followed by the same response items as in 
Studies 2 and 3: agreement, plausibility, convincingness, interestingness, worthiness of 
consideration, and coherence. The article and questionnaire were presented online using 
the Qualtrics survey website, and the time each participant took to complete the study 
was measured and logged. A sample questionnaire is included in Appendix E. 
ECHO models 
As in Study 3, the materials in Study 4 were designed to fit a predetermined 
family of ECHO models. The control condition model (see Figure 6), which is a proper 
subset of the other models used, involves the four hypotheses, represented by the nodes 
AS (AI-Sharuq), FK (Free Knights of the Cross), WL (chemical weapons lab accident), 
and U (inside job). All four cohere with the available evidence, represented by the data 
node PG (poison gas), and in cohere with one another. WL and 11 both cohere with the 
higher-order node CU ( cover-up). Each condition adds a piece of evidence that coheres 
with one of AS, FK, WL, 11, or CU and has no direct relationship with the other nodes. 
Model simulations were run using the javaECHO app\et. 
Results 
Empirical data 
A 6 (evidence condition; between-participants) x 4 (proposed cause; within-
participants) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F( 14.30,551.77) = 1.75, 
MSE = 1.47,p = .04, partial 1'/2 = .04 (Huynh-Feldt df correction used due to violation of 
the sphericity assumption; Mauchly's W= .87,1 = 25.77,p < .001; see Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Explanatory coherence network representing the control condition in Study 4. 
Solid lines represent coherence relationships, dotted lines represent incoherence, circles 
represent propositions, and rectangles represent data. 
Figure 7. Mean agreement with each potential explanation across conditions in Study 4. 
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As a manipulation check we perfonned a series of Bonferroni-corrected planned 
comparisons, examining whether participants agreed with each proposed culprit more in 
the conditions that supported their involvement than in the control condition. This was 
not the case for Free Knights of the Cross (M = 2.97 versus M = 2.81), t(72) = .74,p 
= .46; for AI-Sharuq (M = 3.09 versus M= 3.02), t(73) = .37, p = .71; for the chemical 
weapons lab (M = 3.32 versus M= 3.0S), t(69) = 1.24,p = .22; or for the false-flag 
theory (M = 2.93 versus M = 2.S6), t( 68) = 1.62, p = .11. Repeating the manipulation 
checks with the composite endorsement measure used in Study 2 also showed no 
evidence of a successful manipulation (all ps > .OS). This casts doubt on any further 
results, as it appears that the manipulations did not have the desired effect. 
Correlational analyses revealed that not only were CTs significantly correlated 
in agreement with one another across the pro-conspiracy conditions, r = .31, p = .02, 
conventional theories were too, r = .42, p < .01. In the pro-conventional conditions, both 
contradictory conventional theories, r = -.04, p = .74, and contradictory CTs, r = -.02, P 
= .87, were uncorrelated. In the control condition, CTs showed a significant positive 
correlation in agreement, r = .36, p = .02, while conventional theories showed no 
significant correlation with one another, r = -.07, p = .64. The same was not true in the 
cover-up condition, however; there was a significant positive correlation not only 
between contradictory CTs, r = .S3,p < .001, but also between contradictory 
conventional theories, r = .36,p = .03. The correlations within the cover-up condition 
were not significantly different from one another, Fisher's z = .87, p = .38. 
Post-hoc LSD tests revealed that in the chemical weapon condition, participants 
did not agree with the inside-job theory (M = 2.71) any more or less than they agreed 
that AI-Sharuq (M= 2.68) or Free Knights of the Cross (M= 2.68) were responsible, 
both ps > .8S. In the inside job condition, however, the chemical weapon theory (M = 
62 
3.15) elicited significantly more agreement than both AI-Sharuq (M = 2.56) and Free 
Knights of the Cross (M= 2.52), bothps < .02. When AI-Sharuq was implicated in the 
gas attack, participants thought it no more likely that the Free Knights of the Cross were 
responsible (M = 2.66) than that the gas came from a secret chemical weapons facility 
(M = 2.93) or was the result of a deliberate inside job (M = 2.40), both ps > .20. When 
the evidence indicated that the Free Knights of the Cross were responsible, participants 
agreed that AI-Sharuq were really behind the bombing (M = 2.52) no more than they 
thought the building was a weapons lab (M= 2.81) or that the attack was perpetrated by 
the US government (M = 2.48), both ps > .20. 
Fit of the ECHO model 
The output of the ECHO model showed the same qualitative patterns as in Study 
3 (see Appendix A). However, the large number of hypotheses examined in Study 4 (4 
hypotheses per condition times 6 conditions for a total of24 individual data points) 
allowed more rigorous statistical testing. In order to test the degree of agreement 
between the predictions of the model and the empirical data, we collected the ECHO 
model's equilibrium activations for each explanation across conditions and rank-ordered 
them from the lowest activation to the highest. We then did the same with participants' 
mean agreement with each explanation in each condition. Consistent with the prediction 
that ECHO can effectively model the structure of the belief system, the ranked node 
activations showed a strong correlation with ranked agreement, Spearman's p = .55, p 
= .01. 
Discussion 
The interpretation of Study 4 is not straightforward. The manipulation checks 
did not show any of the expected differences between the control condition and the 
others, so it is not clear to what extent the different conditions actually reflect the 
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differences that we expected when designing the study. To some extent, this may be an 
issue of statistical power - Study 4 had six separate conditions and only 200 participants 
to split between them. To make matters worse, due to an unexpected interaction 
between counterbalancing and the randomisation system used by the Qualtrics 
questionnaire website, these participants were not evenly divided between conditions: 
while the control and cover-up conditions had about 40 people each, the remaining 
conditions only had about 30 each after random responders were eliminated. 
Regardless of the lack of statistically significant differences in agreement 
between the various hypotheses, the predictions generated by the ECHO model 
correlated very reliably with the empirical data. In this sense Study 4 has replicated the 
extended MBS theory's contention, and Study 3's finding, that beliefs in CTs are 
amenable to computational network modelling. 
More theoretically interesting - and immediately interpretable - results come 
from the correlational analyses. Consistent with our findings in Studies 2 and 3, in the 
control condition only contradictory CTs were significantly correlated with one another. 
In the cover-up and pro-conspiracy conditions, however, both CTs and conventional 
theories showed contradictory correlations, while in the anti-conspiracy conditions there 
were no contradictory correlations at all. This was an unexpected result, but due to the 
way in which the study was designed any asymmetry between conspiracist and non-
conspiracist explanations should in principle be traceable to beliefs in a cover-up (and 
related higher-order beliefs), since this is the linkage between CTs that the conventional 
theories do not possess. In this light, the correlation between CTs but not conventional 
explanations in the control condition makes some amount of intuitive sense: the CTs are 
correlated because they are linked by beliefs in a cover-up, as in Studies 1-3. In the 
cover-up condition, the cover-up node gains in activation due to its coherence with the 
events related in the stimulus materials, and this activation propagates through the 
network via coherence with the CTs and incoherence with the conventional 
explanations. 
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Both the CTs and conventional explanations are affected equally by the change 
in the cover-up node, resulting in a positive correlation. In the pro-CT conditions, 
activation propagates from the CT nodes to the cover-up node - since a CT implies a 
cover-up (due to the incongruence between the CT and the story told to the public), the 
cover-up node gains in activation, which then spreads equally to each conventional 
theory and results in a contradictory correlation. Finally, in the pro-conventional 
conditions, the provided evidence has no bearing on a cover-up - the evidence could 
just as well be part of the cover-up, so there is no direct incoherence between the 
conventional theories and the cover-up. Activation, therefore, has to propagate through 
several different levels of the network in order to reach the cover-up node and produce 
an effect: from the evidence to the relevant conventional node, from there (via 
incoherence) to the CT nodes, and from there to the cover-up node, where the remaining 
activation propagates through the network. By that time, however, the signal is greatly 
attenuated and is not strong enough to produce consistent correlations between the 
various contradictory theories. 
The apparent irrelevance of anti-conspiracy evidence to the overall perception of 
a cover-up is one that has been noted before by observers of the conspiracy world: the 
perception of a cover-up allows contradictory evidence to be dismissed as having been 
planted by the conspirators (Clarke, 2002; Keeley, 1999; Melley, 2002). This usage of 
cover-ups to explain away contradictory evidence is a hallmark of the conspiracist 
monological belief system as formulated by Goertzel (1994b). Of course, not everyone 
holds the cover-up belief strongly enough that they would make this assumption, but 
those who consider it to be at least plausible would probably notice that the additional 
evidence in the anti-conspiracy conditions could itselfbe part of a conspiracy. 
General discussion 
65 
In this chapter we have outlined four studies that provide initial support for the 
extended MBS theory of conspiracist belief. This theory proposes that belief in CTs are 
sustained by coherence with a broader belief system. Ilypothesised components of this 
belief system include (but are not limited to) a belief that authorities and officials are 
inherently deceptive and that the truth about events is often covered up: that there is 
more going on than meets the eye. For this reason, conspiracy beliefs are often vague 
and poorly specified, as the most important elements of conspiracy beliefs are their 
coherence with a broader conspiracist worldview rather than the creation of a consistent 
and fruitful narrative. 
Studies 1,2,3, and 4 all show that beliefs in contradictory CTs tend to be 
positively correlated. This is consistent with the predictions of the extended MBS 
framework: coherence with broader worldviews produces enough shared variance in 
belief to override inconsistencies in the specific details ofa CT, such as the perpetrator, 
the motives, and the methods. Indeed, in Study 2 we showed that a shared belief in a 
cover-up accounted completely for the relationship between the two contradictory CTs. 
In Study 3, this was true in some conditions but not in others - perhaps a natural 
consequence of the generally stronger correlations, or an artefact of the manipulations 
used. After all, belief in a cover-up is not the only higher-order belief which can bind 
together disparate CTs; instead, it is one of a class of such beliefs that might include 
factors as diverse as a generalised social mistrust (Goertzcl, 1994), an extemallocus of 
control (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), high openness to experience (Swami et al., 2012), 
and authoritarianism (YeHand & Stone, 1996). 
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In Study 3 we also used ECHO, a computational instantiation of Thagard's 
(1989) model of explanatory coherence, to model well-defined subsets of conspiracist 
belief systems. ECHO successfully predicted the empirically observed tendency for a 
CT incongruent with one given additional support to still be preferred over conventional 
explanations, an effect which is a straightforward predictions of the extended MBS 
framework. While ECHO accurately predicted the empirical results for most of the 
network model inputs it was given, the limited scope of the models may have restricted 
its accuracy to some degree. For instance, in Study 3 participants had a general 
preference for corporate CTs over governmental CTs, and the anti-conspiracy condition 
proved to be difficult to model at all. This is due to either some quirk of the stimulus 
materials or a more general preference that cannot be modelled. In the future, individual 
participants' thought processes about the plausibility of various CTs, conventional 
theories, and higher-order beliefs could be modelled more accurately using a procedure 
similar to that used by Schank and Ranney (1992), who had independent raters 
construct belief networks based on verbal descriptions of reasoning processes. 
Finally, Study 4 provided another replication of the contradictory CT correlation 
effect, and added to it some indications that contradictory conventional explanations can 
show positive correlations as well, though not as widely as CTs do. This may indicate 
that some of the same processes at work in the interaction between individual 
conspiracy beliefs and the higher reaches of the belief system are also at work in non-
conspiracist belief systems - in other words, that the tendency for individual 
contradictions between beliefs to be overtaken by mutual coherence or incoherence with 
higher-order beliefs might not be entirely specific to CTs. Everyone has broad 
worldviews and beliefs about how society works, and these can probably act in the same 
way that higher-order conspiracist beliefs do in order to override local contradictions 
67 
and allow consideration - and perhaps even provisional belief - in several contradictory 
hypotheses at once. Nevertheless, there was not an exact equivalency between the 
conspiracist and conventional theories in Study 4 - while contradictory conventional 
theories were correlated in some conditions, they were not as reliably correlated as the 
CTs were. Importantly, the CTs were significantly positively correlated in the control 
condition, where there was no manipulation of evidence, while the conventional 
theories were not. If this result is not a statistical fluke, it would seem to indicate an 
important difference between the two classes of explanations. 
Of course, there are limits on the degree to which contradiction is tolerated. The 
idea that authorities are engaged in motivated deception may cohere with the vast 
majority of CTs, but a theory could conflict with any number of other deeply held 
beliefs. Beyond a certain point, a certain amount of conflict with established knowledge, 
a contradictory CT becomes unacceptable. Within the 9/11 Truth Movement, for 
instance, there is somewhat of a schism between the majority, who believe that the 
Twin Towers were hit by passenger jets but ultimately destroyed by demolition charges, 
and a vocal minority, who believe that the aircraft did not exist and were either 
holographic projections, missiles disguised with cloaking technology, or simply 
computer-generated images created by the news media. In these 'no-plane' theories, the 
towers are often said to have been destroyed by space-based energy weapons rather than 
by explosives (Wood, 2009). Many of the controlled demolition theorists have 
expressed dismay and incredulity in relation to the no-plane theories, finding their 
invocation of exotic weaponry implausible. Some even accuse the proponents of the no-
plane theories of being in league with the conspirators in an attempt to divert attention 
from the evidence of controlled demolition or to tarnish the reputation of the Truth 
Movement (e.g. TruthMove.org, 2007). Even though the no-plane CT did not pass 
muster in the mainstream Truth Movement, the monological nature of conspiracism 
persists, and the rejected CT is woven into the conspiracist narrative as yet another 
component of the conspirators' plot to deceive the public. 
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Based on these results, extended MBS theory may be useful as a basis for 
designing future measures of conspiracist thinking. If the idea of a cluster of broad 
beliefs which facilitate a generally conspiracist view of the world is accurate, belief in 
those central theses should not only predict endorsement of CTs in general, but should 
also mediate the relationships between different, overtly unrelated CTs in addition to 
contradictory theories about the same event. The scope of the present research is rather 
narrow, and only examines domain-specific beliefs; it will at some point be necessary to 
examine the process by which perceived deception by authority in individual cases is 
generalised to form part of a broadly applicable belief system. This question could 
naturally be approached from a connectionist perspective, as shown by Read and Miller 
(2003). 
Finally, if a belief in malevolent, deceptive officialdom is indeed one of these 
defining central principles of the conspiracist belief system, new measures of conspiracy 
belief could be constructed using that belief as a basis. Historically, CT belief scales 
have taken the approach of asking about participants' agreement with a list of particular 
theories. Scales using this approach are tied to a particular geographic, historical, and 
cultural context, however; with the idea of an extended MBS in mind, it may be 
possible to create a more dispositional measure of conspiracist ideation, perhaps 
something approaching the conspiracist style of personality proposed by Kalichman, 
Eaton, and Cherry (201 O).If the style of conspiracism has indeed shifted toward the 
vague and nonspecific, as Clarke (2007) has suggested, questionnaires which are direct 
and specific might be misguided; in a manner of speaking, they are written in a sort of 
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antiquated conspiracist language that has not had much currency since the advent of the 
internet. Future measures of conspiracist ideation may benefit from measuring the 
degree to which people endorse tenets of conspiracism itself, rather than individual 
theories. Such a measure would eliminate the need not just for culture-specific measures 
of conspiracist belief (c.f. Swami, 2012), but for changing the contents of questionnaires 
over time to reflect which CTs are most culturally relevant. 
It must be noted that not all CTs fall under the 'malevolent, deceptive 
officialdom' umbrella. Anti-Semitic CIs are a notable and historically important 
exception; instead of alleging abuse of power by elites, historical theories of Jewish 
conspiracy usually detailed supposed attempts by a minority to seize power for 
themselves (Graumann, 1987). Ihe character of these theories has changed over the last 
century, however; in latter-day anti-Semitic CIs, the Jews are more commonly 
portrayed as puppet-masters of the international finance system. Arguably, theories that 
governments are suppressing knowledge of the existence of alien visitation do not 
necessarily presuppose malevolence on the part of the conspirators; rather, the cover-up 
is sometimes said to be in place to avoid a mass panic. In these cases, the 'malevolent, 
deceptive officialdom' belief is probably not as important, and other higher-order 
beliefs might become more important. Ihis distinction also parallels the conflicting 
lines of research regarding the role of authoritarianism in conspiracist belief, as 
examined in Chapter 1. 
Returning to the question of whether there is a qualitative difference between the 
belief systems that support CIs and those that underlie a more conventional worldview, 
there is some indication from Study 4 that CTs are uniquely able to tolerate 
contradictions. Part and parcel of the conspiracist belief system is an opposition to 
officialdom in general, as suggested by studies showing a correlation between 
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conspiracy beliefs and negative attitudes toward authority (McIIoskey, 1995; Swami et 
al., 2010), and any event will have a conventional explanation for conspiracists to 
oppose. As CTs are rooted in opposition to some official narrative, they are almost 
inherently reactive rather than proactive. With opposition to a particular narrative as a 
starting point for discussion, a number of conspiratorial possibilities begin to seem more 
plausible despite the contradictions between them. In the next chapter, we explore this 
issue further: to what degree is there a difference between conspiracist and conventional 
belief systems? Specifically, how does this difference make itself manifest in the online 
discourse of conspiracists versus anti-conspiracists? 
Chapter 3: Online Discourse 
Abstract 
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Much of the discourse surrounding contemporary conspiracy theories occurs in online 
forums. Debates between conspiracy advocates and conspiracy sceptics are particularly 
contentious. In Chapter 3, we use archival methods to examine the differences between 
conspiracist and anti-conspiracist rhetoric in the course of such online debates. As 
predicted, pro-conspiracist commenters were more likely to argue against the opposing 
interpretation and less likely to argue in favour of their own interpretation compared to 
anti-conspiracist commenters. In addition, pro-conspiracists were more likely to express 
mistrust and made more positive and fewer negative references to other conspiracy 
theories. The data also indicate that pro-conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply 
the 'conspiracy theory' label to their own beliefs, lending support to the long-held 
suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social stigma. Finally, anti-conspiracist 
arguments tended to have a more hostile tone. Consistent with extended MBS theory, 
these tendencies in persuasive communication can be understood as a reflection of an 
underlying conspiracist worldview. 
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Chapter 2 has provided initial support for the predictions of the extended MBS 
framework, a theory of conspiracism which proposes that beliefs in CTs are essentially 
held together by a series of broader, 'higher-order' beliefs, tendencies, and attitudes that 
are concordant with the idea that the world is a place governed by conspiracy. These 
higher-order beliefs might include factors like generalised mistrust or a broad disbelief 
in explanations provided by authority figures. In each of the first four studies, we found 
that contradictory CTs are positively correlated in endorsement and that this association 
is usually explainable (partially or in full) by the CTs' mutual associations with higher-
order beliefs. In addition, when the evidence regarding a CT is manipulated 
systematically, the resulting shifts in agreement with various possible explanations can 
be predicted with considerable accuracy by a computational network model using 
architecture based on extended MBS theory. 
Within the higher-order belief network thought to be the main component of 
conspiracist belief, one hypothesised component is a generalised disbelief in official 
explanations. If this is the case, then for those who hold conspiracist beliefs, the 
specifics of a CT are less important than the fact that it is a CT - or that it opposes 
whatever the received explanation is. The important element is that those in power are 
lying and cannot be trusted, and that they are covering up something sinister. That is, 
CT belief is generally more of a negative belief than a positive one - it is more 
concerned with saying what the cause of a condition or event was not (i.e. whatever the 
official explanation is) than with putting forward a specific alternative account. 
Opposition to officialdom, in this sense, parallels the generalised prejudice that Adorno 
et af. (1950) found to be strong enough to overcome contradictions between different 
anti-Jewish stereotypes. In this view, many CTs are not theories per se, at least not in 
the sense of being systematic attempts to engage with available evidence with the aim of 
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producing a coherent, unifying explanation of a particular event or condition. Rather, 
they are disorganised clusters of suspicions, claims, and spurious statements that mayor 
may not fit together particularly well. 
This tendency has been noted by Dean (2002), who described most CTs as 'bits 
and pieces without a plot... [which] fail to delineate any conspiracy at all. They simply 
counter conventional narratives with suspicions and allegations that, more often than 
not, resist coherent emplotment' (p. 92). It also finds some intuitive support in the form 
ofthe more accessible pro-conspiracy arguments. Perhaps the most famous argument in 
favour of a CT in the Western world is the 'magic bullet' scene in the film JFK, in 
which a character details the apparent absurdity of the idea that a single bullet could 
have produced the wounds that killed President Kennedy (110 & Stone, 1991). Rather 
than advancing a particular conspiracist view of the assassination, the argument is 
simply that the official story cannot be true - and with that, a wealth of conspiratorial 
possibilities opens up. Chapter 3 focuses primarily on the idea that specific alternative 
beliefs are not the defining component of the conspiracist worIdview. Rather, 
conspiracism is characterised primarily by a generalised opposition to officialdom. To 
investigate this possibility, we use archival methods to conduct a quantitative 
examination of the content and tone of public persuasive comments on news websites. 
Study 5 
An opportunity to examine the nature of conspiracist and anti-conspiracist 
thought from a different angle than the usual questionnaire methods presents itself in the 
form of online discourse. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the lack of mainstream 
public acceptance for their theories, many conspiracists, both prominent and otherwise, 
see themselves as having a duty to spread their views to the public at large. They often 
exhort the unthinking masses to 'wake up' (e.g. Byers, 2009; Crane, 2008; Icke, 2012). 
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This is a reasonable reaction: given a belief that our lives are being manipulated by 
shadowy forces beyond our control, most people would probably agree that trying to 
spread the word about that fact is a good idea. Others, such as those in the 'skeptic' 
movement (e.g. Randi, 1982; Sagan, 1995; Shermer, 1997), find most CTs to be 
misguided at best and destructive at worst, and so make a point of arguing against them 
in the public sphere. 
This discussion is highly visible in many arenas, perhaps none more so than 
news website comment sections. Articles about topics for which popular CTs exist, such 
as 9111, the moon landing, and vaccines, can have tens of thousands of comments, most 
of which are devoted to advancing or refuting allegations of conspiracy. These 
comments are often archived along with the associated articles for months or years 
afterward, which provides an excellent opportunity for archival research, which 
provides an excellent opportunity for archival research to give some insight into the 
thoughts and beliefs of those writing them (e.g. Fat, Sell, Barrowman, & Doja, 2012; 
Loke, 2012; Sisask, Mark, & Vamik, 2012) .. In Study 5, we examined a large number 
ofCT-related comments on news stories in an effort to gain insight into the way in 
which the comments' authors think about CTs and conventional explanations. 
Specifically, we were interested in whether the content of commenters' arguments 
reflects how their belief systems are structured. 
How reasonable is the assumption that persuasive communications can reflect 
inner beliefs? Analysis of online discourse as a method of examining psychological 
states has increased in prominence as the internet has become a more popular place to 
discuss one's ideas. The subject and pace of online discussion has been shown to be a 
more or less reliable barometer of public concern over social issues (Roberts, Wanta, & 
Dzwo, 2002; Scharkow & Vogelgesang, 2011), and emotional reactions expressed 
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online can be used to consistently predict political approval ratings (Gonzalez-Bailon, 
Banchs, & Kaltenbrunner, 2012). Quantitative analysis of online discussion has also 
been successfully applied to the end of gaining insight into the social psychology of 
groups with fringe views (Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005), and even research 
following the explanatory coherence framework has been supplemented by quantitative 
studies based on coding participants' utterances when considering some issue or another 
(Schank & Ranney, 1992). Online writings have been used in the past to gain 
quantitative insight into their authors' mindsets, including attitudes toward Tourette's 
Syndrome (Fat et al., 2012), personality traits (Rosenberg & Egbert, 2011), and racial 
views (Loke, 2012). Qualitative research on online discourse has been more common, 
even including a study of conspiracist ideation (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). 
There are some caveats associated with online archival research, however. As 
with any archival research, any trends in the data are several steps removed from the 
psychological processes thought to underlie them. As such, despite a potential increase 
in external validity, there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the internal validity of 
any conclusions drawn from such methods. Waller and Zimbelman (2003) have 
recommended using archival methods as a complement to more tightly controlled 
experimental methods that are more proximal to the constructs involved. In addition to 
the distal nature of the observations from the psychological constructs of interest, there 
is the issue of to what degree the content of persuasive communications reflects the 
properties of the author rather than of the situation. Rather than faithful representations 
of internal psychological processes, commenters' methods of argumentation might 
instead reflect strategic considerations regarding the audience, the venue, and the 
subject matter. Vogel, Kutzner, Fiedler, and Freytag (2010) found that people have 
some intuitive understanding of the psychology of persuasion: the more attractive 
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participants thought they were, the more successful they thought they would be in 
selling products in person compared to over the telephone. This effect was strongest 
when the potential customers were described as having low elaboration likelihood. This 
finding is in agreement with Douglas, Sutton, and Stathi (20 I 0), who found that 
people's intuitive understanding of persuasion accords an important role to the 
psychological construct of need for cognition, a central variable in the psychology of 
persuasion. Given that people adapt their persuasive approaches according to the 
audience and the context, to what degree can we really expect persuasive 
communications to be an accurate reflection of inner psychological processes? 
Unfortunately, the extant literature on the effect of lay persuasive knowledge on 
generation of persuasive arguments is extremely sparse. While there is a substantial 
body of research on lay persuasive knowledge, the vast majority of it focuses instead on 
how such knowledge affects susceptibility to the persuasive messages of others (e.g. 
Friestad & Wright, 1999). Vogel et al. (20 10) and Douglas et al. (20 I 0) appear to have 
conducted some of the only investigations into how people adapt their own persuasive 
strategies according to circumstances, so it is difficult to gauge the degree to which the 
content of persuasive arguments in favour of a particular viewpoint should diverge from 
the persuader's own thoughts on the matter. However, it is well established that people 
tend to rely heavily on projection for predicting others' behaviour - that is, they use 
themselves as a model for prediction. This effect is especially strong when relatively 
little is known about the target (for a review, see Robbins & Krueger, 2005). In general, 
then, persuaders probably use the self as a model for argument generation: in other 
words, they argue in a way that they would themselves find convincing. This, in tum, 
suggests that the types of arguments used by persuaders can contain information 
relevant to understanding how they think about the issue at hand. 
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The tendency to use social projection is especially relevant in online settings. 
Much online discussion is either fully anonymous or conducted under pseudonyms, 
greatly limiting the amount of information available about the other party in a 
discussion. As such, we assume in Study 5 that people will generally tend to use 
arguments that they themselves would find most convincing were they the audience 
rather than the persuader. This, in tum, should reflect the structure of their belief 
systems - the arguments that people find most convincing are those that match up with 
how they view the world (Newheiser et al., 2011). To that end, we systematically coded 
and analysed comments from four major news websites on articles relating to 9/11 from 
the period of 1 st July through 31 st December, 2011, with a particular focus on 
comparing arguments made in favour of a 9/11 CT against arguments made in favour of 
the conventional explanation of9/11. 
In Study 5 we were specifically interested in the difference in persuasive tactics 
used in comments arguing for versus against CIs. If the above reasoning regarding the 
influence of projection on persuasive tactics is correct, we should see systematic 
differences in the ways in which pro- and anti-conspiracists argue. Specifically, we 
should be able to replicate earlier results which demonstrate that unrelated conspiracy 
beliefs are intercorrelated (e.g. Goertzel, 1994b; Swami el al., 2010) - in this case, pro-
conspiracist comments should contain more positive (and fewer negative) references to 
unrelated CTs compared with anti-conspiracist comments. We also examined the degree 
to which comments contained explicit expressions of mistrust, predicting that pro-
conspiracist comments would be more likely to express mistrust of authorities or other 
targets than anti-conspiracist comments (e.g. Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Wright & 
Arbuthnot, 1974). Further, we examined expressions of powerlessness, and predicted 
that pro-conspiracist comments would express more concerns about power, as feelings 
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of powerlessness have been shown to correlate reliably with CT belief (Abalakina-Paap 
et al., 1999). Replicating the previously established relationships between trust, 
feelings, and power would increase confidence in Study 5's methods and help to justify 
any novel results derived therefrom. 
In addition to verifying the utility of this sort of archival approach by replicating 
previous results, we made several novel predictions. First, if we are correct in our 
contention that much of the conspiracist worldview is based on a higher-order 
opposition to officialdom rather than on positing particular alternative narratives, pro-
conspiracist comments should focus on refuting the official story more than on 
presenting or supporting specific CTs. We expected that this would be in contrast to 
anti-conspiracist comments, which might do the same but to a lesser extent. Second, we 
elected to examine the veracity of the long-held contention that 'conspiracy theory' and 
'conspiracy theorist' carry an intellectual stigma (e.g. Bratich, 2002, 2008; Coady, 
2006). If this is true, people should be unwilling to apply the term to themselves. As 
such, we predicted that pro-conspiracists would avoid applying the term 'conspiracy 
theory' to their own beliefs (or 'conspiracy theorists' to themselves, etc.), and would 
argue the point if others did so. 
Finally, another possible avenue by which the spread of CTs could be fruitfully 
understood is social influence theory (Latane, 1981). Since 9/11 CTs are (at least in the 
West) an opinion held by a vocal minority attempting to effect change, social influence 
theory (Latane, 1981) would predict that anti-conspiracists, if they are good majority 
influencers, are more likely to show patterns consistent with normative social influence. 
In particular, Bratich (2008) has highlighted the hostility of intellectual orthodoxy 
toward conspiracist explanations for events and the labelling of conspiracists as 
paranoid or otherwise mentally ill (c.f. Hofstadter, 1964; Kalichman et aI., 2010). 
Therefore, we examined the hostility of each comment, and predicted that anti-
conspiracist comments would be more hostile on average. This hostility would be the 
result of an attempt to signify that CTs are socially unacceptable and to enforce 




The raw data consisted of the comment sections of various online news articles. 
Samples were taken from news articles posted between 1 st July and 31 st December, 
2011, on four mainstream news websites: ABC News, CNN, the Independent, and the 
Daily Mail. This date range was chosen because of the large number of 9/11-related 
articles around the time of the tenth anniversary of the attacks, and these four news sites 
were selected on the reasoning that an ideal sample would not be restricted to a single 
country, journalistic style, or ideological position, as well as for more practical reasons 
such as search capabilities, comment archiving, and unpaid access. 
Relevant articles were selected by searching for a series of terms within the 
specified date range: '9/11', '11/9', 'september 11 th', '11 th september', 'world trade 
center', 'world trade centre', 'wtc', 'al-qaeda', 'shanksville', and 'building 7.' Where 
possible (Le. the Mail and Independent) the websites' own advanced search functions 
were used; on the remaining sites, we conducted the required searches using Google 
News. 
Comments 
In each article that resulted from these searches, the primary author read through 
the public comment sections and extracted verbatim all relevant comments regarding 
the various 9/11 CTs. Specifically, since only persuasive comments were of interest, 
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only comments containing original content that could be considered persuasive, or 
written with the intent to persuade, were extracted. To operationalise this constraint we 
adhered to four criteria. 
I. The comment must not consist solely of insults, ridicule, or threats (e.g. 'u 
stupid sheeple need 2 wake up 101', 'Let me know what your home address is, 
and we can have a frank 'discussion' about your idiotic conspiracy theories'). 
This criterion was adopted because insults on their own are not persuasive, and 
while insults may be relevant to the hostility and stigma variables, they are 
irrelevant to the majority of the analyses we wished to conduct. 
2. The comment must not consist solely of 'meta' discussion (e.g. 'I see the 
government disinfo machine is working overtime with all the shills posting 
here', 'can't believe CNN is letting these tinfoil hat nut jobs hijack a story about 
the 9/11 memorial'). As with insults, 'meta' comments do not make persuasive 
arguments, and are in fact about entirely different subject matter - they are 
concerned with the minutia of discussion rather than with the CTs and 
conventional explanations in question. 
3. The comment must not consist solely of a link to an external website, Youtube 
video, or similar, or a link with minimal description that adds no meaningful 
content (e.g. 'go to ae911 truth.org for some informed discussion about 9/11', 
'google Popular Mechanics 9/11 debunking'). While it would be in principle 
possible to code the contents of such videos, websites, and other bodies of Web 
content, they are usually prohibitively large and may not even have been read or 
watched in their entirety by the commenter. Linking to them is no guarantee that 
the commenter finds their contents particularly persuasive, as they did not 
generate the content themselves. 
4. The comment must not be copied verbatim from an external source. This was 
determined by conducting web searches when a comment was extremely long, 
contained unusual formatting such as inappropriate line breaks, or was out of 
character in terms of word choice or grammatical ability for a previously 
recognised commenter. As with external links, these passages were not 
generated by the commenters and cannot be relied upon as a reliable gauge of 
the structure of their own belief systems. As such, when an otherwise original 
post contained a passage quoted from an external source, only the original 
content was coded. 
The author of each comment was recorded, along with the Web address of the parent 




Once the comments were collected, they were coded by the primary author 
according to the hypotheses of interest. Although the primary coder was not blind to the 
hypotheses, the coding was vetted by a second coder who was (described below in the 
inter-rater reliability section). The tone ofthe comment (pro- or anti-conspiracist) was 
of interest to all analyses, so this was the first content variable coded. Since the first 
hypothesis concerned the number of unrelated CTs mentioned favourably and 
unfavourably in the comment, we coded two separate variables for each comment: one 
comprised the number of other CTs mentioned favourably, and the other comprised the 
number of other CTs mentioned unfavourably. Importantly, these counts did not include 
superconspiracies (Barkun, 2006) of which 9111 was thought to be a part. For instance, 
if a commenter accused the New W orId Order or the Illuminati of masterminding the 
9/11 attacks, this would be considered part of the 9/11 theory rather than a separate 
theory entirely. 
The next hypotheses concerned trust and powerlessness. We therefore coded 
whether each comment contained expressions of mistrust, whether generalised or 
specific (e.g. 'never believe what the media tells you' or 'nobody's trustworthy these 
days'), as well as powerlessness (e.g. 'they've won, there's nothing we can do'). 
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Our primary hypothesis, and the one most relevant to the extended MBS theory 
of conspiracist belief, concerned whether the comments contained positive or negative 
arguments. As such we coded for two separate binary-valued variables: first, whether 
the comment contained advocacy of the person's favoured interpretation (e.g. 'thermite 
residue in the wreckage is consistent with controlled demolition', 'office fires can bum 
hot enough, uncontrolled, to weaken structural steel to the point of collapse'); second, 
whether the comment contained derogation of the opposing interpretation ('there is no 
way that a plane would have left so little wreckage at the Pentagon', 'it's totally 
implausible that such a large conspiracy could be kept secret for so long'); and third, 
whether the comment directly put forward an explanation for either the entirety of 9111 
or an element of it ('9/11 was an inside job', 'the collapse was caused by terrorists 
flying planes into buildings, nothing more'). 
We were also interested in how commenters used the term 'conspiracy theory'. 
As such, we created a nominally-coded variable with values representing the different 
ways in which each comment used the phrase and its variations: not at all; applied to an 
opposing interpretation (,that's just a crazy conspiracy theory'); applied to the 
commenter's own interpretation ('it may be a conspiracy theory, but it's still true'); both; 
or disputed in its applicability ('calling something a conspiracy theory is just a way of 
silencing dissent'). This included variations on the term, such as 'conspiracy theorist', 
'silly conspiracy nonsense', etc. 
The final hypothesis concerned the degree to which persuasive pro- and anti-
conspiracist comments were hostile. As such, we coded the hostility of the comment 
toward those who hold opposing views on a scale of 1-5. 
Data preparation 
While a wide variety of comments were obtained, certain authors tended to 
dominate the conversation across several news articles and even multiple websites. 
Therefore, in addition to analysing the entire collection of comments, we conducted a 
separate analysis in which we calculated the mean values of each variable for each 
individual author and repeated the analysis on the level of authors rather than 
comments. All results obtained below were found at both the author and comment 
levels of analysis, so only the comment level is reported for the sake of brevity. 
Inter-rater reliability 
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A random sample of 10% of the comments selected was passed to a second rater 
for coding, and intraclass correlation analyses were conducted to determine the degree 
of concordance between the two raters. We set the absolute limit for acceptable 
reliability for nominal data at lC = .21, the lower bound of the "fair agreement" range 
(Landis & Koch, 1997), and for ordinal data at ICC = .70, the usual lower-bound for the 
related Cronbach's alpha statistic. While there was good agreement regarding the 
conspiracist versus anti-conspiracist tone of each comment, lC = .94, and for hostility, 
ICC = .74, the ratings for advocacy, lC = .49, and the use of "conspiracy theory", lC = .44, 
showed only moderate inter-rater reliability. Derogation, lC = .31, and mistrust, lC = .39, 
showed fair reliability. The inter-rater reliability for making a direct statement about 
what happened was deemed to be unacceptably low (lC = .20), so this variable was 
dropped from the final analysis. With the exception of tone judgements, no variable 
showed very good reliability, so caution is due in interpreting these results. 
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Results 
A total of2174 useable comments were collected for analysis, of which 1459 
were coded as pro-conspiracy and 715 as anti-conspiracy. The four news websites did 
not contribute equally to the sample, with 65 comments coming from ABC News, 632 
from CNN, 1006 from the Daily Mail, and 471 from the Independent. Nevertheless, 
each site had about equal proportions of pro- and anti-conspiracy comments: for ABC, 
21 anti-conspiracy and 44 pro-conspiracy; for CNN, 218 anti-conspiracy and 414 pro-
conspiracy; for the Daily Mail, 330 anti-conspiracy and 676 pro-conspiracy; and for the 
Independent, 146 anti-conspiracy and 325 pro-conspiracy; i(3) = 1.514, p = .68. 
Table 2 shows the general results of the coding analysis. In line with our 
predictions, pro-conspiracy comments mentioned more non-9/11 CTs as being correct 
than anti-conspiracy comments (M = .12 per comment versus M = .02; /(2172) = 3.82, p 
< .001) and fewer such theories as being incorrect (M= .02 per comment versus M 
= .18; t(2172) = -7.51,p < .001). Likewise, pro-conspiracy comments were more likely 
to express mistrust than their anti-conspiracy counterparts (10.6% versus 1.4%; I( 1) = 
57.22,p < .001). We were unable to test the powerlessness prediction, however, as only 
two comments in the entire sample contained expressions of powerlessness. 
Analysis revealed a number of differences between the rhetorical styles of pro-
and anti-conspiracist commenters. Twenty-six percent of pro-conspiracy comments 
contained information that constituted support for their own position, compared to 55% 
of anti-conspiracy comments. This difference proved to be significant, I( I) = 170.22, p 
< .001. In contrast, 72% ofpro-conspiraey comments involved derogation of the 
opposing explanation, significantly more than the 55% of anti-conspiracy comments, 
r(I) = 61.19,p < .001. 
As predicted, anti-conspiracy comments (M= 2.08, SD = 1.02) were 
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significantly more hostile than pro-conspiracy comments (M = 1.44, SO = .79), t(2172) 
= 16.22, P < .00 I (see Table 2). Finally, neither pro- nor anti-conspiracists were 
particularly willing to self-apply the term 'conspiracy theory' or its derivatives: only 31 
pro-conspiracist comments referred to their beliefs as such, while 63 used the term to 
describe the official story of 9111 and 65 disputed others' use of it. Anti-conspiracists 
were likely to call opposing beliefs CTs, with 166 doing so, compared to only a single 
comment that self-applied the term and another one that contested its applicability. Four 
pro-conspiracist comments described both explanations as being CTs, but no anti-
conspiracist comments did the same. 
Table 2 




Mean CTs mentioned favourably 0.12 0.02 
Mean CTs mentioned unfavourably 0.02 0.18 
% comments expressing mistrust 10.6 1.4 
% comments advocating own explanation 26 55 
% comments derogating other explanation 72 55 
Mean hostility (1-5 scale) 1.43 2.07 
Comments describing own belief as CT 31 
Comments describing opposing belief as CT 63 166 
Comments describing both beliefs as CTs 4 0 
Comments disputing usage of 'CT' 65 
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Discussion 
Although some caution is necessary in interpreting these data given the low 
inter-rater reliability of some of the variables, the data were generally consistent with 
our predictions. In agreement with the findings of Study 1, pro-conspiracist comments 
expressed more favourable opinions about unrelated CTs than anti-conspiracist 
comments did. This serves as a conceptual replication of previous findings indicating 
that beliefs in CTs tend to be correlated: if someone agrees with 9/11 CTs, they are also 
more likely to agree with other CTs (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Swami et 
al., 2011). Further, in accordance with previous work on the role of trust in CT beliefs 
(e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Wright & Arbuthnot, 
1974), pro-conspiracist comments were more likely to contain expressions of mistrust 
than were anti-conspiracist comments. Despite the unexpected impossibility of testing 
the powerlessness hypothesis, this cluster of results should increase confidence in the 
validity of the remainder of Study 5 's conclusions. The well-established tendencies for 
conspiracists to be less trusting than average and for CT beliefs to intcrcorrelate have 
manifested themselves in the persuasive communications examined, which suggests that 
other tendencies may do so as well. 
Most notably, and in accordance with the idea that opposition to officialdom is a 
major component of the conspiracist extended MBS, conspiracy advocates showed a 
tendency to spend much more time arguing against the official explanation of 9/11 than 
advocating their own interpretation. In contrast, conspiracy opponents did both in 
approximately equal measures. This pattern of results supports the idea that CTs have 
their basis more in opposition to officialdom than in beliefs in specific alternative 
theories (Dean, 2002). For the adherents of the 9/11 Truth Movement examined in 
Study 5, the search for truth consists mostly of finding ways in which the official story 
cannot be true. There is much less of a focus on providing and defending coherent 
explanations that can better account for the available evidence. 
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We also found that hostility was higher in persuasive arguments made by anti-
conspiracists than in those by pro-conspiracists. As 9/11 conspiracism is by and large a 
minority viewpoint in the West (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008), this makes sense: anti-
conspiracists, rather than focussing on presenting novel information, instead attempt to 
enforce conformity to the majority viewpoint (Latane, 1981). While the inter-rater 
reliability for hostility was acceptable, there is a risk that we may not have captured the 
full spectrum of responses, as we specifically excluded comments that consisted solely 
of threats, insults, or ridicule. As such, although we cannot say with certainty that anti-
conspiracist comments are more hostile on average than pro-conspiracist comments, we 
can say with some confidence that this is true among comments that also contained 
some amount of persuasive content. 
Finally, the statistics on the usage of the phrase 'conspiracy theory' provide an 
illustration of how the term is viewed. Few people were eager to apply it to their own 
positions. Pro-conspiracists were more likely to apply it to the conventional narrative, 
often counterintuitively referring to it as 'the official conspiracy theory', or to dismiss 
the term as needlessly loaded and derogatory, consistent with recent scholarly 
characterisations (Bratich, 2008). Part ofthe problem is probably the vagueness of the 
term; while we have provided a working definition in the present thesis, there is no 
universal agreement on what exactly constitutes a CT (Coady, 2006). 
There are other possible interpretations for some of these results. For instance, 
the observed difference between pro- and anti-conspiracist comments could be seen as 
an issue of rhetorical congruence more than of genuine belief. This pattern could 
naturally arise as the result of an inclination toward arguing by analogy: conspiracists 
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might compare the 9111 attacks to the JFK assassination, which a majority of Americans 
believe was the result of a conspiracy (Goertzel, 1994), in order to make a CT seem 
more plausible. In contrast, anti-conspiracists could compare 9/11 CTs to more overtly 
ridiculous or comical examples, such as the proposed cover-up of the existence of 
Bigfoot or the idea that Elvis Presley is still alive, in order to make the point that CTs in 
general are not to be taken seriously. While both of these strategies were in evidence in 
the data, there were also instances of the opposite tendency: some anti-conspiracists said 
that while some other CTs are true, there is no evidence for a 9/11 conspiracy, and some 
pro-conspiracists claimed that while most CTs are bogus, in the case of9/11 the 
evidence is sufficient to reject the official story. This may ultimately be a more 
persuasive argument: people who portray themselves as nominal anti-conspiracists who 
nevertheless find 9/11 CTs plausible are essentially portraying themselves as deviant 
ingroup members. Such people can be very effective in exerting social influence on the 
majority (Maass & Clark, 1984). 
Ideas of rhetorical congruency and self-presentation recall the issue of whether 
people's persuasive communications are really an accurate reflection of their own 
thoughts and ideas rather than a carefully calculated attempt to playoff others' biases 
and reasoning. The 9/11 Truth Movement is, by and large, a movement of converts -
most 'Truthers', at some point, became convinced that their previous belief in the 
official story was wrong (Kay, 2011). Therefore, in debating with those who hold the 
positions they previously held, they might repeat the arguments that frrst caused them to 
doubt the conventional narrative and shaped their subsequent thinking accordingly. On 
the other hand, the actual content that the discussions centred upon was often highly 
technical, and many of the arguments were unlikely to have been generated entirely by 
the people doing the commenting. While some commenters made intuitive jUdgements 
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about the physics of crashing airplanes and collapsing buildings, many others relied on 
arguments advanced in websites or documentaries devoted to either advancing or 
debunking 9/11 CTs. With the amount of information to choose from, however, the 
arguments commenters chose to put forward may still reveal useful information about 
their own decision-making. 
The chief limitation of Study 5 is the fairly low inter-rater reliability. Aside from 
simply differentiating between pro- and anti-conspiracist comments, on which there was 
substantial agreement between raters, the reliability ranged from low to merely 
acceptable. The reason for this likely derives from the highly contextual nature of online 
discourse, in which the tone or main thrust of a comment depends upon previous 
comments and implicit information, the interpretation of which differs significantly 
between raters. Many of the comments had an ironic or sarcastic tone, which 
complicates interpretation somewhat. It can be difficult to tell the difference between a 
genuine comment making a particular point and an ironic comment attempting to 
parody it. Any comment whose tone is interpreted differently by two raters will 
naturally produce wildly different results. For instance, a comment reading 'ROFL 
FIRE CANT MELT STEEL U SHEEPLE!!!' could be interpreted either as a 
straightforward pro-conspiracist comment derogating the official story or an ironic anti-
conspiracist comment mocking a common conspiracist argument. While this could be 
mitigated to some degree by referring to other posts by the same commenter, it was not 
always possible to do so. Even in the absence of irony and other challenges unique to an 
online debate setting, inter-rater agreement for this sort of coding is not very high; our 
reliability here is roughly on par with that of Schank and Ranney (1992), who used 
structured interviews to create personalised explanatory coherence networks. Whether 
Study 5 is an accurate analysis of conspiracist and anti-conspiracist discourse despite 
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the reliability problems is an issue that can only be addressed by future research. 
In sum, despite some problems with the reliability of the coding, our results are 
in agreement with predictions derived from prior research and from the extended MBS 
theory of conspiracist belief. Consistent with much of the existing literature on 
individual differences associated with conspiracy belief, comments that supported 9/11 
CTs were more likely to express mistrust and to refer to other CTs favourably. Pro-
conspiracists were less overtly hostile than their anti-conspiracist counterparts, and did 
not appreciate being called conspiracy theorists. Perhaps most importantly, however, the 
finding that conspiracists spend more time arguing against official explanations than for 
alternative explanations supports extended MBS theory. The coherence of the belief 
system is driven by higher-order considerations such as a disbelief in official narratives, 
rather than positive beliefs in particular alternative narratives. This result also agrees 
with previous informal observations by anti-conspiracist commentators, who devote a 
great deal of time to examining and debunking CTs. One tactic which anti-conspiracists 
often accuse conspiracists of using is 'anomaly hunting': 
They imagine that if they can find (broadly defined) anomalies in that 
data that would point to another phenomenon at work. They then commit 
a pair of logical fallacies. First, they confuse unexplained with 
unexplainable. This leads them to prematurely declare something a true 
anomaly, without first exhaustively trying to explain it with conventional 
means. Second they use the argument from ignorance, saying that because 
we cannot explain an anomaly that means their specific pet theory must 
be true. I don't know what that fuzzy object in the sky is - therefore it is 
an alien spacecraft. (Novella, 2009) 
The observed tendency of pro-conspiracists to argue against the conventional narrative 
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rather than in favour of a particular alternative closely resembles this description of 
anomaly hunting, and also parallels Keeley's (1999) observation that 'the chief tool of 
the conspiracy theorist is what I shall call errant data' (p. 117). We argue that in fact, 
anomaly hunting, or a fixation on errant data, is a manifestation of the way 
conspiracism is structured as a worldview, as specified in extended MBS theory. In 
general, conspiracy belief is not based around specific theories of how events transpire, 
though these may exist as well. Instead, conspiracism is rooted in several higher-order 
beliefs such as an abiding mistrust of authority, the conviction that nothing is quite as it 
seems, and the belief that most of what we are told is a lie. Apparent anomalies in 
official accounts seem to support this, even if they do not point to a specific, well-
defined alternative. For the conspiracist, there are two worlds: one real and (mostly) 
unseen, the other a sinister illusion meant to cover up the truth; and evidence against the 
latter is evidence for the fonner. 
While the existence of differences in pro- and anti-conspiracist persuasive tactics 
is infonnative in itself, it leaves us with the question of how effective this sort of pro-
conspiracist argumentation really is. Does the vagueness in conspiracy advocacy 
identified by Clarke (2007) make for a more convincing argument than specificity? To 
what degree is derogating the official story effective when compared to advocating for a 
specific alternative theory? We explore these questions, and others, in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4: Just Asking Questions 
Abstract 
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Following on from the study presented in Chapter 3, this chapter investigates the 
persuasiveness of various strategies used to convince people of CTs. Study 6 shows that 
CTs with few details are seen as more plausible than more detailed ones, while the 
opposite is true of conventional explanations, and Study 7 shows that raising 
generalised suspicion is effective in rendering CTs about as plausible as conventional 
explanations. Study 8 shows that provoking suspicion is a disadvantage when the 
evidence for a CT is high quality. Study 9 demonstrates that disparaging conventional 
explanations can backfire when combined with positive arguments in favour of a CT. 
Finally, Study 10 shows that there is no difference in persuasiveness between 
straightforward accusations of conspiracy and equivalent leading questions. Raising 
doubts about conventional narratives appears to promote generalised suspicion and 
mistrust, both of which are important components of conspiracist belief. This can 
eliminate the plausibility gap between conventional explanations and CTs by 
encouraging the audience to suspend their judgement regarding which explanation is 
correct, but can also lead people to question the CTs themselves if they are sufficiently 
well-specified. Moreover, additional details have the potential to create either coherence 
or conflict with higher-order beliefs, which can increase or decrease the plausibility of 
the explanation accordingly. 
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In Chapter 3, we examined the ways in which people argue for and against CTs 
in an online setting. This focus on the internet as a venue for conspiracy theorising is 
emblematic of a larger cultural shift: as digital communication has grown in popularity, 
the nature of discourse surrounding CTs has adapted accordingly. Stewart (1999), 
noting this shift, remarked that online discussion is remarkably well-suited for 
conspiracist discourse, as though 'the Internet [were] made for conspiracy theory: it is a 
conspiracy theory: one thing leads to another, always another link leading you deeper 
into no thing and no place' (p. 18). 
While conspiracy advocates can propagate their ideas quickly and easily over the 
internet, however, conspiracy sceptics and proponents of rival theories can criticize and 
debunk with equal ease. The culture of instant criticism which has arisen on the internet 
has resulted in noticeable effects on the character of CTs: specifically, the most 
successful conspiracy advocates have become increasingly vague about the plots they 
propose (Clarke, 2007). Conspiracist tracts are increasingly likely to deal in innuendo 
rather than in comprehensive alternative narratives, with many of the details of how the 
alleged plot was accomplished being implicit or left as an exercise to the reader to 
figure out. This shift is particularly apparent among 9/11 conspiracists: the most 
influential figures in the 9111 Truth Movement generally refuse to give a specific 
account of exactly what they believe happened on September 11 th, 2001 (Kay, 2011). 
Instead, they focus on repeating the fairly nonspecific claim that the apparent terrorist 
attacks were an 'inside job' and raising doubts about the veracity of the official story 
rather than positing a coherent counter-narrative. This shift can be characterised as 
either a change in the complexity of the CTs themselves or a change in the degree of 
detail in which they are presented. Clarke (2007) has suggested that the latter is in fact 
the case: the theories might be quite complex in the minds ofthose proposing them, but 
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only the most essential details are presented explicitly. The fewest possible perpetrators 
are implicated, and methods are glossed over where possible. 
The tendency toward vagueness in conspiracism has some intriguing parallels 
with the tenets of extended MBS theory put forward in this thesis. Recall that the theory 
proposes that conspiracist worldviews are held together not by beliefs in particular 
theories, but by broader beliefs - for instance, the idea that people are untrustworthy, or 
a negative attitude toward a particular group of potential conspirators. Extended MBS 
theory would therefore disagree with Clarke (2007) - in the domain of private belief as 
well as that of public advocacy, the particulars of a CT are less important than the 
simple fact that it is a CT. As long as a theory coheres with conspiracist higher-order 
belief structures, it will seem somewhat credible to people who hold a conspiracist 
worldview. These properties are inherent to almost all CTs, at least as they are defined 
in the present research. However, by the same token, a CT that is increasingly elaborate 
may seem decreasingly plausible to someone with an anti-conspiracist worldview: as 
more details are added, there are more opportunities for incoherence with incongruent 
higher-order beliefs. To take a recent example, alleging that the 2013 Sandy Hook 
school shooting is not all it appears to be coheres with a variety of conspiracist higher-
order beliefs, and in the wake of the shooting there have been many such vague claims 
(Vancouver Sun, 2013). While some outright claim that it was an elaborate hoax or a 
false-flag attack, this approach appears to be less common, and may alienate people 
Who are less invested in the particulars of the conspiracist worldview but may still agree 
with its general philosophy (Seitz-Wald, 2013). 
There is good reason to believe that on some level, the general principles of the 
conspiracist worldview have broad appeal among Westerners. Conspiracy is a common 
theme in popular fiction (Melley, 2002) and the Western democratic ideal is predicated 
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upon a suspicion that those in authority are prone to abuse their power (Barkun, 2006). 
Trust in the institutions of society is at a historic ebb (Goertzel, 2010). This is fertile 
ground for conspiracy thinking. Moreover, under the extended MBS framework, 
mistrust and suspicion are thought to be core higher-order components of conspiracist 
belief, as dispositional trust is one of the most consistent predictors of conspiracist 
belief (e.g. Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974; Goertzel, 1994). However, mistrust may exert 
influence beyond simple coherence with CTs. Research has shown that when mistrust is 
provoked by some stimulus, it tends to generalise to any available target and promote 
the spontaneous generation of counterarguments (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004; 
Sinaceur, 2010). This includes any well-specified account of an event, whether 
conspiracist or not, so providing the details of a CT may actually prove to be a 
disadvantage - the more details there are, the more amenable they are to 
eounterargumentation. 
If this formulation of the extended MBS theory is accurate, CTs will seem more 
convincing when they are presented vaguely and without much detail, and provoking 
suspicion will lead to spontaneous counterargumentat generation - not just against 
official explanations but against CTs as well. These ideas are the focus of the empirical 
component of this chapter. While Studies 7-10 investigate the role of suspicion and 
counterargument in the context of a particularly conspiracist rhetorical technique known 
as 'just asking questions', Study 6 examines the role of detail and specificity in the 
general plausibility of CTs. Are CTs more plausible when they are more or less 
detailed, and are they any different in this respect from conventional explanations? 
Study 6 
Perhaps the most relevant existing research on the effect of detail on the 
plausibility of social explanations comes from the literature on cognitive heuristics, 
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particularly the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). More complex, 
detailed explanations are seen as more plausible when they fit with existing ideas about 
the world. The canonical example used by Tversky and Kahneman is that of a woman 
who is politically liberal and interested in social justice issues, and is therefore judged 
more likely to be a feminist and work at a bank than simply to work at a bank. This 
holds true even though the latter option includes the former and therefore must be at 
least as probable - the closer the description of the woman is to the perceiver's 
schematic view of her, the more likely that the description will appear to be correct. 
Descriptions that add incongruent details, on the other hand, are generally perceived as 
being less accurate. 
The availability heuristic can be instantiated within Thagard's (1989) 
explanatory coherence framework: an explanation for some event will seem more 
plausible if it draws additional activation through coherence with higher-order 
knowledge structures. As an illustration of this principle, consider the case of9/11 CTs. 
To simplify matters, say we have one evidence node: 
El. The Twin Towers collapsed. 
There are two rival explanations for E 1, which are mutually incoherent. One is a 
simplified version of a popular 9/11 CT: 
CI. The towers were destroyed by a controlled demolition. 
The other is a shortened version of the official explanation: 
01. The towers collapsed because of fires and structural damage. 
Cl and 01 both cohere with El and incohere with one another. In this simplified model, 
the network is symmetrical and neither explanation has a particular advantage (see 
Figure 8). 
Figure 8. An explanatory coherence network representation of the 9/11 'controlled 
demolition' CT and the conflicting conventional explanation. Solid lines represent 




Now consider what happens if more dctail in the form of an additional 
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proposition C2 is added to the CT, and if there is an additional evidence node E2, which 
represents a higher-order belief: 
C2. Demolition charges were planted by CIA agents. 
E2. The American government is both competent and malevolent. 
Cl and C2 both cohere with El. In addition, C2 coheres with E2, since such an evil and 
audacious plan would be in character for US Government agents, and C 1 and C2 both 
incohere with 01 as both cannot be true at the same time (see Figure 9). 
Running Thagard's (1989)javaECHO instantiation of the ECHO modcl on this 
network (see Appendix A for the code representing the full model, along with all other 
models referred to in the present section) reveals that the CT now has an advantage over 
the conventional explanation, with a final equilibrium activation of .61 for Cl versus-
.51 for 01. This is the result of additional activation stemming from the CT's coherence 
with the belief in the competence and malevolence of the US government. 
98 
Figure 9. An explanatory coherence network representation of a simplified conspiracist 
belief system and a relatively detailed controlled demolition CT. Solid lines represent 
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However, not everyone would hold beliefE2. Many probably see the American 
government as benevolent, indifferent, or simply incompetent enough that they are 
incapable of executing and covering up such a complex plot. For these people, E2 might 
be revised as such: 
E2'. The American government is either incompetent or at least not actively 
malevolent. 
In this version of the model, E2' does not cohere with C2, and in fact probably 
contradicts it - incompetence or lack of ill will would seem to incohere with an 
accusation of conspiracy. A javaECIIO run of this version of the model (see Figure 10) 
reveals that replacing E2 with E2' has rendered the official explanation more plausible 
than the CT, with equilibrium activations of .61 and -.48 respectively (see Appendix A 
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for the full results). Whether detail is an advantage or a disadvantage therefore depends 
on coherence between the additional propositions and higher-order beliefs, as suggested 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
Figure 10. An explanatory coherence network representation of a simplified anti-
conspiracist belief system and a relatively detailed controlled demolition CT. Solid lines 






















Of course, these examples are simplified in the extreme; in reality, nearly every 
proposition might be supported or contradicted by a great number of different bcliefs 
and pieces of knowledge about the world (e.g. Simon et ai., 2004). However, this 
example serves to demonstrate that all else being equal, increasing the complexity of a 
theory should work to its benefit when the added dctails are congruent with onc's 
worldview, and should work against it when the added details contradict established 
views and beliefs. Given that CTs tend to be rejected by a majority of the population 
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(Goertzel, 1994b; WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008; Zonis & Joseph, 1994), they likely 
involve elements that are at odds with beliefs held by the majority. For instance, an 
internal locus of control (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Hamsher et al., 1968), high trust 
in government (Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974), a belief that the proposed conspirators are 
low in entitativity (Grzesiak-Feldman & Suszek, 2008), and low Machiavellianism 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011) would all constitute obstacles to conspiracy belief. Based on 
this potential incongruence between CTs and mainstream beliefs, we predicted that 
more complex CTs would generally be less convincing while more complex 
conventional explanations for the same event, following the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), would be more convincing. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four students (mean age 22.8,39% female) from the University of Kent 
participated in Study 6 in exchange for sweets. 
Materials, procedure, and design 
For the purposes of Study 6, we created three fictional scenarios which could be 
explained either with or without reference to conspiracy: an explosion at a nuclear 
power plant, the announcement and subsequent retraction of the discovery ofa cancer 
vaccine, and the assassination of the president of a developing nation. Each scenario 
was presented through a brief initial description, and was followed by four CTs or 
conventional explanations of increasing detail. The initial descriptions were very short 
and written so as not to favour either the conventional or conspiracist explanation. Each 
explanation included the text of the explanations before it, with an additional phrase 
added (for the sake of brevity, the repeated text is not included here). For example, the 
CTs for the cancer vaccine scenario were as follows: 
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1. The announcement was retracted because of external pressure. 
2. . .. from pharmaceutical corporations, who stand to lose a great deal of money 
on cancer treatments if a vaccine is developed. 
3. . .. The senior researchers were paid substantially for their silence. 
4. '" and the junior researchers were threatened into staying quiet. 
The conventional explanations were created to be as similar as possible in terms of 
length and the number of actors involved. For the cancer cure scenario, the conventional 
explanations were as follows: 
1. The announcement was retracted because the data were inaccurate. 
2. . .. There was an error in the researchers' data analysis that led them to the wrong 
conclusion. 
3. . .. The senior researchers were careless in double-checking their results. 
4. '" and the junior researchers were afraid to speak up about the errors. 
As in Studies 2-4, each explanation was followed by a set of six Likert scale 
items ranging from 1-7, asking the participant to rate how much they agreed with the 
explanation (scale endpoints labelled 'strongly disagree' and 'strongly agree ,), as well 
as the degree to which they found it plausible, convincing, worth considering, 
interesting, and coherent (scale endpoints labelled 'not at all' and 'very much '). 
Whether the scenarios were followed by conventional explanations or CTs varied 
between subjects, resulting in a 2 (explanation type: conspiracy vs. conventional; 
between-participants) x 4 (level of detail; repeated measures) mixed factorial design. 
The order in which the scenarios were presented was counterbalanced. A sample Study 
3 questionnaire is included in Appendix F. 
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Results and discussion 
A mixed-design 2 (explanation type: conspiracy vs. conventional; between-
participants) x 4 (level of detail; repeated measures) ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of explanation type, such that CTs (marginal M = 3.55) elicited less 
agreement than conventional explanations (marginal M= 4.63), F(l,90) = 32.61, MSE = 
3.08, P < .001. This was true not just in general, but also at each level of detail (planned 
comparisons; all ps < .01). There was also a significant interaction between explanation 
type and detail, F(2.45,220.74) = 9.59, p < .001 (Huynh-Feldt df correction used due to 
significant violation of the sphericity assumption, Mauchly's W= .618, i(5) = 42.68, p 
< .001). Simple effects analysis revealed that agreement increased with specificity for 
conventional explanations, F(2.37,106.53) = 3.25, MSE = .74,p = .04, partial rp = .14, 
and decreased with specificity for CTs, F(2.59, 116.6) = 8.45, MSE = .51, P < .001, 
partial 1'/2 = .16 (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11. Agreement with conventional and conspiracy explanations over varying 
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This pattern of results is in line with our predictions. The more complex a CT is 
in its presentation, the less plausible it seems. Conversely, complexity appcars to be an 
asset for conventional explanations. The dissociation between CTs and conventional 
explanations in this regard supports the idea that the addcd dctails are broadly coherent 
with existing higher-order knowledge structures in the latter case and incoherent in the 
former. The practical implications are clear: on average, the most effective way to 
convince someone of a CT is to make the theory as simple as possible and to make any 
added details conform to what they already believe to be true about the world. Likewise, 
when arguing against a CT, an effective approach would be to state the CT in the most 
specific, complex terms possible to make salient any potential incoherence between the 
details of the theory and the perceiver's other beliefs, as well as to promote spontaneous 
counterargument on the part of the audience (Schul et at., 2004). 
Study 6's effects are adequately explained by schematic incongruency. If 
counterargumentation is another possible contributor to the decrease in the plausibility 
of CTs as they become more detailed, why is the same not true for conventional 
explanations - in other words, why do people not generate counterarguments against 
complex conventional explanations? This is to be expected, as counterargumcntation is 
prompted by mistrust or suspicion, both of which are inherent to the conspiracist belief 
system but not to the acceptance of conventional, non-conspiracist explanations. 
Finally, it should be noted that even with the smallest possible amount of dctail, 
there was still a gap between the two explanation typcs: at no point did CTs reach the 
level of agreement enjoyed by conventional explanations. Simply describing CTs in 
vague terms does not appear to be enough to bring their agreement on par with 
conventional explanations. To do so may necessitate a distinct rhetorical approach .We 
now turn to an examination of one such approach, which combines a lack of detail with 
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the explicit promotion of mistrust and suspicion. 
Study 7 
While the most plausible explanation for Study 6 appears to involve varying 
levels of congruence between additional details and higher-order beliefs, the possibility 
of a role of suspicion and counterargument merits examination. One method of arousing 
suspicion and prompting mistrust of officialdom is known in internet debating 
terminology as the Just Asking Questions (JAQ) approach, named for the response it 
allows when challenged: 'I'm not saying it was necessarily a conspiracy; I'm just asking 
questions' (e.g. Rowe, Bermas, Brown, & Avery, 2005). Anti-conspiracist activists have 
characterized it humourously as a form of intellectual masturbation (RationaIWiki, 
2009; emphasis in original): 
JAQing off is the act of cowardly [sic] spouting accusations while 
cowardly hiding behind the claim of' Just Asking Questions'. The 
strategy is to keep asking leading questions in an attempt to influence 
listeners' views; the term is derived from the frequent claim by the 
denialist that they are 'just asking questions', albeit in a manner much the 
same as political push polls. 
JAQ, as a type of argument by insinuation, is perhaps one of the most extreme forms of 
the vagueness in conspiracy advocacy identified by Clarke (2007). Not only does it 
avoid specific claims of perpetrators and motives, it even avoids explicitly stating the 
existence of a conspiracy at all. JAQ is exemplified by the 9/11 conspiracy film Loose 
Change (Rowe et al., 2005). A representative section of the film presents an analysis of 
the aircraft debris inside the Pentagon and asks the viewer, 'Why is the damage to the 
Pentagon completely inconsistent with a Boeing 757?' The implication, of course, is 
that whatever hit the Pentagon was not a Boeing 757 - but that claim is never explicitly 
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made in the film, nor do the filmmakers allege outright that the attacks were perpetrated 
by the American government. While this is clearly the message of Loose Change, it is 
conveyed almost entirely through clever editing, sinister musical cues, strategic pauses, 
and leading questions. The number of direct accusations of conspiracy in the 65-minute-
long film can be counted on one hand, and is dwarfed by the number of oblique 
suggestions and innuendoes. 
Much like the more general construct of vagueness, JAQ may be a highly 
persuasive tactic for CT advocacy. Rather than providing a coherent theory that can be 
argued against or disagreed with in its particulars, it seeks to sow distrust in 
officialdom, cast doubt upon official narratives, and lead the audience to conspiracy 
explanations. It keeps the argument vague, and therefore, as shown in Study 6, more 
plausible than if it were elaborated in any great detail. Moreover, the use of innuendo 
rather than direct accusations of impropriety may help to mitigate the effect of source 
credibility: even when the source of a particular accusation is seen as unreliable or 
sensationalistic, the implications of innuendo-type arguments tend to be readily 
accepted (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, & Beattie, 1981). This is important given the 
inherent stigma of conspiracy theorising indicated by the effects found in Study 5. 
Rather than making direct accusations of conspiracy, which may induce incoherence 
between the hypothesis and the widely-held higher-order belief that CTs are generally 
untrue (Bratich, 2008; Coady, 2006), JAQ frames itself as simple questioning without 
any agenda other than uncovering the truth. Finally, JAQ aims to arouse suspicion and 
promote mistrust of official narratives. This mistrust should generalise to all available 
information, prompting counterarguments against a well-specified official story while a 
poorly specified CT might remain immune (Schul et al., 2004). 
We resolved to test the effectiveness of JAQ by attempting to persuade people 
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that a real-world event, rather than a fictional scenario, had a conspiracy behind it. We 
predicted that it would be more effective in doing so than direct, unambiguous advocacy 
ofa CT, even when the same supporting evidence was presented. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty-eight University of Kent students and staff participated in 
exchange for a randomised reward: either a small snack or £1-£2, determined by a dice 
roll. Of these, six were excluded from data analysis for not answering all questions or 
otherwise failing to follow instructions, leaving a total of 152 data points. 
Materials, procedure, and design 
In early 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded and sank in the Gulf of 
Mexico, causing a massive oil leak and a large-scale environmental disaster. At the time 
there were many conspiracist accounts of the event circulating around the internet, 
though for the most part they had not received a significant amount of mainstream 
media attention. In Study 7, which took place shortly after the oil spill, we attempted to 
convince participants of one such CT: that the US Government sabotaged the oil rig in 
order to demonize the oil industry and create support for carbon taxes and harsher 
environmental regulations. 
Participants first read a one-paragraph summary of the events of the oil spill and 
the official story. Next, they read a list of claims about the events surrounding the spill, 
some true, some distorted versions of the truth, and some entirely fictitious. The claims 
were presented as facts and were intended to give strong support to the idea that the oil 
spill was indeed the result of a government conspiracy. For instance: 
• Halliburton, a contracting firm with substantial connections to the US 
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government, bought an oil cleanup firm about a week before the spill happened. 
[partially true; Halliburton acquired an oil well service firm 11 days before the 
explosion, but the company in question was largely associated with safety 
services rather than cleanup} 
• Some of the surviving rig workers claim they heard a small explosion just before 
the large one that ultimately destroyed the rig. [untrue; this was adaptedfrom 
similar claims regarding the 9/11 attacks and the possibility of controlled 
demolition charges being in the building] 
• Goldman Sachs, an investment company with close ties to high-ranking 
members of the U.S. government, dumped much of its BP stock shortly before 
the spill. [true; Goldman Sachs did sell some of their shares in BP in the first 
quarter of 2010} 
Following this list of 'facts', participants read a short transcript of a radio interview with 
an 'independent researcher'. The content of the interview varied between participants: 
in the control condition, the researcher simply talked about the severity of the spill: 
The whole Gulf of Mexico is in danger, not just in the short term, but in the 
long term too - we could see twenty, maybe thirty years before a real 
recovery of the ecosystem. We knew right from the beginning that they 
were trying to play down the importance, to make it not seem as bad as it 
was, but the truth is that it's actually worse than it seems. This is a real 
catastrophe, and I don't think anyone who's informed on the subject is 
satisfied with the way BP and the American government are conducting the 
cleanup. Whether it's because of greed or just incompetence, the spill and 
its after effects are going to be much worse than they ought to be. 
rn two different direct advocacy conditions, the interviewee directly accused the 
American government of conspiracy. In one version, he was vague about how it was 
accomplished: 
The American government is in trouble. They're low on money, so they 
need to tax American corporations to keep themselves - keep their heads 
above water. So what do they do? They decide that they need a disaster. I 
don't think this so-called oil spill was an accident. I really don't. I think 
that the oil rig was bombed, and that the bombing was perpetrated by 
agents of the United States government. 
In the other version, the interviewee was more specific about how the conspiracy was 
carried out: 
The American government is in trouble. They're low on money, so they 
need to tax American corporations to keep themselves - keep their heads 
above water. So what do they do? They decide that they need a disaster. So 
they sabotage an oil rig with a little bomb, and distract the Coast Guard 
with a bogus terrorism drill so they can't put out the fire, and blame it on 
evil negligent corporations. They make even more money off it through 
their cronies in Goldman Sachs and Halliburton, and they freeze out the 
media, they don't let them investigate the oil rig. Anyone who suspects 
what went on, like the workers, they intimidate or bribe or just kill. And it 
worked perfectly. We all fell for it. 
In the JAQ condition, he implied the existence of a conspiracy but refused to say as 
much outright, instead promoting distrust of authorities and doubt in the official story: 
There are too many problems, too many inconsistencies, too many 
connections to powerful people who have an interest in a disaster like this. 
And so there are questions that need to be raised, because there's more to 
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this than meets the eye. But I don't want to speculate on what really caused 
the oil spill. I want people to go and do the research and draw thcir own 
conclusions about what really happened. 
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Finally, participants were presented with three statements: 'The official story is 
basically true', 'The oil spill was an accident', and 'The oil spill was the result of a 
government conspiracy'. As in Study 6, we asked participants to rate their agreement 
with each statement on a 1-8 Likert scale, along with the degree to which they found the 
statements to be plausible, convincing, worth considering, interesting, and coherent. 
This resulted in a 2 (explanation type: official story vs. CT; within-participants) x 4 
(advocacy strategy: control, vague, specific, and JAQ; between-participants) mixed 
factorial design. A sample questionnaire is included in Appendix G. 
Results and discussion 
Planned comparisons by condition revealed no significant differences between 
agreement with the official story and agreement that the oil spill was an accident, so 
only the accident results are analysed here for the sake of brevity. A 2 (explanation type; 
within-participants) x 4 (advocacy strategy; between-participants) mixed ANOVA with 
agreement as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of explanation 
type such that participants generally expressed more agreement with the official story 
(M= 4.60) than with the CT (M= 3.40), F(1,148) = 32.06, MSE = 3.32, P < .001, 
partial,,2 = 18. This was qualified by a significant interaction, F(3,148) = 3.36, MSE = 
3.32, p = .02, partial ,,2 = .06. Pairwise comparisons using the LSD error correction 
showed significantly greater agreement with the official story than with the CT in the 
control, detailed CT, and vague CT conditions (allps < .01) but not in the JAQ 
condition, p = .80 (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12. Agreement with official story and CT over different persuasive styles in 
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This result is in line with our hypotheses: participants generally expressed 
scepticism about the conspiracist explanation of the oil spill, agreeing more with the 
official explanation. The only exception was in the JAQ condition, where a CT was 
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advocated through suggestion and innuendo rather than explicitly. As alluded to above, 
the strength of JAQ may lie in the fact that the idea of conspiracy is never raised 
explicitly as an argument, which helps to minimise incoherence between the 
conspiracist explanation and the anti-conspiracist views held by the majority of 
observers. Instead, the focus is on the perceived inadequacy of the official explanation 
and some pieces of evidence that point to something vaguely sinister. In the direct 
approach, however, the CT is well-defined and can end up as a target for 
counterarguments provoked by the suspicion and distrust engendered by accusations of 
conspiracy (Schul et al., 2004). 
Along with Study 6, the findings of Study 7 indicate that CTs are most 
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believable when they are simple and never explicitly stated. Providing details, or even 
being explicit about the existence of a conspiracy, seems to have a deleterious impact. 
We propose that this effect is primarily due to background knowledge and beliefs 
concerning CTs and the world as a whole, in line with extended MBS theory. When a 
proposition comes into conflict with broad worldviews, it suffers for it; when it is in 
accord with one's higher-order beliefs, however, it gains substantial credibility from the 
association. The degree to which someone believes in CTs is greatly affected by their 
own traits, beliefs, and biases, and this effect can be accentuated or mitigated through 
variations in how the theories are presented. 
As alluded to above, however, the JAQ technique has several potential 
advantages over direct accusations of conspiracy, and Study 7 does not give a strong 
indication of which one is at work. While JAQ is indeed vague and likely provokes 
suspicion, it may also be more convincing than direct advocacy because it insulates the 
substance of a pro-conspiracist argument from the potentially damaging stigma 
surrounding CTs in general. We examine this possibility in Study 8. 
Study 8 
Extended MBS theory would explain Study 7's JAQ effect with recourse to the 
way in which it minimises contact between the particulars of the CT and other 
components of the perceiver's potentially non-conspiracist worldview. However, this is 
not the only possible interpretation of the results. The results of Study 5 suggest that 
CTs suffer from an intellectual stigma. This may prevent people from giving due 
consideration to hypotheses that appear to be conspiratorial (Bale, 2007; Bratich, 2008; 
Keeley, 1999). JAQ may therefore serve as a way of disguising CTs as non-
conspiratorial questioning of received explanations: rather than directly conveying CTs 
to the reader through explicit presentation, JAQ's use of innuendo and advocacy of 
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questioning authority and independently coming to one's own conclusions may help to 
mitigate the effect of this stigma. To understand why, it is necessary to describe in some 
detail the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (ELM). 
The ELM is a dual process model proposing that persuasive messages are 
processed in different ways depending on the perceiver's ability and inclination to think 
about the matter in depth (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). A perceiver who is likely to think 
critically about the content of a particular persuasive communication is said to have 
high elaboration likelihood, and will be more convinced by good arguments than by bad 
ones. This is the central route to persuasion: a thoughtful evaluation of the contents of a 
persuasive message, with the result depending largely on the strength of the arguments. 
A perceiver who is either unable or unwilling to give much thought to the substance of 
the argument is said to have low elaboration likelihood, and is more likely to rely on 
peripheral cues such as the perceived expertise or attractiveness of the source. 
Accordingly, this method is known as the peripheral route: evaluating a message on the 
basis of external cues rather than on the quality of the message itself. While the strength 
of an argument has a measurable effect on central route persuasion due to the primary 
importance of thoughtful evaluation of the message, the success of peripheral route 
persuasion is mostly unrelated to the strength of the arguments themselves. Conversely, 
peripheral cues such as source attractiveness have a stronger effect under conditions of 
low elaboration likelihood (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
This distinction is important when considering CTs' negative reputation. Bale 
(2007) has suggested that because of the stigma surrounding CTs, people generally do 
not bother to distinguish between genuine and bogus conspiratorial hypotheses - in a 
reversal of the pattern we found in Chapter 2, while conspiracists entertain CTs simply 
because they are CTs, non-conspiracists reject them for the exact same reason. In this 
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view, peripheral-route consideration of CTs by non-conspiracists would put the CTs at a 
disadvantage. However, increasing elaboration likelihood would help to mitigate the 
impact of the social stigma of conspiracy theorising. Intellectual orthodoxy's distaste for 
CTs is not based solely on rational considerations of incoherence with broader views of 
the world - it is affective as well as cognitive (Bratich, 2008). Therefore, pro-CT 
persuasive communications under conditions of high elaboration likelihood should 
depend less on congruence with broader worldviews and more on the strength of the 
argument itself. Since JAQ distances itself from allegations of conspiracy, emphasises 
the importance of critical thinking, and encourages the reader to participate in making 
conspiratorial inferences, it may well contribute to more central processing of 
conspiracist arguments than direct accusations would (c.f. Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Heesacker, 1981). 
Study 8 was designed to test the elaboration likelihood explanation for the JAQ 
effect. When elaboration likelihood increases, so too does the effect of argument quality 
- stronger arguments are more convincing the more thought they are given, while the 
opposite is true of weaker arguments (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Therefore, Study 8 
constituted an experiment in which argument technique and argument quality both 
varied between participants. The evidence in favour of the CT was either strong or 
weak, and the rhetorical argument constituted either direct accusations of conspiracy, 
JAQ, or a control condition. If the JAQ effect is due to increased elaboration likelihood, 
we should see a stronger effect of argument quality. In other words, we predicted that 
while stronger arguments would be more convincing for all participants, this effect 
would be more pronounced when the arguments were delivered in a JAQ-style message 
than when delivered in a more straightforward manner. 
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Method 
Participants and design 
We recruited one hundred and eighty-four participants for Study 8, all undergraduate 
and postgraduate students at the University of Kent. In exchange for their participation, 
participants were given a randomised prize of either sweets or £ 1-£2. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: they would either be presented with a 
strong straightforward argument, a strong JAQ argument, a weak straightforward 
argument, or a weak JAQ argument. As such, the study followed a 2 (evidence quality) 
x 2 (argument style) between-participants factorial design. 
Materials and procedure 
The materials used in Study 8 were similar to those used in Study 7. As before, 
participants were presented with a brief summary of the events surrounding the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, followed by a list ofleading 'facts' (mostly fabricated) and 
a brief interview with a fictitious researcher. In Study 7, however, the list of facts had 
two separate versions: one in which they were designed to be convincing, and one in 
which they were designed to be unconvincing. The subject matter was still roughly the 
same, but the degree to which the facts pointed to a conspiracy varied systematically 
between participants. For instance, one 'strong' item was: 
On the day of the spill, the US Coast Guard were busy participating in a 
large-scale anti-terror drill and had a delayed response as a result. This kind 
of drill happens only once each year. 
And the equivalent 'weak' item: 
On the day of the spill, the US Coast Guard were busy participating in a 
large-scale anti-terror drill and had a delayed response as a result. This kind 
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of drill is conducted about twice a month. 
This was the general pattern for the argument quality manipulation: weaker arguments 
were more likely to be attributable to coincidence or misperception, whereas stronger 
arguments were more definite and contained clearer implications of conspiracy. The 
relative quality of each argument was assessed in a brief pilot study, which confirmed 
that the high-quality arguments were generally viewed as more convincing than the low-
quality ones were. 
We manipulated argument style by varying the content of the interview at the 
end. The JAQ interview was the same as in Study 7, and the straightforward interview 
was a word-for-word copy ofthe direct conspiracy condition in Study 7. Finally, 
participants were presented with two statements, 'The official story is basically true' 
and 'The Gulf of Mexico disaster was the result of a government conspiracy', followed 
by the same S-point Likert scales used in Study 7. A sample of the questionnaire used in 
Study 8 is included in Appendix H. 
Results 
A 2 (evidence quality) x 2 (argument style) between-participants ANOYA 
revealed a significant effect of evidence quality such that participants given strong 
evidence in favour ofCTs agreed less with the official story, F(I,180) = 8.49, MSE = 
2.61,p < .01, partial YJ2 = .05. However, there was no main effect of argument style, 
F(l,ISO) = .016, MSE= 2.61,p = .90, partial 112 < .01, nor was there any interaction 
between the two variables, F(l, 180) = .147, MSE = 2.61 p = .70, partial YJ2 < .01. 
Another ANOY A, this time with agreement with the CT as the dependent 
Variable, showed the equivalent effect of evidence quality: participants who were 
exposed to strong arguments agreed more with the CT, F(1,174) = 15.54, MSE = 2.4S,p 
< .001, partial 112 = .OS. There was no main effect of argument style, F(l,174) = 2.37, 
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MSE = 2.48, p = .13, partial172 = .01 , but there ~as a significant interaction, F(l , 174) = 
4.27, MSE = 2.48 , p = .04, partial '12 = 02 . Whi le there was no simple effect of argument 
style when the provided evidence was low-quality, F(I,174) = . 14, MSE = 2.48 P = .71 , 
partial 1'/2 < .01, there was a significant simple effect in the high-qua li ty condition, 
F(1 ,174) = 6.50, MSE = 2.48, p = .01 , partial ,,2 = .04. Specifically, agreement with the 
CT was lower for high-quality JAQ arguments (M = 3.95) than it was for high-quality 
explicit arguments (M = 4.80) (see F igure 13). 
Figure 13. Mean CT agreement as determined by argument quality and argument style 
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While we found an argument quality effect in Study 8, it was the opposite of the 
one hypothesised. If the JAQ technique is effective because it increases elaboration 
likelihood, it should have been more persuasive than direct arguments when the 
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arguments were high-quality. Instead, direct arguments were much more persuasive in 
the high-quality condition. This directly contradicts the hypothesis that JAQ works by 
increasing elaboration likelihood. 
There are several potential reasons for this unexpected finding. Firstly, the effect 
of JAQ might be the opposite of what was hypothesised - it is possible that JAQ 
actually decreases elaboration likelihood instead of increasing it. Rather than engaging 
directly with the evidence by attempting to fit it into a coherent narrative, JAQ might 
encourage a cursory surface examination of the evidence and a vague sense of suspicion 
while resisting any attempt to shape it into an alternative account of what might have 
happened. Making such a detailed argument invites counterargument (Schul et aI., 
2004), while JAQ shuts down any attempts at such by its very nature - rather than 
advocating aCT, JAQ seeks to provoke doubt in non-conspiracist narratives. Dean 
(2002) noted that "conspiracy's insinuations disrupt the presumption that there is a 
coherent, knowable reality that [can] be mapped" (p. 93) - rather than promoting 
conscious elaboration and careful consideration of evidence, JAQ discourages it. 
If this explanation holds, Study 8 fits closely with Studies 1 through 6. The 
reliance on vagueness, innuendo, and suspicion is in agreement with the extended MBS 
theory's contention that conspiracist belief is rooted in significant part in opposition to 
official narratives, and that the details of a particular CT are not very important. As 
shown in Study 5, conspiracists focus less on the details ofCTs and more on perceived 
flaws in the competing mainstream explanations. Finally, Study 6 showed that including 
additional details when presenting CTs is in fact a disadvantage: the less detailed a CT 
is, the less it diverges from most people's established knowledge about the world and 
the more plausible it seems. JAQ may decrease elaboration likelihood by shifting the 
focus from the details of the CT to the inadequacies of the official story. 
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However, if it is indeed true that JAQ serves to reduce elaboration likelihood, 
participants who received a JAQ-style argument should have been more convinced by 
the low-quality arguments than those who received a more explicit argument were 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). We did not find such an effect. This naturally casts doubt 
upon the validity of the decreased elaboration likelihood explanation. Alternatively, the 
arguments used might have been too strong and/or too weak. The weak arguments may 
have been seen as extremely unpersuasive, and it could be that even adding a 
peripheral-route approach in the form of JAQ does not do much to improve them. 
Participants may have found the interviewee to be overly smug and disingenuous in the 
high-quality JAQ condition, or overconfident and unbalanced in the low-quality explicit 
condition. Alternatively, the issue may have been one of power - it is possible that there 
was a difference in low-quality arguments' effectiveness according to how they were 
presented, but the sample size was insufficient to detect it. A post-hoc power analysis 
shows that for an effect with partial 112 = .01 and an alpha level of .05, a sample size of 
184 would give 1-~ of only 0.27. 
Study 7 also presents a problem for one important reason: Study 8 did not 
replicate its predecessor's JAQ effect. In the high-quality condition JAQ produced the 
opposite effect, apparently causing a drop in conspiracy agreement relative to explicit 
arguments; in the low-quality condition, there was no simple effect of argument style on 
agreement with the CT - in other words, JAQ did nothing at all. This failure to replicate 
the effect of Study 7 makes any interpretation of the JAQ effect based on Study 8's 
results problematic. It could be that the strong arguments were simply too strong and the 
weak arguments too weak, and the JAQ technique only produces a salutary effect when 
there is some amount of uncertainty regarding the plausibility of a CT. Indeed, van 
Prooijen & Jostmann (in press) showed that some pro-conspiracy interventions work 
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only under conditions of uncertainty. Alternatively, Study 7 was conducted while the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill was still in progress and therefore fresh in participants' 
minds, and when a number of actual CTs regarding the spill were circulating on the 
Internet (e.g. Humint Events Online, 2010). Study 8 took place several months later, 
when the flow of oil (along with major media coverage of the incident) had stopped, 
and opinions about the causes of the incident may have solidified in participants' minds 
before the study began. 
There are therefore several possibilities that could explain the unexpected results 
of Study 8. Due to the failure to replicate the JAQ effect from Study 7 and the lack of an 
effect between JAQ and direct statement conditions for low-quality arguments, the most 
probable interpretation seems to be that the suspicion and mistrust aroused by JAQ 
provoked counterarguments to the lists of facts in both conditions. In the strong 
condition, this attenuated the persuasive effect; in the weak condition, the arguments 
were already weak enough that any potential salutary effect of JAQ did not make much 
of a difference. 
Moreover, across both JAQ and explicit argument conditions the lists of facts 
remained the same, and it could be argued that this list of facts in itself constituted the 
main body of the argument being put forth. The section at the end which instantiated the 
argument style manipulation was really more of an appendix, a section which presented 
no new evidence and instead summarised what had already been said along with 
offering some rather substance-free opinions and moral judgements. Would taking a 
consistent rhetorical approach throughout the argument, rather than solely at the end, 
lead to a more faithful representation of that approach's effects? We pursued this 
question in Study 9 by extending different rhetorical approaches to the presentation of 
the evidence as well as to the summary at the end. 
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Study 9 
Whatever the ultimate explanation for the results of Study 8, the findings are not 
conclusive. The results are nearly the opposite of what one would expect to see if lAQ 
worked by increasing elaboration likelihood, but are not exactly a match for the 
opposite proposition either, despite that option's higher degree of concordance with 
previous results and with the extended MBS framework. While it is possible that the 
effects of the manipulations were attenuated by divorcing the substance of the 
arguments - the facts of varying quality - from their style, this still does not provide a 
coherent interpretation of the observed differences. 
As such, Study 9 was devised as a follow-up meant to more closely couple the 
style and substance of the arguments used. Unlike Studies 7 and 8, we designed Study 9 
so that each leading 'fact' about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was accompanied by 
either no additional information, an interpretation that challenged the official story's 
ability to account for the fact, additional text that painted the fact as supporting a CT, or 
both derogation of the official story and support for the CT. In this sense, Study 9 
parallels Study 5, in which we found that CTs tend to make lAQ-style arguments that 
derogate official narratives but fail to provide a clear alternative. Based on this finding, 
and on the results of Studies 6 and 7 which indicate that poorly specified and vaguely 
presented CTs are generally seen as being more plausible than those which are more 
specific and well-elaborated, we predicted that while presenting evidence as a 
contradiction of official narratives would produce an increase in agreement with aCT, 
presenting the same evidence as supporting a specific CT would either have no effect or 
reduce CT agreement. 
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Method 
Participants and design 
We recruited one hundred and sixty participants from the University of Kent's 
Canterbury campus for Study 9, compensating them for their time with a randomised 
prize of sweets or £ 1-£2. Of these, nine were eliminated due to copying one another's 
answers, failing to read instructions, or being under the age of 18. The remaining 151 
participants (65% female) had a mean age of23.9. Study 9 followed a 2 (promotion of 
CT) x 2 (derogation of official story) between-participants design, and participants were 
randomly assigned to each of the four conditions. 
Materials and procedure 
Study 9, like its two immediate predecessors, consisted of a paper questionnaire 
containing information regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and two items meant 
to assess participants' beliefs in CTs and in the official account of the incident. It 
diverged from Studies 7 and 8 in three important ways, however. First, the list of facts 
changed once again, attempting to strike a balance between the weak and strong 
argument conditions of Study 8 in order to achieve a middle ground that would promote 
uncertainty about the official story but still leave some doubt as to whether the oil spill 
was indeed the product of a deliberate conspiracy. Second, the interview at the end was 
eliminated. In its place, each 'fact' was accompanied by one of several different 
postscripts. Each fact was followed by a sentence presenting it as difficult to explain 
using the official story, a sentence presenting it as explainable by a CT, both, or neither. 
For example, one (fabricated) fact was as follows: 
• At the time of the explosion, the US Coast Guard were participating in a major 
anti-terror drill, which delayed their response and may have worsened the effects 
of the spill. 
The sentence implying that the official story cannot explain this was as follows: 
• This kind of drill is only conducted on only three days out of every year, 
meaning that the odds of such a coincidence are less than one percent. 
And the sentence claiming that this fact supports aCT: 
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• If someone wanted to create a major disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, it would be 
necessary to get the Coast Guard out of the way with just such a drill. 
The final divergence from Studies 7 and 8 was in the form of the framing device used. 
The editorialising that accompanied the facts and the absence of an interview 
necessitated the reframing of the text as a summary of a documentary film on the oil 
spill by an environmental watchdog group. This did not vary between conditions, and 
text relating to it was only present in the introductory paragraphs. 
The dependent measures consisted of two 1 (,Strongly Disagree') - 6 (,Strongly 
Agree') 6-point Likert scale items at the end of the questionnaire. The statements were 
identical to those used in Study 8. We elected to use a simplified scale in Study 9 rather 
than the composite endorsement items used in Studies 6, 7, and 8 as the agreement 
items are more interpretable and have consistently given similar or identical results to 
the composite endorsement measures. A sample of the questionnaire used in Study 9 is 
included in Appendix I. 
Results 
A 2 (promotion of CT) x 2 (derogation of official story) between-participants 
ANOV A with conspiracy agreement as the dependent variable revealed no main effect 
of Official-story derogation, F(1,146) = 1.01, MSE = 1.66, P = .32, partial 1'/2 = .01, and 
no main effect ofCT promotion, F(l,146) = .40, MSE = 1.66,p = .53, partial 1'/2 < .01. 
There was, however, an interaction between the two, F( 1,146) = 4.35, MSE = 1.66, p 
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= .04, partial1'f2 = .03 (see Figure 14). 
Simple main effects analyses revealed that when the materials directly promoted 
the CT there was a significant effect of derogation, F( 1,146) = 4.72, MSE = 1.66, p 
= .03, partial1'f2 = 03 . This effect was such that participants who were given both anti -
official-story and pro-CT information (M = 3.14) agreed less with the CT than those 
who only received information supporting the CT did (M= 3.80). In the absence ofCT 
promotion, however, agreement with the CT was no different between the derogation 
(M = 3.45) and no-derogation (M = 3.22) conditions, F(1,146) = .59 1, MSE = 1.66, p 
= .44, partial1'f2 < .01 . When no derogation was used, there was a marginal simple effect 
of promotion, F(l,146) = 3.69, MSE = 1.66, p = .06, partial '1'f2 = .03 ; in the presence of 
derogation, however, adding CT promotion produced no significant difference, 
F(l, 146) = 1.06, MSE = 1.66, p = .31 , partial '1'f2 = .01. 
Figure 14. Agreement with proposed oil spill CT in Study 9 according to whether the 
official story was derogated and/or the CT was explicitly promoted. Error bars repre ent 
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The effects found in Study 9 are contrary to what was predicted. Emphasising 
the inadequacies of the official account had no significant effect on agreement on its 
own, and when derogation was added to a text that also promoted the CT directly it 
actually made the argument less convincing. Though we found no significant 
differences between doing nothing, promoting the CT directly without derogating the 
official story, and criticising the official story without promoting the CT, there was a 
marginal trend toward promotion providing an advantage over giving no additional 
information. This effect is surprising, given the pattern found in Study 5 whereby pro-
conspiracist arguments tended to focus more on highlighting perceived inadequacies in 
the official account than on promoting specific alternative theories. The ineffectiveness 
of official-story derogation in Study 9 further calls into question Study 7's finding that 
the JAQ technique - which is essentially official-story derogation with some rhetorical 
flourishes - is more effective than direct conspiracy advocacy. 
However, one potential factor that was overlooked in the design of Study 9 was 
the fact that the CT was never explicitly spelled out. While the CT -promotion 
conditions did contain information which argued that a CT was the most reasonable 
explanation, the CT itself was never directly put forth as a potential explanation. In this 
way, even the CT-promotion conditions resemble the JAQ technique used in Studies 7 
and 8: rather than directly accusing anyone of conspiracy, they put forward arguments 
that seem to support a number of different CTs while never committing to a specific 
version. At no point did the stimulus materials directly accuse the U.S. government of 
deliberately blowing up the oil rig - it was certainly heavily implied that they did, but it 
was never stated outright. Thus the CT -promotion materials may have essentially been a 
more forceful version of JAQ. 
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Why, then, did including both promotion and derogation lead to lower 
agreement than promotion alone? The answer to this may lie in the result of Study 6, 
wherein the more details about a CT were provided, the less plausible it seemed. While 
the additional stimulus materials did not provide additional evidence per se, they did 
contain additional information about how unusual some of the alleged occurrences 
were. Combined with the more (but still not entirely) direct accusations of conspiracy 
from the CT -promotion condition, this may have increased the amount of detail enough 
that the implied conspiracy began to seem implausible. In this view, JAQ on its own 
provokes a generalised feeling of distrust, which feeds into the extended MBS via the 
higher-order belief that officials and official explanations are generally untrustworthy. 
When combined with specific details of a CT, however, the distrust created by JAQ 
generalises and causes reactance, inducing participants to generate counterarguments to 
the CT itself (Schul et al., 2004). When the details of the CT are left unspecified, there 
is very little of a CT to argue against and the counterarguments are confined to the 
official account, to the benefit of the CT. 
If this interpretation is accurate, then the results of Studies 6-9 would indicate 
that the key to successful CT persuasion lies in striking a balance between providing too 
much information and providing too little. There must be sufficient grounds to arouse 
distrust in the audience, thereby provoking counterarguments against the official 
account and feeding into the anti-authoritarian elements of the conspiracist belief 
system, but not so much information that the CT is either directly stated or too heavily 
implied, as this provokes the audience into generating counterargumcnts against the CT 
as well. JAQ, with its suspicion-provoking innuendo and inherent vagueness, has the 
potential to balance the two concerns very well. However, thcre is one aspect of JAQ 
that we have not yet addressed: the use of questions. Canonically, although not in the 
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materials we have used in Studies 7 and 8, JAQ consists at least partially of leading 
rhetorical questions. Leading questions have been shown to have unique effects in 
persuasion, and may play an important role in the popularity of the JAQ technique. As 
such, Study 10 examined the effect of using leading questions on conspiracy persuasion. 
Study 10 
JAQ, as exemplified by the style of argumentation used by conspiracy advocates 
such as the makers of the 9/11 conspiracy documentary Loose Change (Rowe et al., 
2005), uses vagueness and insinuation to its advantage, but - perhaps crucially - also 
engages in leading rhetorical questions. For instance, why was the debris at the 
Pentagon inconsistent with a passenger jet? Was the US military given a 'stand down' 
order by Vice-President Cheney during the attacks? 
Leading questions such as these can have powerful effects on their audience. 
While innuendo of any kind can help to alleviate the effects of negative source 
perceptions on the persuasiveness of a message, leading questions have a particularly 
strong effect in this regard (Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982; Wegner et al., 1981). 
Past research has demonstrated that rhetorical questions can increase message 
processing and persuasion, particularly when the audience has a low degree of 
involvement in the subject at hand or is already amenable to persuasion (Blankenship & 
Craig, 2006; Burnkrant & Howard, 1984). Leading questions may also have the effect 
of insulating the questioner from criticism - they allow deniability such that the 
speaker, if challenged, can deny that they are making any accusations at all. An 
advantage might lie here, and in the fact that questions tend to be misremembered as 
statements (Pandalaere & Dewitte, 2006), as well as in any unique persuasive advantage 
to questions in and of themselves. 
All else being equal, what is the difference between a conspiracist argument that 
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asks questions and one that uses statements? If there is in fact a difference, it probably 
depends upon the specificity of the accusation being made. Studies 6-9 have all pointed 
in the direction of more detailed accusations of conspiracy being generally less 
plausible, as the generalised distrust produced by reading pro-conspiracist arguments 
causes counterarguments to be generated against any propositions stated coherently 
enough to allow them (Schul et ai., 2004). Since leading questions have been shown to 
increase elaboration likelihood and thoughtful processing of persuasive messages, as 
well as the generation of attitude-congruent counterarguments (Blankenship & Craig, 
2006; Burnkrant & Howard, 1984), they may also encourage the generalised 
counterargumentation naturally provoked by a specific approach to accusations of 
conspiracy. In this view, asking a question, rather than simply giving a statement, would 
prompt effortful thought and intensify the generation of counterarguments. When 
accusations of conspiracy are too vague to argue against, these counterarguments would 
target only the official story; when they are specific, however, the CT would suffer a 
decline in plausibility. 
In order to investigate the role of questions versus statements in conspiracist 
persuasion, we conducted a study in which a list of evidence suggesting a CT was 
followed by a statement that was either devoid of content or contained vague or specific 
accusations of conspiracy. The statement was either declarative or interrogative. On the 
basis of the idea that leading questions can promote the generation of counterarguments 
and that such counterargumentation is one of the disadvantages of a specific approach to 
conspiracy persuasion, we predicted that there would be an interaction between 
specificity and argument style such that leading questions reduce CT plausibility when 
the CT is well-specified but increase it when the CT is vague. In addition, we expected 
that when there were no accusations of conspiracy at all, suspicion would not be 
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aroused and there would be no effect of rhetorical style. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and four undergraduate students (84% female, mean age 19.6) at 
the University of Kent participated in Study 10 for course credit. Of these, eight were 
eliminated from analysis due to spending less than 45 seconds on the task, leaving 196 
useable data points. Study 10 used a 2 (argument style: interrogative vs. declarative) x 3 
(information content: empty, vague, or specific) between-participants factorial design, 
and accordingly each participant was randomly assigned to one of the resulting 6 
groups. 
Materials and procedure 
After providing demographic information, participants were presented with a 
short persuasive text regarding the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of201O, framed as an article 
on a website run by a former oil industry executive. The first three paragraphs were the 
same for all participants, and gave a brief summary of the oil spill followed by two of 
the suspicious 'facts' used in Study 9. The fmal sentence varied according to both the 
style in which it was presented (interrogative or declarative) and its information content 
(empty, vague, or specific). For example, the interrogative/empty condition read: 
How did the oil spill really happen? 
The interrogative/vague condition: 
Was the destruction of the oil rig deliberately engineered? 
And the interrogative/specific condition: 
Was the destruction of the oil rig deliberately engineered by agents of the 
US government? 
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Except for the declarative/empty condition (which had no additional text), the 
declarative conditions used sentences that had the same content, rephrased as statements 
rather than as questions - for instance, in the declarative/vague condition: 
The destruction of the oil rig was deliberately engineered. 
Participants were then presented with four statements regarding the oil spill and were 
asked to indicate to what degree they agree or disagree on a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The statements were 'The oil spill was 
either an accident or the result of negligence', 'There was a plot to create the oil spill', 
'The oil spill was intentionally planned and carried out', and 'Some information about 
the oil spill is being intentionally covered up'. The dependent measure was the total of 
the agreement scores for both conspiracy items (,There was a plot to create the oil spill ' 
and 'The oil spill was intentionally planned and carried out'). A sample copy of the 
questionnaire used in Study 10 is included in Appendix J. 
ResuJts and discussion 
The data were analysed using a 2x3 between-participants ANOYA, which 
revealed that there was no main effect on CT agreement of either style, F( 1,188) = .00 I, 
MSE = 1.34, p = .98, partial 112 < .00 I, or specificity, F(2, 194) = .002, MSE = 1.34, 
p> .99, partial 112 < .001. In addition, there was no significant interaction between style 
and specificity, F(2, 194) = 1.60, MSE = 1.34, p = .20, partial 112 = .02 (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. CT agreement in Study 10 across empty, vague, or specific accusations of 
conspiracy phrased as a question (interrogative) or a statement (declarative) . Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
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Contrary to our predictions for Study 10, phrasing a conspiracy accusation in the 
fonn of a question rather than a declarative statement gave no persuasive advantage or 
disadvantage regardless of whether the accusation itself was vague, specific, or 
nonexistent. Why did we not find an interaction between detail and argument style? One 
explanation suggests itself from our rationale for the effects of the past set of studies . 
We have reasoned that it is important to fall between two extremes in specificity: a 
persuasive conspiracist message must be detailed enough to provoke distrust, but vague 
enough to avoid provoking counterarguments against the proposed conspiracy itse lf. If 
this reasoning holds, there are two possible reasons for our failure to find an effect. 
First, it is possible that both conditions are too detailed - the invariant text that all 
conditions were exposed to simply says too much, so adding even more specific 
accusations of conspiracy at the end does not give participants any more of a basis for 
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disagreement than otherwise. If this were true, however, we would still expect to see a 
main effect of argument style. The other possibility is that both conditions are too 
vague. This seems more immediately plausible, since the text used in Study 10 bears 
more of a resemblance to the official-story derogation conditions in Study 9. However, 
the framing device in Study lOis different from those used in previous studies - the 
information was presented as coming from a fonner oil industry executive. lie could be 
seen as having a vested interest in discrediting his former colleagues in the industry by 
concocting bogus CTs about them. If participants had their suspicions aroused by the 
materials, this angle might occur to them readily, since suspicion leads to more 
sophisticated attributional thinking than normal (Fein, 1996; Hilton, Fein, & MiIlcr, 
1993). 
Finally, placing the manipulation at the end of the text, rather than at the 
beginning as was the case for Bumkrant and Howard (1984), may have attenuated the 
effect. Rather than having the rhetorical question in mind when looking at the rest of the 
evidence, the effect came in only at the end and may not have been able to affect the 
procedural generation of counterarguments sufficiently to produce a significant effect. 
Thus, there are several possible explanations for the null effects found in Study 10, and 
without further investigation it is difficult to pinpoint which is most plausible. 
General discussion 
Studies 6-10 present a challenge to interpret consistently. While Studies 6 and 7 
appeared to show that CTs are more plausible when they are vague and presented in a 
manner that uses innuendo rather than direct accusations, Study 8 was unable to 
replicate the innuendo effect, and Study 10 showed no differences between vague and 
specific accusations, whether they were phrased as statements or questions. Moreover, 
Study 9 found no advantage for arguing against the official story over arguing in favour 
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ofa CT, despite Study 5's finding that this method of argumentation dominates 
conspiracist discourse in news website comment sections and the apparent congruence 
between the official-story derogation approach and the innuendo-laden JAQ technique 
examined in Study 7. 
How can we reconcile the results of Studies 8-10 with those of Studies 6 and 7? 
The chain of reasoning that we have followed throughout this chapter proposes that the 
JAQ and specificity effects are a natural consequence of a generalised mistrust that is 
provoked by the conspiracist mistrust of official narratives and officialdom in general. 
This mistrust manifests itself as reactance against any sufficiently specific arguments 
the participant reads, sueh that well-specified CTs tend to generate their own 
counterarguments while vague CTs are largely immune due to the lack of any 
substantive information about them. When it works, the JAQ technique works because 
it serves to maximise mistrust and suspicion. Under this interpretation, Study 6 found 
that providing additional details about CTs decreases their plausibility because of the 
additional raw material for counterarguments, Study 7 demonstrated that using JAQ 
with a poorly-specified CT is more convincing than directly arguing for it; Study 8 
showed that JAQ attenuates the effect of high-quality arguments since they carry with 
them a much more obvious and suspicion-provoking implication of conspiracy, which 
then invites counterarguments; and Study 9 showed that the JAQ-type tactic of arousing 
suspicion by arguing against the official story interacted poorly with providing details 
about a CT (operationalised by arguing in favour of it). Study 10's null result may have 
simply been due to a lack of statistical power, insufficient variance in specificity 
between conditions, or simply a misguided choice of the placement of the manipulation 
within the stimulus materials. 
On the whole, we believe that this account provides a more coherent account of 
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the data at hand than the idea that Studies 6 and 7 were simply statistical flukes. This is 
extremely unlikely on the simple basis of the inferential statistical results obtained in the 
first two studies. Moreover, consistent with the mistrust-based interpretation, the 
rhetoric used in Study 6's JAQ condition contained much mistrust-provoking rhetoric: 
There are too many problems, too many inconsistencies, too many 
connections to powerful people who have an interest in a disaster like this. 
And so there are questions that need to be raised, because there's more to 
this than meets the eye. 
Not only is mistrust a previously determined correlate of conspiracist belief (and a 
proposed element of the extended conspiracist MBS; e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), 
it provokes counterarguments against any arguments that are coherent and accessible, 
whether congruent with the initial target of mistrust or not (Schul et al., 2004). This line 
of reasoning matches several findings in the literature on interpersonal suspicion: Fein 
(1996) showed that interpersonal suspicion provoked by the possibility of ulterior 
motives tends to generalise, such that the resultant effortful, rational attributional 
thinking and consideration of evidence (Hilton et af., 1993; Sinaceur, 2010) is applied 
to actors quite separate from the originally suspicious ones. 
An important distinction here is that in the attribution literature, interpersonal 
suspicion is usually conceptualised as a state in which multiple plausible hypotheses 
about actors' motivations are entertained at once, rather than a single one being settled 
upon (Kramer, 1998; Sinaceur, 2010; though see Kalichman, 2009). This may provide 
another explanation for the divergent results found in this chapter: in Study 7, the effect 
of the JAQ condition was such that it was the only one where the conventional and 
conspiracy explanations were on equal footing. In other words, participants appeared to 
suspend judgement as to which hypothesis was more plausible. In Study 8, JAQ actually 
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had a similar effect - while in the high-quality explicit condition the CT was found to 
be more plausible than the official story, both possibilities elicited the same level of 
agreement in the high-quality JAQ condition. Study 9's unexpected effect in which 
official-story derogation appeared to reduce CT agreement actually put CT agreement 
more in line with official story agreement compared to the promotion-only condition. 
The strange effects in these studies, then, might be an artefact of the initial differences 
in agreement. Given that most CTs are generally less popular than the opposing official 
explanations, JAQ would generally confer an advantage by putting the competing 
explanations on equal ground - it is only in the fairly rare cases where the CT is 
believed more than the official story that JAQ confers a disadvantage. 
If JAQ indeed generates suspicion, the reason for the effects found in this 
chapter is probably a combination of counterargument generation and judgement-
suspension. Ifparticipants can generate counterarguments equally well for both 
conspiratorial and conventional hypotheses (because both are well-elaborated), they will 
end up suspending judgement. If not, then the one which is better-elaborated will 
provoke more counterarguments and finish at a disadvantage. However, this explanation 
is post-hoc, and more research would be required to determine whether it can accurately 
predict novel effects as well as explaining old ones. Probably the most straightforward 
test of the suspicion-counterargument hypothesis would be to directly induce 
interpersonal suspicion in one group of participants through an essay-writing 
manipUlation similar to that used by Whitson and Galinsky (2008), and have a second 
group write a control essay. Both groups would then fill out the same questionnaire as 
in Study 9. The control group should show the same results found here: an increase in 
agreement with the CT in the condition in which the CT is advocated but the official 
story is not derogated. If the suspicion-counterargument hypothesis holds, the suspicion 
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essay group should not show this effect - since they are already suspicious, they should 
generate anti-CT eounterarguments regardless of the presence or absence of official 
story derogation. There are many such studies that could be conducted to examine this 
account, and further research could indeed clarify some of the ambiguous results found 
in Chapter 4. 
Finally, how does this line of reasoning match up with extended MBS theory? 
Study 6 supports the theory, in that it shows an asymmetry in how CTs and 
conventional explanations work. The contingent effect of complexity is explainable as a 
consequence of how the different kinds of theories match up with higher-order beliefs: 
since most people do not hold conspiracist worldviews, more complex CTs on average 
seem less plausible. It might be informative to explore this effect by seeing if the 
opposite effect can be obtained for pro-conspiracists, but as there was no individual-
differences measure of conspiracism in Study 6, such an analysis would require a new 
study. Studies 7 through 10, however, are less direct in their support for extended MBS 
theory. We hypothesise that the driving force behind the effects found in these studies is 
the tendency to generate counterarguments against any sufficiently well-specified 
explanations when suspicion or mistrust is aroused (Schul et ai., 2004; Sinaceur, 2010). 
Therefore, under conditions of suspicion and mistrust, producing a well-specified CT 
provokes the audience into generating anti-conspiracist arguments, which makes the CT 
seem less plausible. The connection to extended MBS theory in these studies is the role 
of suspicion or mistrust, which, as outlined in previous chapters, are two of the 
hypothesised higher-order components of the conspiracist MBS. Indeed, we hypothesise 
that some of the suspicion and mistrust experienced by participants in these studies was 
the result of spreading activation - in other words, reading sufficiently explicit 
persuasive conspiracist messages caused the activation of related higher-order beliefs, 
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suspicion and mistrust included. These then generalised to produce the paradoxically 
anti-conspiracist effects found in the latter half of the chapter. In this sense, the results 
are consistent with extended MBS theory, though they do not constitute unequivocal 
support. 
Chapter 5: Implications and Future Research 
Abstract 
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In this fmal chapter, we summarise our findings, review the theoretical and practical 
implications for future research and policy, and outline potential limitations. Although 
the results of the present research are not unequivocal, and some of the effects obtained 
can be given alternative explanations, the general pattern points strongly toward the 
utility of extended MBS theory as both a unifying framework for previous results and a 
theory that allows novel predictions to be made. The research reported here suggests 
several potential avenues for future investigation, including cross-cultural comparisons, 
psychologically justified conspiracy theory classification schemes, a more detailed 
examination of the social stigma surrounding conspiracism, and potential interventions 
against harmful conspiracist beliefs. 
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The central point of this thesis has been a specification and subsequent 
evaluation of the extended mono logical belief system theory of conspiracism, a 
proposed successor to Goertzel's (1994b) original MBS theory. Goertzel, having found 
significant correlations between seemingly unrelated CTs (as well as a highly coherent, 
near-unitary factor structure), theorised that for many people CTs form a belief system 
that is monological in character - in other words, it explains nearly everything that 
happens without stepping outside of its core assumptions. For a monological thinker, 
every problem is explained as having the same single cause: "the conspiracy of the 
Jews, the capitalists, the patriarchy, the communists, the medical establishment, or 
whatever" (Goertzel, 1994b, p. 741). This explains the correlations in beliefs in different 
CTs: the Jews being behind the JFK assassination makes it seem more likely that they 
are also behind both World Wars, the financial crisis of2008, the ongoing cover-up of 
flying saucers, and so on. Goertzel's idea of monological belief has much in common 
with Barkun's (2006) idea of a superconspiracy - a conspiracy of conspiracies, whereby 
individual events are caused by smaller conspiracies that are themselves part of a large, 
world-spanning conspiratorial plot. However, it has never been clear that many people 
really believe in these superconspiracies, and it seems unlikely that a belief held by only 
a small percentage of the population could account for the substantial shared variance 
between unrelated CTs (in Study I, they were generally in the .30-.40 range). 
The present research project fills a need that was also recognised by Newheiser 
et al. (2011) as the first studies of this project were coming to fruition: the necessity of 
including higher-order knowledge structures in any model of conspiracist belief. The 
importance of cognitive consistency between CT beliefs and other beliefs has been 
largely ignored until the past few years, and the extended MBS theory was initially 
designed to explain correlations between unrelated conspiracy beliefs as a product of the 
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need for consistency and to link this literature with the substantial body of research on 
individual differences. In Chapter 1, we proposed four major components to the theory: 
1. Beliefs can be represented as nodes in a feed forward connectionist network. 
2. Belief in a particular CT has excitatory and inhibitory connections with beliefs 
in other CTs and with conventional (non-conspiracist) explanations: 
contradictory beliefs inhibit one another, while those which directly support 
each other are bridged by excitatory connections. 
3. Beliefs in individual explanations also share connections with higher-order 
beliefs: broader assumptions and ideas about how the world works in general. 
These higher-order beliefs can constitute any general approach or opinion. such 
as a negative perception of a particular group, a generalised mistrust of people, 
or the idea that conspiracies are common. 
4. Higher-order beliefs generally playa more important role in binding together 
conspiracist beliefs than beliefs in individual theories do. 
The first and second points of extended MBS theory allow the theory to he evaluated 
directly via computational connectionist modelling, while the third and fourth make 
empirically testable predictions about the sorts of patterns that ought to emerge in 
studies of conspiracist belief. Potential candidates for the higher-order beliefs that hold 
the system together have included generalised mistrust, anomie, an external locus of 
control or feeling of lacking control, and more specific beliefs regarding the proposed 
conspirators. The ten studies presented in this thesis have examined the utility of 
extended MBS theory as specified here in predicting and meaningfully explaining 
patterns of cognition unique to conspiracist belief. 
Study 1 served in part as a replication of previous work on correlations between 
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unrelated CTs (e.g. Goertzel, 1994b; Swami et ai., 2010; Swami et ai., 2011), 
demonstrating that reliable positive correlations can be found between CTs that have no 
overt connection to one another. The novel component of Study 1 consisted of the 
finding that the more participants believed that Princess Diana had been assassinated, 
the more they also believed that she had faked her own death and is still alive 
somewhere - a positive correlation in beliefs in two clearly contradictory theories. 
Likewise, the more they believed that she had been killed by a rogue cell of MI6, the 
more they believed that she had been killed by Mohamed Al-Fayed's business enemies. 
These correlations are difficult to explain, because the possibilities are mutually 
exclusive: Diana cannot be dead and alive at the same time, nor can she have been . . . 
independently killed by two entirely different parties. The extended MBS framework is 
able to explain this by positing that the various Diana CTs, as well as CTs in general, 
are held together by higher-order beliefs whose shared variance among various 
alternative accounts tend to overshadow contradictions at the locallcvel. One flaw in 
Study 1 was an apparent floor effect: very few people seemed to believe that Diana 
faked her own death, so the correlations between that particular idea and others ended 
up being rather small, and in one case only marginally significant. 
Study 2 replicated the pattern of contradictory correlations by demonstrating a 
significant positive correlation between endorsement of CTs proposing that Osama bin 
Laden is still alive and CTs proposing that he has been dead for many years. The 
extended MBS framework, via the fourth point, would predict that these correlations 
can be attributed to shared higher-order beliefs such as a generalised suspicion of 
authority, the perception of a cover-up, and so on. In support of this prediction, Study 2 
showed that the contradictory correlation was fully explained by belief that a cover-up 
had taken place (although the correlation did not become negative, indicating that other 
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higher-order beliefs possibly contributed as well). One weakness of Study 2 was that the 
correlation did not manifest in agreement, but only in a broader measure of composite 
endorsement. This measured not just the degree to which participants agreed with the 
statement in question, but also the degree to which they found it plausible, convincing, 
worth considering, and coherent. To some degree this makes it less intuitivcly 
surprising that contradictory theories should show a positive correlation, since there is 
no contradiction in finding two different possibilities to be equally plausible or equally 
worthy of consideration. In any case, however, the pattern persists in the form of 
composite endorsement, and it is still explained by extended MBS theory. 
Study 3 sought to combine the findings of Studies I and 2 with the first two 
components of extended MBS theory. It constituted an experiment that presented 
evidence favouring one of several explanations for a fictitious event. We used 
simulations based on the ECHO instantiation of Thagard's (1989) explanatory 
coherence framework to model the responses that extended MBS theory would predict, 
and found that they were generally a good match to the data. Specifically, the model 
made the counterintuitive prediction that in conditions where the evidcnce favoured one 
CT, the other CT would still be preferred to the conventional explanation - and indccd, 
the data matched this prediction. Two results were not predicted by ECIIO, however -
in the anti-conspiracy condition participants agreed with all possibilitics equally, and in 
each condition other than that favouring a government conspiracy, participants tendcd to 
agree more with the idea of a corporate conspiracy. We argue that sincc thc anti-
conspiracy condition was the only one in which the conventional explanation was on 
equal footing with the CTs, this is consistent with ECHO's prediction plus a general bias 
toward the CTs that the model did not predict, and could be accounted for by the effects 
of analogy or unaccounted-for higher order beliefs. One example might be an analogy 
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between the journalist scenario used in Study 3 and existing CTs or similar occurrences 
in popular fiction. Popular CTs allege that many apparent suicides, including those of 
Kurt Cobain and Dr David Kelly, were actually cleverly disguised murders. Crime 
television shows commonly feature plots in which an apparent suicide turns out to have 
been a homicide. If participants believed in these CTs or were fans of murder mysteries, 
the suicide verdict might seem less plausible due to the similarities between the 
situations. The general preference for corporate over government CTs can be explained 
in more or less the same way. For instance, participants may have had a general belief 
that local governments are less competent than multinational corporations, and therefore 
that conspiracies are more likely to stem from the latter than from the former. 
Study 3 also replicated the contradictory correlation findings from Studies 1 and 
2 with a fictitious (rather than veridical) CT, allowing us to factor out any specific 
preconceptions about the CT that participants may have brought with them and thereby 
reducing the amount of noise in the relationships involved. The contradictory 
correlation was strongest in the condition in which a higher-order belief in the existence 
of a cover-up was reinforced by evidence, further solidifying our confidence in the 
pattern of results pointing to the primary importance of higher-order beliefs in 
conspiracism, although the correlation was only marginal in one of the pro-conspiracy 
conditions. In some of the conditions, as in Study 2, belief in a cover-up accounted 
entirely for the contradictory correlation, while in others it only partially explained it. 
Finally, Study 4 sought to determine whether conspiracist beliefs were distinct 
from non-conspiracist beliefs in their ability to intercorrelate in spite of contradictions. 
Although contradictory conventional explanations showed a tendency to intercorrelate 
in some conditions, they did not do so in a control condition without persuasive 
evidence one way or another, while contradictory CTs did. In addition, neither class of 
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explanation showed contradictory correlations in the conditions which presented 
evidence backing one of the conventional theories, further implying that there is a 
fundamental asymmetry in the structure of conspiracist and non-conspiracist beliefs. 
Moreover, there was a strong rank-order correlation between the predictions of ECHO 
simulations and the empirical results in each condition. However, caution is due in 
interpreting the results of Study 4, as the manipulations did not seem to have the desired 
effect - in each condition which favoured a particular interpretation, that interpretation 
was not agreed with any more than it was in the control condition. 
The above studies constituted the first empirical chapter, as they can all be 
grouped together under the common themes of contradiction and simulation. In general 
they provide strong, though not unqualified, support for the predictions of the extended 
MBS model of conspiraeist belief. The contradictory correlations cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by a belief model that takes only CTs and the direct connections 
between them into account, such as the original formulation of MBS theory as proposcd 
by Goertzel (l994b) and elaborated upon by Swami and colleagues (Swami et ai., 2010; 
Swami et ai., 2011). Any coherent explanation for these correlations seems to require 
acknowledging the contribution of higher-order beliefs that make CTs as a class of 
explanation more or less plausible in general. This explanation is reinforced by the 
findings of Studies 2 and 3 that higher-order beliefs account for much, and in some 
cases all, of the variance shared between contradictory CTs that show a positive zero-
order correlation. Moreover, Studies 3 and 4 showed that Thagard's explanatory 
coherence model (Thagard, 1988) provides a promising avenue for further exploration 
in the computational modelling of belief systems in general, and of conspiracist belief 
systems in particular. 
Following in the footsteps of Byford and Billig's (2001) dialogical analysis of 
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anti-Semitic CTs in the former Yugoslavia, Study 5 used quantitative archival methods 
to examine the differences between conspiracist and non-conspiracist belief systems 
suggested by the results of Studies 1-4. Specifically, we examined whether these 
differences would manifest themselves in online discourse regarding 9/11 CTs between 
pro- and anti-conspiracy advocates in news website comment sections. Consistent with 
our contention that the conspiracist extended MBS includes as a major component a 
reflexive rejection of received explanations for events, results showed that pro-
conspiracist comments were far more likely than anti-conspiracist comments to attack 
perceived weaknesses in the opposing argument and less likely to advance arguments 
that supported their own point. Study 5 also provided further support for the 
interrelatedness of unrelated CTs within the conspiracist MBS, as pro-conspiracist 
comments were more likely to mention unrelated CTs as being true while anti-
conspiracist comments were more likely to mention unrelated CTs as being false. The 
results also provided further confirmation for the idea, put forward by many 
philosophers and other observers of the conspiracy world, that "conspiracy theorist" is 
an unflattering label that many seek to avoid (e.g. Bale, 2007; Bratich, 2002, 2008). 
Finally, an analysis of the hostility of pro- and anti-conspiracist comments revealed that 
pro-conspiracist arguments tend to be less hostile than anti-conspiracist ones. 
Some caution is due in the interpretation of Study 5, as the inter-rater reliability 
was, in some cases, not sufficiently high. In fact, one analysis (regarding whether a 
specific explanation was put forward in each comment) had to be dropped because there 
was so little agreement between raters. While archival analyses of online conspiracy 
belief have significant potential as a future investigative method, particularly given the 
vast amount of raw material, reliable ratings may be a problem. Many of the comments 
used sarcasm and irony, and it was often challenging to interpret them in a consistent 
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manner. 
In Study 6, we began a related line of research by investigating the degree to 
which vague accusations of conspiracy are more convincing than specific ones. Indeed, 
the more detailed a CT, the less believable it was; for conventional explanations, the 
opposite was true. This suggests that pro-conspiracist advocates' tendency to keep focus 
on the implausibility of the conventional narrative, as demonstrated in Study 5, may 
have real utility: due to CTs' divergence from the assumptions of non-conspiracist belief 
systems, additional detail renders them less plausible to most people, while the opposite 
is true of conventional explanations - additional details bring them more in line with 
what is expected, raising their plausibility by way of the availability heuristic (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). In addition, the lack of detail in a CT may make it hard to generate 
counterarguments against it, and distrust, a major proposed component of the 
conspiracist MBS, tends to provoke fairly indiscriminate counterargument generation 
(Schul et al., 2004). 
Study 7 followed up Study 6's investigation of vagueness versus detail with a 
targeted examination of the popular "Just Asking Questions" (JAQ) technique of 
argumentation, which focuses on promoting doubt and mistrust in the absence of 
specific proposals. Leading questions and innuendo also feature prominently. In the first 
of many studies centred around attempting to convince participants that the 2010 Gulf 
of Mexico oil spill was the result of a sinister conspiracy, Study 7 showed that JAQ is 
an effective persuasive tactic, and was alone among several other tcchniqucs in bringing 
CT belief up to the same level of agreement as the opposing conventional explanation. 
We explain this effect with in a similar manner to Study 6 - the JAQ tcchnique relies on 
raising vague suspicions and mistrust regarding the fairly well-specified official account 
while failing to provide a coherent conspiracist alternative. This provokes a generalised 
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mistrust and leads to spontaneous counterargument generation, for which all well-
specified arguments suffer. Study 8 explored an alternative possibility, that of increased 
elaboration likelihood, reasoning that JAQ may have served to increase central 
processing and soften the impact of the stigma ofCTs. Contrary to this possibility, 
Study 8 showed that in fact JAQ presented a disadvantage when the CT was obvious 
from the evidence, which is consistent with the generalised mistrust interpretation. 
In a more or less direct follow-up to Study 5, Study 9 investigated the 
effectiveness of using the same evidence to promote a CT versus to derogate the official 
story. While there was no main effect of either promotion or derogation, an interaction 
resulted in which promotion alone was significantly more effective than when the two 
were combined. We interpret this finding as further confirmation of the 
counterargument-generation effect: official-story derogation serves to generate doubt, 
mistrust, and suspicion, which when combined with the otherwise effective direct CT 
promotion strategy results in counterarguments being generated in response to each 
otherwise believable conspiracist point (Schul et al., 2004). 
Finally, Study 10 examined the role of phrasing conspiracist arguments as 
questions versus statements and the amount of content of conspiracist accusations. 
Unlike in previous studies in the final empirical chapter, the amount of content in the 
final accusation had no effect. Whether the accusation was declarative or interrogative 
also made no difference. We are cautious in our interpretation of this final study, as the 
amount of actual conspiracist content did not vary substantially between conditions -
the manipulated section was quite brief, and as such the effect may have been 
attenuated. However, the lack of an effect of interrogative versus declarative style 
eliminates another potential explanation for the apparent effectiveness of the JAQ 
technique that, as its name implies, often implies the use of leading questions to make 
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its point. 
In general, the findings of the empirical studies reported here indicate that 
extended MBS theory provides a solid base from which to examine the psychology of 
conspiracy belief. The theory predicted the correlations between contradictory 
conspiracy beliefs, something its predecessor cannot account for - in this formulation, 
people hold the higher-order beliefs that govern beliefs in individual CTs to a greater or 
lesser extent. This leads to a reliable correlation because increased activation of these 
higher-order beliefs leads to a generalised increase in conspiracy belief. Those with a 
low level of congruent higher-order belief find CTs mostly implausible simply because 
they are CTs, and those whose belief systems are more in line with a conspiracist 
worldview find CTs generally plausible for the same reason. While Studies 6-10 are 
more difficult to interpret, the most consistent interpretation of this series involves 
provocation of suspicion, which is a hypothesised higher-order component of the 
conspiracist MBS. 
Practical implications 
The empirical findings of this thesis, along with the postulates of extended MBS 
theory, have obvious utility for officials and policy-makers. Conspiracist belief is not 
harmless; it discourages pro-environmental behaviours and engagement with politics 
and society (Butler et a/., 1995; Jolley & Douglas, in press), and may help to reinforce 
some of the higher-order beliefs identified above, such as feelings of powerlessness and 
mistrust (Read et a/., 2003; Simon et a/., 2004). The associated construct of paranoid 
social cognition can disrupt organisations, promote interpersonal suspicion, create 
hostile work environments, and hamper productivity (Kramer, 1999). Other researchers 
have emphasised the need for a strategy to reduce public belief in CTs, often by having 
authorities combat them through either open or clandestine "cognitive infiltration" of 
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conspiracist groups (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). 
The present research, however, suggests that this approach may be misguidcd. 
The empirical studies detailed in this thesis have supported the central contention of 
extended MBS theory: that belief in a particular CT is dctermined less by the particulars 
of the theory than by broader beliefs about the world. Government conspiracies seem 
more likely when the perceiver does not trust the government (Gocrtzel, 1994), 
conspiracies by ethnic or religious minorities seem more likely when the person in 
question is authoritarian and sees the group in question as highly entitative (Grzesiak-
Feldman & Suszek, 2008; Grzesiak-Feldman & Izrycka, 2009), and conspiracies in 
general seem more likely when the world seems like an untrustworthy and unknowable 
place that quashes any sense of personal control (Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974). Arguing 
against individual CIs seems unlikely to be very productive when these higher-order 
beliefs remain intact - if conspiracist belief really has a monological character to it, it 
should have no trouble rejecting contradictory evidence as part of the conspiracy. 
Indeed, this is a well-observed tendency among conspiracists (e.g. Keeley, 1999). If CT 
belief is a problem is to be addressed, it may be more productive to address the 
underlying beliefs about the world that make conspiracism as a worldview seem 
plausible than to attack individual beliefs that are ultimately of little consequence in 
maintaining the overall coherence of the belief network. 
That said, many of the underlying causes of conspiracist belief are probably due 
to either individual differences or broader social concerns such as economics, 
immigration, and the vagaries of the political system (Willman, 2002). If this is so, then 
addressing them would be outside the purview of smaller organisations or individuals 
Who might be the targets of CTs themselves. In this case, a more direct and focussed 
approach might be beneficial, and in fact the present research provides some instructive 
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insights into tactics for direct argumentation with conspiracists. Study 5 has 
demonstrated that conspiracists prefer to attack official narratives rather than to 
advocate directly for CTs, Study 6 has shown that more specific CTs are less plausible, 
and Studies 7-10 all point to the conclusion that highly elaborated CTs can be self-
defeating because the suspicion and distrust that pro-conspiracist arguments generate is 
indiscriminate enough that it turns on the CTs as well. When arguing against aCT, anti-
conspiracists may be best served by prompting their opponents to put forward a specific 
theory (or by attempting to construct one themselves) rather than 'just asking questions' 
or focusing on perceived weaknesses in non-conspiracist narratives. 
This tactic may have the effect of bringing to light the utility of the connectivity 
principle - the scientific idea that a new theory must be able to account for existing data 
as well as whatever evidence disconfirms the old one (Stanovich, 2003). In spite of the 
fact that the explanatory coherence model accurately models both scientific and lay 
cognition (Schank & Ranney, 1992), the connectivity principle remains poorly 
understood in the general public (Stanovich, 2003). Tactics like JAQ and arguing 
against conventional explanations as a way of arguing for a CT without really arguing 
for it can be seen as a way of side-stepping the connectivity principle: a vague CT may 
explain selected bits of evidence very well but struggle in producing a coherent account 
of the entire event in question. For example, one popular 9/11 CT is the idea that the 
aircraft that hit the Pentagon was not a passenger jet, as the official story would have it, 
but a drone or missile fired by the U.S. Military. This idea is brought forward to explain 
several alleged anomalies, such as an apparent lack of significant debris at the crash site 
and an unclear image of the aircraft on CCTV footage (Kay, 2011). Debating the 
validity of these points keeps the focus on the official story, but attempting to weave the 
remaining evidence into a conspiracist narrative begins to present a problem, as this 
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necessitates constructing a coherent account of the ultimate fate of the hijacked 
passenger jet, the source of eyewitness accounts purporting to see a passenger jet, the 
lamp posts which appeared to have been broken off at the level of the jet's wings, and so 
on. Bringing these aspects to the foreground by attempting to construct a comprehensive 
alternative account essentially emphasises the importance of the connectivity principle. 
Even in cases where a CT ends up being true, or at least a more coherent account than 
competing conventional explanations, promoting the development of a coherent 
alternative account can only be a good thing. 
Theoretical implications and directions for future research 
Practical implications aside, what implications does extended MBS theory and 
this series of studies have for further research into the psychology of conspiracy belief? 
The theory was devised not only as a continuation ofMBS theory, but as a framework 
that has the potential to unify several disparate results in the field. As noted in Chapter 
1, the majority of the psychological literature on conspiracy belief has historically 
focused on individual differences: factors like mistrust (Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974), 
locus of control (Hamsher et al., 1968), openness to experience (Swami e/ al., 2010), 
anomie (Swami e/ al., 2011) and authoritarianism (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; but see 
MclIoskey, 1995) have all been linked with conspiracy belief. Extended MBS theory is 
a novel addition to the field in that it provides a unitary mechanism by which these 
factors could exert their influence on the degree to which someone believes in CTs. 
They can either be construed as beliefs in themselves which affect how the person in 
question thinks about CTs, or they can lead to beliefs and attitudes that could do so in 
their place. For instance, a low level of interpersonal mistrust could be represented by 
the belief that people are untrustworthy. This would cohere with many CTs, given that 
CTs almost invariably involve sinister actions on the part of powerful others. An 
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external locus of control could also be represented as a higher-order belief that one's life 
is ruled over by forces outside of any possible control, which matches the structure of 
conspiracist beliefs particularly well. Openness to experience is more complex, but a 
high degree of openness could reflect a value orientation toward open-mindedness, 
which, if represented as a belief node, could help to generally mitigate the effect of 
conspiracism's intellectual stigma. 
Extended MBS theory also has the potential to account for some apparently 
conflicting results in the conspiracy belief literature. Authoritarianism provides an 
instructive example. Yelland and Stone (1996) found that high authoritarians were more 
susceptible to persuasive messages alleging that the Holocaust was a hoax, Grzesiak-
Feldman and Izrycka (2009) and Swami (2012) found a positive correlation between 
right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy beliefs about Jews and other minorities, and 
Abalakina-Paap et a/. (1999) showed a positive correlation between right-wing 
authoritarianism and specific conspiracy beliefs. However, Leman and Cinnirella 
(2007a) found no correlation between conspiracist ideation and authoritarianism, 
McHoskey (1995) found that authoritarians are less likely to accept JFK assassination 
CTs, and Swami et a/. (2010) showed that 9/11 conspiracy beliefs are associated with 
negative attitudes toward authority. Extended MBS theory can account for this diversity 
of results by referencing the specific properties of the CTs involved. Authoritarianism, 
for instance, is a cluster of traits and beliefs that tend to intercorrelate - the three that 
have stood up to analysis since Adorno et a/. (1950) first described the authoritarian 
personality are authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism 
(Altemeyer, 2006). Though not completely orthogonal to one another, these three 
represent distinct facets of authoritarianism. The observed correlations between CT 
belief and authoritarianism may differ because different aspects of the construct interact 
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in distinct ways with conspiracy belief: for instance, authoritarian aggression, 
instantiated in an extended MBS as a higher-order belief that aggression against 
deviants or outgroups is a moral imperative, may have a high degree of coherence with 
CTs which implicate minority groups such as Jews (e.g. Yelland & Stone, 1996). 
Perhaps the perceiver's antipathy toward the outgroup makes it seem more likely that 
that group has done something to deserve it, or perhaps it is a case of projection, a 
psychological process already implicated in conspiracist belief (Douglas & Sutton, 
2011). 
In contrast, the findings that conspiracists tend to be anti-authoritarian may 
apply to a different set ofCTs, particularly those that implicate authorities directly in 
the conspiracies themselves. Anti-authoritarian attitudes would certainly cohere with the 
idea that authorities are untrustworthy, are actively plotting harm against the people 
they govern, and are conspiring to cover up the truth about their sinister activities. 
Moreover, authoritarian conventionalism would most likely militate against 
unconventional beliefs. This would make sense of the negative corrclation found by 
Swami et al. (2010), and given that CTs usually implicate U.S. government agencies in 
the JFK assassination, can explain Mclloskey's (1995) finding as well. If this rationale 
is accurate, we should be able to see consistent associations bctween the nature of CTs 
and their correlations with higher-order beliefs, traits, attitudes, and tendencies such as 
the three primary facets of the authoritarian personality. 
This method of breaking down seemingly conflicting correlates into their 
constituent parts and examining those parts' coherence with individual theories is not 
unique to extended MBS theory, but it suggests itself as a natural outgrowth of the idea 
that the system is driven by sub-networks of coherence and incoherence. One caveat is 
that while throughout this thesis we have referred to the relevant higher-order 
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knowledge structures as beliefs and the systems they belong to as belief systems, there 
is more to the picture than belief - attitudes, values, and biases are no doubt relevant to 
CT belief as well. Indeed, Heider's (1958) concept of balance, on which much of the 
cognitive consistency literature (and therefore extended MBS theory) is based, 
described networks not of belief and disbelief but of liking and disliking. For the sake of 
using computational models to portray the cognitive context of a particular CT it makes 
sense to simplify somewhat by grouping all of these constructs under the "belief' label 
and their interrelationships as coherence or incoherence, or by only examining the 
beliefs that one would expect to be associated with particular values, attitudes, and so 
on. However, this assumption should be examined at some point in the future, 
particularly in regard to the influence of implicit attitudes and perceptions (e.g. 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
The extended MBS theory's interpretation of the apparently inconsistent results 
regarding authoritarianism seems straightforward. But it raises an interesting question, 
one which has only received cursory treatment in the psychological literature: can CTs 
be separated into meaningfully distinct categories? For Barkun (2006), the question is 
one of scale: conspiracies are either event-based, such as a particular assassination, 
terrorist attack, or similar occurrence; systemic, such as the idea that the banking system 
is controlled by Jews or that pharmaceutical corporations are deliberately making 
people ill in order to sell more drugs; or superconspiracies, such as the idea that all 
individual CTs simply describe elements of a centuries-spanning plot to bring about a 
New World Order. Byford (2002) characterised CTs as belonging to one of two 
categories: pseudo-mystical conspiracies such as the ones concerning the Jews, the 
Masons, and various occult groups, thought to be an outgrowth of medieval witch 
panics and pogroms; and world-elite conspiracies, which are a more modem and secular 
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development and usually concern small, tight-knit groups of conspirators working to 
exert material dominance over others. While these schemes certainly have a descriptive 
validity to them, it is not clear that the distinctions which they draw are psychologically 
meaningful. Extended MBS theory could be used to create a psychologically useful 
typology: one that partitions CTs into discrete categories that correlate with different 
higher-order beliefs. If our interpretation of the authoritarianism literature holds, 
Byford's typology may be a good starting point - as reviewed above, world-elite CTs 
generally seem to be believed more by anti-authoritarians, whereas pseudo-mystical 
CTs, particularly those involving minorities, appeal more to authoritarians. Different 
CTs also depend on different sets of beliefs that are more common in different cultures 
or subcultures, such as the cluster of medicine-related CTs generally believed by 
African-Americans, generally thought to be a consequence of the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiments (e.g. Bogart & Thorburn, 2005; Crocker et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 
2005), or the climate-change CTs which appear to be largely restricted to political 
conservatives and libertarians (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
One aspect of CTs that has made itself apparent a few times in the course of the 
present research is the associated social stigma. Study 5 showed that conspiracists are 
reluctant to classify their own beliefs as CTs or themselves as "conspiracy theorists," 
often attempting to tum the label around on those who would apply it to them. This 
confirms earlier theorising by observers of the conspiracy world, who caution against 
over-applying the term because ofthe risk that it could be used as a pejorative in ordcr 
to attack unorthodox views of history and politics (Bratich, 2002, 2008; Willman, 2002) 
- it is easy to dismiss something by accusing it of being ''just a conspiracy theory." 
Study 5 represents the first direct empirical confirmation of the idea that conspiracy 
theorising is stigmatised, and opens the door for further research into the subject. Does 
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the common stereotype of conspiracists as being paranoid and deluded (c.f. IIofstadter, 
1964; Kalichman et al., 2010; Kay, 2011) present an obstacle to conspiracist belief - in 
other words, do people avoid conspiracist beliefs because they do not want to appear 
paranoid? If so, how do conspiracists overcome this obstacle? 
Another area of future research suggested by the results of Study 5 concerns the 
status of CTs as a minority opinion and conventional explanations as a majority opinion 
(in most cases). Viewed in this way, conspiracists could be seen as an active minority 
attempting to make headway against a contrary majority, which opens up the social 
influence literature as a potential avenue for explaining differences in conspiracist and 
anticonspiracist behaviour, as well as reactions to different methods of persuasion 
(Latane, 1981). For instance, the success of minority influence depends in part upon the 
minority presenting a united and consistent front (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974), which 
may present a problem for conspiracists given the diversity of mutually contradictory 
opinions regarding the truth of a particular event. By the same token, good minority 
influencers must be likeable, which could present a further problem if eonspiracists are 
negatively stereotyped. Social influence theory can also present alternative explanations 
for previous findings in the conspiracy belief literature; for example, the finding of 
Douglas and Sutton (2008) that people underestimate the degree to which they were 
influenced by conspiracist material has some parallels in the social influence literature. 
Social cryptoamnesia is the process by which the source of attitude change toward a 
minority viewpoint is forgotten: the new attitude seems as though it were always the 
case, and the source of the attitude change is largely forgotten (Perez, Papastamou, & 
Mugny, 1995). 
Finally, Study 5's usage of online discourse data and Chapter 4's examination of 
the JAQ technique, a popular online debating tactic, suggest that examining common 
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elements of online discourse may be fruitful ground for further research. For example, 
the social influence literature suggests that deviant ingroup members can be more 
persuasive in presenting minority opinions than members of an outgroup (e.g. Maass & 
Clark, 1984). This mirrors the online tactic of 'concern trolling': 
In a situation where there exist mutually exclusive positions A and B, a 
concern troll is someone who supports A but professes to support B 
around genuine supporters of B. However, they express their 
"concerns" about aspects of position B in order to sow doubt and 
uncertainty amongst genuine supporters of B. (UrbanDictionary, 
2011). 
This tactic, among others, provides an interesting basis for further research. Naturally 
this is not restricted to debates regarding CTs, but could constitute part of a more 
general investigation into the tactics and tropes of online discourse. 
Potential limitations 
In invoking higher-order beliefs to explain the results of Studies 6-10, we run 
into a problem of specificity. While trust is perhaps the most well-established 
individual-differences contributor to conspiracy belief, and is therefore a prime 
candidate for a major higher-order component of any conspiracist belief network 
(Abalakina-Paap et at., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Hamsher et at., 1968; Inglehart, 1987; 
Kramer, 1998; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007a; Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Simmons & 
Parsons, 2005; Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974; Yelland & Stone, 1996), its adoption as an 
explanation for the effects of Studies 6-10 was post-hoc. This raises an important issue 
if extended MBS theory is to be used in future research: to what extent can we expect to 
define the relevant higher-order beliefs a priori, and is it a problem for the theory if the 
beliefs themselves are vaguely defmed? 
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On one hand, the theory does not explicitly specify which higher-order belief 
structures a conspiracist belief system must contain. There is likely some individual 
variation in which beliefs contribute most to the coherence of the belief system - as 
Goertzel (1994b) theorised, one person might believe that world events are tightly 
controlled by one of Barkun's (2006) superconspiracies, such as a JewishlMasonic plot 
to destroy Christianity, while another might have a generally low opinion of politicians 
and the other power brokers of society and believe that they are essentially corrupt, self-
serving, and power-hungry. The former person would likely have their belief system 
held together largely by constructs such as right-wing authoritarianism and beliefs in the 
proposed conspirators' entitativity (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman & 
Suszek, 2008), while the belief system of the latter might draw more of its shared 
variance from feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, and anomie (Hamsher et al., 1968; 
Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Swami et aI., 201l).1t seems counterproductive to commit to 
a predetermined set of higher-order beliefs rather than adapting the specifics of the 
theory according to the variation that can be expected between individuals and cultures 
(cf. Swami, 2012). 
On the other hand, extended MBS theory should avoid ad-hoc explanations 
whenever possible. Unlike CTs, scientific theories cannot be advocated through vague 
proposals, denigration of opposing explanations, and "just asking questions." In order to 
make meaningful predictions the theory must in principle be falsifiable, and this 
probably requires some minimal specification of the central components of conspiracist 
belief systems in general. Mistrust, as specified above, is almost certainly a component 
of the belief system: the idea that people cannot be trusted and will look to serve their 
own ends through sinister, secretive means is an inextricable part of conspiracy 
theorising. Other elements that likely bind together conspiracist belief systems, as 
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outlined here, include powerlessness, anomie, an external locus of control, extreme 
political opinions, and so on. However, these are not straightforward predictions of 
extended MBS theory - rather, they are postdictions, previous findings that the theory 
purports to be able to explain. What would constitute a more straightforward test of 
extended MBS theory? 
One approach would be to examine belief systems at the individual level. A 
study of individual conspiracist beliefs could be based around structured interviews in 
which people describe how they come to a conclusion on the validity or invalidity of 
particular CTs. The contents of these interviews could then be used to create Thagardian 
belief system models in a computational instantiation of the explanatory coherence 
model such as 'Convince Me' (Schank & Ranney, 1992). As shown in the total lack of 
overt comments relating to powerlessness in Study 5, people cannot be expected to talk 
about every higher-order belief that may be relevant to conspiracist belief, so some 
higher-order beliefs could potentially be added to the interview-based networks based 
on standardised measures of trust, powerlessness, anomie, and so on. If extended MBS 
theory holds, adding these elements to the interview-based belief networks should result 
in a substantial increase in explanatory power. 
Another potential future research project to test the predictions of extended MBS 
theory could centre around experimentally manipulating higher-order beliefs. While we 
have made some initial steps in this direction with Studies 3 and 4, wherein we 
manipulated the evidence for a cover-up, the results were mixed - while Study 3 
showed the expected effect, in Study 4 the manipulation check failed to show any 
statistically significant difference between the cover-up condition and the control 
condition. Some previous research could also be seen as fitting into this mould, 
particularly Whitson and Galinsky (2008), who showed that manipulating feelings of 
controlled to an increase in conspiracy belief. If extended MBS theory is indeed an 
accurate model of conspiracist cognition, we should be able to find more effects like 
this one. 
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The interrelatedness of CTs could potentially be accounted for by an alternative 
explanation that relates to another element of Thagard's (1989) model of explanatory 
coherence. One of the principles instantiated by the model is that of analogy. When two 
or more propositions are joined by a relationship that is congruent with a relationship 
between a separate but similar set of propositions, the equivalents in each group are 
joined by excitatory links. For instance, consider two separate CTs, one alleging that 
JFK was killed by a conspiracy within the US government and another alleging that 
Princess Diana was killed by a conspiracy within the British government. If the person 
in question believes in the JFK CT, the Diana CT will seem more plausible since the 
situations are basically analogous. Just as JFK was assassinated by elements within his 
own government, so was Diana assassinated by elements within hers; just as the French 
Revolution was orchestrated by Freemasons and Jews, so was the Second World War. 
Analogical reasoning could therefore serve to induct people into a conspiracist 
worldview: believing one CT leads to similar ones seeming more plausible, leading to a 
sort of ripple effect. While this explanation certainly sounds plausible, and analogy 
most likely plays some role in convincing people of CTs, it is not clear how it would 
account for the paradoxical positive correlations between contradictory theories shown 
to exist in Studies 1-4, much less the finding that the magnitudes of these correlations 
tend to be much reduced when selected higher-order beliefs are taken into account. No 
explanation other than extended MBS theory that can adequately explain this pattern of 
results has presented itself. 
Through the course of this thesis we have provided substantial support for the 
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idea that beliefs in CTs can be part of a broad belief system that is governed by ccrtain 
clusters of conspiracy-friendly higher-order beliefs. However, one aspect that we have 
not explored in any great depth is the 'M' in 'MBS'. To what degree are conspiracist 
beliefs really monological? Goertzel's (1994a) original distinction between dialogical 
and mono logical beliefs proposed that monological beliefs are essentially divorced from 
reality, and are not amenable to change from outside. They explain everything in terms 
of what is already known or believed, and very rarely accommodate new views or 
contradictory information without waving it away somehow. Saying that conspiracist 
beliefs form an MBS could in some ways be seen as a caricature of conspiracism that 
does not do the majority of conspiracists justice - even Goertzel noted that this extreme 
form of closed-minded cognition is more associated with clinical paranoid delusions 
than with everyday CT belief (Wulff, 1987). It may make more sense to think of the 
monologicalldialogical distinction as more of a spectrum than a hard distinction. Our 
results here, particularly those of Study 4, would therefore suggest that CT belief is 
more monological, on average, than non-conspiracist belief is. In other words, 
conspiracist beliefs, while not entirely closed off to outside evidence, tend to hold a 
higher degree of monologicality than conventional beliefs do. 
Concluding remarks 
In this thesis we have proposed and tested the extended MBS theory, a novel 
framework for understanding the structure of conspiracist belief systems. The theory, 
based in part on Goertzel's (1994b) contention that CTs can form a monological belief 
system, essentially proposes that CT beliefs are held together by mutual coherence with 
a set of higher-order beliefs, attitudes, and general assumptions about how the world 
works. This belief network is amenable to computational modelling as a feed forward 
connectionist network based on the principles of cognitive constraint satisfaction, and 
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can serve as a unifying framework for much of the existing research into the psychology 
of conspiracy belief. Our findings indicate that the mono logical nature of conspiracism 
manifests itself in various ways: in paradoxically positive correlations in belief between 
overtly contradictory ideas; in a generalised suspicion of authoritative explanations for 
events; and in a fine balance between CTs being presented in so much detail as to be 
implausible and so vaguely as to be vacuous. These trends are observable not just in 
questionnaires but also in behaviour in natural settings, as seen in Study 5's 
examination of online discussion. 
Conspiracism's status as an extended monological belief system is both a 
strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it allows seemingly self-contradictory 
worldviews to persist with a minimum of actual internal conflict. The opposition to 
officialdom that lies at the heart of conspiracism leads to the populist, anti-authoritarian 
messages of groups like the 9/11 Truth Movement, an ideology that comports well with 
the ideals of Western democracy. It is a weakness, however, because the very suspicion 
that on which conspiracism is built causes potential converts to the conspiracist 
worldview to be suspicious of CTs themselves. At their most convincing, CTs are more 
ephemeral than concrete: there is little in the way of development of coherent 
alternative narratives. The stereotype of conspiracy theorists laying out their beliefs in 
voluminous, Byzantine flowcharts does not reflect the reality for most people who hold 
conspiracist views. Rather, the conspiracist worldview is defined by suspicion, mistrust, 
and amorphous ideas about sinister control from behind the scenes. CTs are at their 
most effective when given only a cursory examination, and at their least convincing 
when they are looked at in detail. 
Perhaps the most important outcome of the present thesis is the idea that 
conspiracism can be usefully seen as a worldview or an ideology, albeit one defined 
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more by negative belief than by positive belief. Conspiracists do not trust authority, do 
not believe received explanations, and do not accept mainstream expert sources. The 
idea of conspiracism as ideology is in some ways radically different from the views 
advanced by early researchers in the 1960s and 1970s, who likened beliefs in conspiracy 
theories to clinical paranoia. It is an outcome of more recent efforts showing that these 
beliefs are the result of a complex interaction between internal psychological processes, 
external stimuli, and sociocultural context. 
Conspiracy theories, as a rule, propose that the world as we know it is a lie, and 
that the real causes of events hide in the shadows for fear of discovery. Yet conspiracy 
theories rarely shine a light into the shadows that purportedly hide the truth about the 
world. They draw a silhouette of the darkness and proclaim that there be dragons, but an 
honest search for truth must examine what lurks within the shadow - or not - rather 
than just tracing its outlines. 
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Appendix A: ECHO Models 
Introduction: murder example 
javaECHO code 
Equilibrium node activations 
Study 2: Osama bin Laden network 
javaECIIO code 
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Equilibrium node activations 
Study 3: Control condition 
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Study 3: Anticonspiracy condition 
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Study 3: Government conspiracy condition 
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Study 3: Corporate conspiracy condition 
javaECIIO code 
data( corpnote, evidence) 
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data( caseclosed, evidence) 
Equilibrium node activations 
Study 3: Coverup condition 
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Equilibrium node activations 
Study 4: Free Knights of the Cross and AI-Sharuq conditions 
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N.B.: The Free Knights version is shown here; the Al-Sharuq version has identical code 
and output, with only the names swapped. 
javaECIIO code 
II Evidence 
II poisongas = the facts of the news story common to all conditions: there was a poison 
gas incident at a US government building 
II Conventional theories 
II alsharuq = the attack was perpetrated by the Islamist terror group AI-Sharuq 
II freeknights = the attack was perpetrated by the white supremacist militia group Free 
Knights of the Cross 
I I Conspiracy theories 
II chernlab = the attack was actually an accident at a secret chemical weapons lab 
II insidejob = the attack was secretly perpetrated by the US government 
II coverup = there's some kind of coverup going on 
II The conventional theories explain the evidence 
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II So do the conspiracy theories 
explain« chern lab ),poisongas) 
explain( (insidejob ),poisongas) 
II Either conspiracy theory involves a coverup 
explain( (coverup ),chemlab) 
explain« coverup ),insidejob) 














Equilibrium node activations 
Study 4: Inside job and chemical weapons facility conditions 
N.B.: The chemical weapon lab version is shown here. The inside job version has 
identical code and output, with only the names swapped. 
javaECHO code 
II Evidence 
II poisongas = the facts of the news story common to all conditions: there was a poison 
gas incident at a US government building in Georgia 
II chemstuff = witnesses saw chemistry equipment being removed from the building 
after the attack 
186 
187 
II Conventional theories 
II alsharuq = the attack was perpetrated by the Islamist terror group Al-Sharuq 
II freeknights = the attack was perpetrated by the white supremacist militia group Free 
Knights of the Cross 
II Conspiracy theories 
II chemlab = the attack was actually an accident at a secret chemical weapons lab 
II insidejob = the attack was secretly perpetrated by the US government 
II coverup = there's some kind of coverup going on 
II The conventional theories explain the evidence 
explain( (alsharuq),poisongas) 
explain( (freeknights ),poisongas) 
I I So do the conspiracy theories 
explain« chemlab ),poisongas) 
explain« insidejob ),poisongas) 
explain« chemlab ),chemstuff) 
II Either conspiracy theory involves a coverup 
explain( (coverup ),chemlab) 
explain( (coverup ),insidejob) 















Equilibrium node activations 




II poisongas = the facts ofthe news story common to all conditions: there was a poison 
gas incident at a US government building 
I I Conventional theories 
II alsharuq = the attack was perpetrated by the Islamist terror group AI-Sharuq 
II freeknights = the attack was perpetrated by the white supremacist militia group Free 
Knights of the Cross 
II Conspiracy theories 
II chemlab = the attack was actually an accident at a secret chemical weapons lab 
II insidejob = the attack was secretly perpetrated by the US government 
II coverup = there's some kind of eoverup going on 
II The conventional theories explain the evidence 
explain( (alsharuq),poisongas) 
explain( (free knights ),poisongas) 
II So do the conspiracy theories 
explain( (chemlab ),poisongas) 
explain((insidejob),poisongas) 
II Either conspiracy theory involves a coverup 
explain« coverup ),chemlab) 
explain« coverup ),insidejob) 














Equilibrium node activations 




II poisongas = the facts ofthe news story common to all conditions: there was a poison 
gas incident at a US government building in Georgia 
II tapes taken = government confiscates or destroys all CCTV footage related to the 
attack 
I I Conventional theories 
II alsharuq = the attack was perpetrated by the Islamist terror group AI-Sharuq 
II freeknights = the attack was perpetrated by the white supremacist militia group Free 
Knights of the Cross 
II Conspiracy theories 
II chemlab = the attack was actually an accident at a secret chemical weapons lab 
II insidejob = the attack was secretly perpetrated by the US government 
II coverup = there's some kind of coverup going on 
II The conventional theories explain the evidence 
explain( (alsharuq),poisongas) 
explain( (freeknights ),poisongas) 
II So do the conspiracy theories 
explain« chemlab ),poisongas) 
explain«insidejob ),poisongas) 
II Either conspiracy theory involves a coverup 
explain( (coverup ),chemlab) 
explain( (coverup ),insidej ob) 
explain« coverup ),tapestaken) 
II The idea of a coverup contradicts the official story 
contradict( coverup,alsharuq) 
contradict( coverup,freeknights) 















Equilibrium node activations 
Study 6: Basic 9/11 conspiracy model 
javaECHO code 
data( collapse) 





Equilibrium node activations 
Study 6: Pro-conspiracist belief network 
javaECIIO code 
data( collapse,evil) 
explain( (fires ),collapse) 
explain« demolition),collapse) 









Equilibrium node activations 
Study 6: Anti-conspiracist belief network 
javaECIIO code 
data{ collapse,good) 
explain( (fires ),collapse) 
explain( (demolition),collapse) 
explain{ (cia ),collapse) 
explain« cia),demolition) 
contradict(good,cia) 





Equilihrium node activations 
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Appendix B - Study 1 Sample Questionnaire 
Please indicate how much you agree with each statement by selecting a number 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
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One or more rogue 'cells' in the British Secret Service constructcd and carricd out a plot 
to kill Princess Diana. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
The European Union is trying to take control of the United Kingdom. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Scientists are creating panic about climate change because it is in their interests to do so. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
There was an official campaign by MI6 to assassinate Princess Diana, sanctioned by 
elements of the establishment. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
There was no conspiracy involved in the assassination of John. F. Kennedy. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
"Climate change" is a myth promoted by the government as an excuse to raise taxes 
and curb people's freedom. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Princess Diana's death was an accident. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist action but a governmental 
conspiracy. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
The "science" behind climate change is at least dubious. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Business enemies ofDodi Fayed and his father Mohammed Al Fayed assassinated 
Dodi, with the death of Princess Diana a cover up for their operation. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
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The American moon landings were faked. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Princess Diana had to be killed because the British government could not accept that 
the mother of the future king was involved with a Muslim Arab. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
A government exercise was behind the suicide at Jonestown. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
The idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Princess Diana faked her own death so she and Dodi could retreat into isolation. 
strongly disagree' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
Governments are suppressing evidence of the existence of aliens. 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
197 
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Appendix C - Study 2 Sample Questionnaire 
MEDIA TRIVIA 
1. What's John McClane's repeated catchphrase in the Die Hard films? 
2. What was the name of the masked killer in the Halloween horror film series? 
3. Which EastEnders character was brought back to the show 14 years after his 
apparent death? 
4. Complete this dialogue from the film Goldfinger: 
JAMES BOND: Do you expect me to talk? 
AURIC GOLDFINGER: No, Mr. Bond! __________ _ 
5. Name a film or TV show in which a character uses the phrase "it's quiet... too 
quiet!" 
6. In The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, what does Gandalf say as 
he confronts the Balrog near the end? 
7. When a character in a film is attempting to defuse a bomb, they often have to 
choose between which of two coloured wires to cut. What are the usual colours 
of the wires? 
8. What was the name ofWes Craven's popular film series which parodied the 
cliches of the horror genre? 
9. In which film did a character played by Harrison Ford famously leap off a dam? 
10. In Kill Bill Volume 2, how did the Bride escape from being buried alive? 
11. If you're a character in a horror film, what's a good way to get yourself killed? 
12. List as many Arnold Schwarzenegger one-liners as you can think of. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each ofthefol/owing 
statements, and keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. 










































5. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are 






























8. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when 











On 2 May 2011, President Barack Obama of the United States announced that Osama bin Laden 
had been shot and killed in Pakistan in a raid by a Navy SEAL team, after being tracked to a 
compound near Islamabad by U.S. intelligence. According to the President, bin Laden was 
buried at sea shortly after the raid, and therefore the body could not be examined independently. 
In the following days, Obama's administration also refused to release photographs of the body, 
saying that their gruesome appearance might provoke retaliation against the U.S. and its allies. 
Some commentators have alleged that bin Laden was not actually killed in the raid. They 
suspect that the announcement was in fact a publicity stunt, meant to improve Obama's flagging 
approval ratings among voters in advance of the 2012 election. 
What do you think? 
I. "Osama bin Laden was killed in the American raid." 
To what degree do you agree with this idea? 
(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree) 
To what degree do you think this idea is: 
Plausible? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Convincing? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Worth considering? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Interesting? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Coherent? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
If you were in the position of the Obama administration. and bin Laden was not actllally killed in the raid. 
would you falsely claim that he was? 
(not under any circumstances) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (probably, yes) 
2. "Osama bin Laden is still alive." 
To what degree do you agree with this idea? 
(strongly disagree) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree) 
To what degree do you think this idea is: 
Plausible? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Convincing? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Worth considering? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Interesting? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Coherent? (not at all) I 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
If you were in the position of the Obama administration. and knew that bin Laden was still alive. ",OlliJ 
you withhold that information from the public and claim to have killed him? 
(not under any circumstances) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (probahly, yes) 
(TURN THE PAGE) 
201 
3. "When the raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already dead." 
To what degree do you agree with this idea? 
(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree) 
To what degree do you think this idea is: 
Plausible? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Convincing? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Worth considering? (not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Interesting? (not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Coherent? (not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
If you were in the position of the Obama administration, and knew that bin Laden had died long before 
the raid, would you withhold that information from the public and stage a fake raid as a publicity Stllnt? 
(not under any circumstances) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (probably. yes) 
4. "The actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some important 
piece of information about the raid." 
To what degree do you agree with this idea? 
(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree) 
To what degree do you think this idea is: 
Plausible? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Convincing? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Worth considering? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
Interesting? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very mlu.:h) 
Coherent? (not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much) 
If you were in the position of the Obama administration, and there was some embarrassing or damaging 
fact regarding the raid that you didn ~ want released, would you attempt to cover it lip? 
(not under any circumstances) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (probahly. yes) 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! 
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Appendix D - Study 3 Sample Questionnaire 
Below is an article from an American national newspaper. 
Please read it carefully before going on to the next page. 
Speculation Into Cause of Utah Journalist's Death 
Ethan Dunbar, an investigative journalist working for the Salt Lake City Tribune, was 
found dead in his apartment last week. Though Dunbar's death was quickly ruled a 
suicide by the local police, Dunbar's colleagues remain uncertain about the true cause of 
his death. 
"Look, I know Ethan was found hanging as though he'd committed suicide, and there 
was a suicide note," said another writer for the newspaper, speaking on condition of 
anonymity. "But I knew him, and I know he wouldn't have killed himself like that. 
Look at what he was working on when he died, and tell me the timing of his death isn't 
suspicious at all." 
At the time of his death, Dunbar was pursuing two separate investigations. In one, he 
was investigating allegations of cronyism and corruption by the mayor of Salt Lake 
City, who stands accused of granting lucrative building contracts to close associates. In 
the other, he was looking into complaints that Glickman Pharmaceuticals, a multi-
billion-dollar drug company with a powerful influence in local politics, was conducting 
highly unethical drug trials in Uganda. 
Suspicion about the circumstances of Dunbar's death has intensified this week since an 
explosive document was leaked from the Salt Lake City mayor's office. In the 
memorandum, dated a week prior to the apparent suicide, the mayor characterised 
Dunbar's investigation as "extremely damaging" and urged his staff to oppose the 
journalist's efforts "by any means necessary." 
Representatives for the mayor's office have attempted to downplay the significance of 
the document, but that has done little to stop growing calls for an independent 
investigation. "Enough of the lies," demands JusticeForEthan.com, a website set up by 
Dunbar's friends and colleagues. "It's time Ethan had justice." 
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Please read the following statements regarding the death of the journalist Ethan Dunbar 
and answer the questions that come after each. 
"Ethan Dunbar committed suicide. " 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 




To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 
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To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 
"The true circumstances of Ethan Dunbar's death are being covered up. " 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 
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Appendix E - Study 4 Sample Questionnaire 
Below is an article from an American national newspaper. 
Please read it carefully before going on to the next page. 
NERVE GAS ATTACK IN SOUTHERN USA CLAIMS 17 LIVES 
In what officials are calling one of the worst terrorist attacks in America in recent years, a cloud 
of deadly Sarin gas spread through a U.S. Government building near Athens, Georgia, killing 17 
employees and sending over 50 more to hospital. The gas attack has been contained and much 
of the building isolated. 
The building, located on the edge of the city, housed offices of the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, among other federal agencies. 
Some were immediately suspicious of the characterization of the incident as a terrorist attack. 
calling it a deliberate lie meant to cover up a more sinister and damaging truth. Many local 
residents, who have long been suspicious about the true purpose of the government building in 
Athens, have proposed that the building housed a secret chemical weapons facility and that the 
"terrorist attack" story is nothing more than a cover-up for a laboratory accident. Much online 
discussion has centered on the idea that the incident was a "false flag attack," secretly carried 
out by the U.S. government in order to stir up public hatred against religious groups and create 
support for harsh anti-terrorism laws. Proponents of both ideas continue to call for an 
independent investigation - at press time, an online petition demanding an independent inquiry 
has gathered over 100,000 signatures. 
No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, and there is some disagreement among 
authorities as to the likely culprit. Federal officials claim to have reliable information indicating 
that the attack was carried out by the Yemen-based Islamic extremist group "AI-Sharuq" as part 
of what they see as an ongoing war between Islam and the West. Local authorities disagree, 
however; the Georgia State Police claim to have evidence that the attack was perpetrated by a 
local far-right white supremacist militia group known as "Free Knights of the Cross." The group 
has declared the U.S. Government "an enemy of the people" for various reasons including 
immigration, excessive taxation, and gun control. 
When asked about the possibility that the two organizations somehow cooperated in the attack, 
there was general agreement among experts that it was not possible. "These two groups 
absolutely despise each other," said Jack Wasserman, a professor of terrorism studies at Georgia 
State University. "One believes in the supremacy of evangelical Christianity, the other in the 
strictest interpretation ofSunni Islam. Pigs would fly before they'd consider working together." 
Workers in the building reported that the toxic gas came through the central ventilation system, 
covering many areas of the building. This struck many employees as odd, given recently 
increased security in the building'S maintenance areas. "Just yesterday Homeland Security had a 
team down in the boiler room," said one maintenance worker in the building, speaking on 
condition of anonymity. "They said they were putting in some fancy new security down there. If 
that's so, then how in the hell did this happen?" Officials have declined to comment, saying only 
that the investigation is ongoing. 
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"The poison gas incident was the result of an attack by AI-Sharuq." 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree 
To what degree do 
Agree 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 
"The poison gas incident was the result of an attack by Free Knights of the Cross." 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 





To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
\Vorth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 




To what degree do 
you agree with this r r r r r 
idea? 
To what degree do you think this idea is ... 
Not at Very 
all much 
Plausible? r r r r r r r 
Convincing? r r r r r r r 
Worth considering? r r r r r r r 
Interesting? r r r r r r r 
Coherent? r r r r r r r 
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Appendix F - Study 6 Sample Questionnaire 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
For the purposes of confidentiality, we would like you to generate a secret identification code. 
Please write the last two letters of your mother's maiden name, followed by the date of your 
birthday. For example, if your mother's maiden name is Smith and your birthday is the 3,d of 
July, write TH03. 
If you wish to withdraw your data from the study in the future, simply contact the researcher 
and provide your identification code. 
Identification code: ____ _ 
Age: ____ _ 
Gender: ____ _ 
On the following pages you will find three scenarios. Each scenario describes a chain of events, 
and is followed by a series of explanations which you will be asked to evaluate. Please read the 
scenarios and explanations carefully before answering, and do not go back and edit your 
answers later. 
Turn the page when you are ready to begin. 
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NUCLEAR PLANT SCENARIO 
An explosion at a nuclear power plant released dangerous amounts of radiation into the 
surrounding area, killing several people and causing environmental damage. 
Explanations 
1. The explosion was the result of an accident. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
2. The explosion was the result of an accident caused by a defective valve in the 
coolant system. The plant workers did not have the skills to stop the explosion. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
3. The explosion was the result of an accident caused bV a defective valve In the 
coolant system. The plant workers did not have the skills to stop the explosion and 
poor management meant that the workers were understaffed. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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4. The explosion was the result of an accident caused by a defective valve in the 
coolant system. The plant workers did not have the skills to stop the explosion and 
poor management meant that the workers were understaffed. They were further 
hindered by inefficient crisis-situation staff. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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ASSASSINATION SCENARIO 
The President of a developing nation was moving through a crowd of supporters to his 
limousine when a man with a knife rushed forward out of the crowd and stabbed him. 
Paramedics and bodyguards rushed to help, but the President died at the scene. 
Explanations 
1. The assassination was the result of a political disagreement. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
2. The assassination was the result of a political disagreement. The assassin was 
inspired by the arguments of a radical dissident group. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
3. The assassination was the result of a political disagreement. The assassin was 
inspired by the arguments of a radical dissident group. The bodyguards were unable 
to spot the assassin due to the large size of the crowd. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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4. The assassination was the result of a political disagreement. The assassin was 
inspired by the arguments of a radical dissident group. The bodyguards were unable 
to spot the assassin due to the large size of the crowd, and the paramedics couldn't 
save the President because his injuries were too severe. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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INVENTION SCENARIO 
A team of medical researchers held a press conference to announce a breakthrough in cancer 
treatment: an inexpensive vaccine that could prevent many types of cancer from occurring. 
Two weeks later, the lead researcher called another press conference to announce that the 
vaccine did not work after all. 
Explanations 
1. The announcement was retracted because the data were inaccurate. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
2. The announcement was retracted because the data were Inaccurate. There was an 
error in the researchers' data analysis that led to the wrong conclusion. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
3. The announcement was retracted because the data were Inaccurate. There was an 
error in the researchers' data analysis that led to the wrong conclusion. The senior 
researchers were careless in double-checking their results. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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4. The announcement was retracted because the data were inaccurate. There was an 
error in the researchers' data analysis that led to the wrong conclusion. The senior 
researchers were careless in double-checking their results and the junior researchers 
were afraid to speak up about the errors. 
To what extent do you agree with this explanation? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that this explanation is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
worth considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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MACH IV SCALE 







disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
1. Never tell anyone the real reason 
you did something unless it is useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
to do so. 
2. The best way to handle people is to 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
tell them what they want to hear. 
3. One should take action only when 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
sure it is morally right. 
4. Most people are basically good and 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
kind. 
5. It is safest to assume that all people 
have a vicious streak and it will give 1 2 3 4 5 6 
out when given the chance. 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
cases. 
7. There is no excuse for lying to 
someone else. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8. Generally speaking, people won't 
work hard unless they are forced to 1 2 3 4 5 6 
do so. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble 
and honest than to be important 1 2 3 4 5 6 
and dishonest. 
10. When you ask someone to do 
something for you, it is better to 
give the real reasons for wanting it 1 2 3 4 5 6 
rather than giving reasons that carry 
more weight. 
11. People who want to get ahead in 
1 2 
the world lead clean, moral lives. 
3 4 5 6 
12. Anyone who completely trusts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
others is asking for trouble. 
13. The biggest difference between 
criminals and others is that the 
1 2 3 4 5 6 








disagree Disagree Agree Agree 
14. Most people are brave. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. It is possible to be good in all 
1 2 
respects. 
3 4 5 6 
17. Barnum was wrong when he said 
that there's a sucker born every 1 2 3 4 5 6 
minute. 
18. It is hard to get ahead without 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
cutting corners. 
19. People suffering from incurable 
diseases should have the choice of 1 2 3 4 5 6 
being put painlessly to death. 
20. Most people forget more easily the 
death of their father than the loss of 1 2 3 4 5 6 
their property. 
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Appendix G - Study 7 Sample Questionnaire 
The following is a brief summary of the official account of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. 
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig, maintained by Transocean and under contract to BP, 
was drilling an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico when it unexpectedly hit a pocket of 
methane gas. The gas made its way up to the platform itself, causing a massive explosion that 
killed 11 workers and set the entire rig on fire. Efforts to extinguish the fire were in vain, and 
the rig eventually sank, causing a massive oil leak. The explosion was later blamed on a series 
of negligent actions by BP and Transocean, including poor maintenance of safety systems and 
inadequate precautions taken in the exploratory well to prevent a blowout. 
The facts listed below came to light in the days and weeks following the spill. Some claim 
that they cast doubt upon the official story. 
• Goldman Sachs, an investment company with close ties to high-ranking members of 
the U.S. government, dumped much of its BP stock shortly before the spill. 
• Halliburton, a contracting firm with substantial connections to the U.S. government, 
bought an oil cleanup firm about a week before the spill happened. 
• Media access to the wreck site was blocked by U.S. government officials. 
• Some of the surviving rig workers claim they heard a small explosion just before the 
large one that ultimately destroyed the rig. 
• Some of the surviving workers claim that they have been followed after the incident, 
and their homes broken into (though in each case, nothing seemed to have been 
stolen). 
• On the day of the spill, the U.S. Coast Guard were busy participating in a large-scale 
anti-terror drill and had a delayed response as a result. This kind of drill happens only 
twice each year. 
• Daniel Whitman, a senior engineering lecturer at a prestigious American university, 
has written a detailed analysis claiming that the methane captured by the oil rig could 
not have exploded on its own. 
• Shortly after the spill, the American government renewed its efforts to pass new taxes 
on industries that can cause environmental damage, using the oil spill as a justification. 
The following is an excerpt from a radio interview with Jason Noory, an independent 
journalist and a sceptic of the official story. 
INTERVIEWER: "So what do you think really happened with the, the Deepwater Horizon spill?" 
NOORY: "''Well, nobody wants to acknowledge it, but it -I think it's obvious. The American 
government is in trouble. They're low on money, so they need to tax American corporations to 
keep themselves - keep their heads above water. So what do they do? They decide that they 
need a disaster. I don't think this so-called oil spill was an accident. I really don't. I think that 
the oil rig was bombed, and that the bombing was perpetrated by agents of the United States 
government. This is the sort of thing that people really need to know about - we need to make 
it an issue, and I'm just trying to wake people up about this so that they start asking some 
tough questions.H 
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1. '7he official story is basically true. " 
To what extent do you agree with this idea? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 strongly 
agree 
To what extent do you think that this idea is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
worth 
considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
2. '7he Gulf of Mexico disaster was an accident. " 
To what extent do you agree with this idea? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 strongly 
agree 
To what extent do you think that this idea is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
worth 
considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
3. '7he Gulf of Mexico disaster was the result of a government conspiracy. II 
To what extent do you agree with this idea? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 strongly 
agree 
To what extent do you think that this idea is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
worth 
considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
219 
Appendix II - Study 8 Sample Questionnaire 
The following is a brief summary of the official account of the recent Gulf of Mexico oil spill. 
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig, maintained by Transocean and under contract to BP, 
was drilling an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico when it unexpectedly hit a pocket of 
methane gas. The gas made its way up to the platform itself, causing a massive explosion that 
killed 11 workers and set the entire rig on fire. Efforts to extinguish the fire were in vain, and 
the rig eventually sank, causing a massive oil leak. The explosion was later blamed on a series 
of negligent actions by BP and Transocean, including poor maintenance of safety systems and 
inadequate precautions taken in the exploratory well to prevent a blowout. 
The facts listed below came to light in the days and weeks following the spill. Some claim 
that they cast doubt upon the official story. 
• One of the companies contributing to the oil cleanup was a subsidiary of Halliburton, a 
contracting firm with substantial connections to the u.s .government. 
• Some of the surviving oil rig workers claim to have had a distinct feeling that 
something was about to go wrong in the days before the explosion. 
• Members of the press were allowed to inspect the wreck site for only a short period of 
time. 
• One of the survivors claimed to have seen something suspicious on the oil rig, and was 
invited onto a weekly TV news programme to discuss it. He appeared extremely 
agitated during the interview and refused to go into specifics. 
• On the day of the spill, the U.S. Coast Guard were busy participating in an anti-terror 
drill and had a delayed response as a result. This kind of drill is conducted about twice 
a month. 
• Ian Bell, an American radio presenter, devoted an episode of his weekly programme to 
the claim that the methane captured by the oil rig could not have exploded on its own, 
and instead must have been detonated by a small explosive charge. 
The following is an excerpt from a radio interview with Jason Noory, an independent 
journalist and a sceptic of the official story. 
INTERVIEWER: "So what do you think really happened with the, the Deepwater Horizon spill?" 
NOORY: "Well, nobody wants to acknowledge it, but it - I think it's obvious that the official 
story can't possibly be true. There are too many problems, too many inconsistencies, too many 
connections to powerful people who have an interest in a disaster like this. And so there are 
questions that need to be raised, because there's more to this than meets the eye. But I don't 
want to speculate on what really caused the oil spill. I want people to go and do the research 
and draw their own conclusions about what really happened. This is the sort of thing that 
people really need to know about - we need to make it an issue, and I'm just trying to wake 
people up about this so that they start asking some tough questions." 
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1. '7he official story is basically true. N 
To what extent do you agree with this idea? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B strongly 
agree 
To what extent do you think that this idea is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
worth 
considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
2. "The Gulf of Mexico disaster was the result of a government conspiracy. " 
To what extent do you agree with this idea? 
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 strongly 
agree 
To what extent do you think that this idea is: 
plausible? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
convincing? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
worth 
considering? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
interesting? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
coherent? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 very much 
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Appendix I - Study 9 Sample Questionnaire 
To ensure that your data will remain anonymous, we would like you to generate a secret 
identification code. This is made up of the last two letters of your mother's maiden name, plus 
the day of your birthday. So for example, if your mother's maiden name is Smith and you were 
born on 29th July, your code would be TH29. 
Enter your code here: _________ _ 
Please enter your age and gender below: 
Age: 
Gender: 
When you are ready to begin, tum to the next page. 
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On April 20, 20 I 0, a methane explosion on the "Deepwater Horizon" deep-sea oil rig in the 
Gulf of Mexico led to a massive oil leak. The leak from the BP-owned platform continued for 
three full months, and the resulting devastation to the ocean and nearby coastline has made it 
one of the worst environmental disasters of the past decade. 
The official explanation for the spill has implicated a faulty concrete seal on the well and an 
unexpected pocket of methane in the oil field. However, nearly two years after the spill, some 
new facts have been brought to light by American oil industry analyst George Whitman, 
president of the watchdog group Clean Coastlines. In his newly released documentary film, 
Spilling the Beans: The Deepwater Horizon Incident, Whitman uses news footage, interviews 
with oil rig workers and industry insiders, and many other sources of information to challenge 
the conventional wisdom about the causes of the spill. 
Here are a few of the points made in the documentary: 
• The official report on the incident by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
was unable to pinpoint any source of ignition for the leaking methane that led to the 
explosion. This casts doubt on the official explanation, which proposes a spontaneous, 
accidental explosion. Some observers have proposed that the methane was in fact 
intentionally detonated. 
• Goldman Sachs, an investment company with close ties to high-ranking members of the 
U.S. government, sold nearly 85% of its BP shares in the two weeks leading up to the spill. 
Selling this much stock is rather unusual, and the timing was extremely fortunate for 
Goldman Sachs. Such convenient timing suggests that Goldman Sachs knew in advance 
that there would be an oil spill. 
• Halliburton, a contracting firm with substantial ties to the U.S. Government, bought a 
major oil-spill cleanup corporation about a week before the spill happened. This was a very 
unusual acquisition for Halliburton, who mostly work with the military. Could Halliburton 
have known in advance that the Deepwater Horizon incident was going to happen? 
• At the time of the explosion, the U.S. Coast Guard were participating in a major anti-terror 
drill, which delayed their response and may have worsened the effects of the spill. This 
kind of drill is only conducted on only three days out of every year, meaning that the odds 
of such a coincidence are less than one percent. If someone wanted to create a major 
disaster in the GulfofMexico, it would be necessary to get the Coast Guard out of the way 
with just such a drill. 
• Several of the surviving workers claim to have been followed in the weeks after the spill, 
and their homes broken into (though in each case, nothing seemed to have been stolen). It 
is unlikely that this was done by simple burglars given that nothing was taken, and there is 
no sign that the break-ins were perpetrated by curious members of the news media. This 
can only be an intimidation campaign, meant to scare the workers into staying silent about 
what they saw. 
• Shortly after the spill, the American government renewed their efforts to impose carbon 
taxes and stricter environmental regulations on the domestic oil industry, using the oil spill 
as a justification. The timing could not have been better, as the U.S. Government, suffering 
from substantial budget deficits, was in dire need of additional revenue. They had a 
powerful motive to deliberately create a disaster in order to benefit from it. 
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Please read the following statements regarding the oil spill and rate how much you agree with 
each. 





































Appendix J - Study 10 Sample Questionnaire 
Please enter your UKC username (e.g. mw337) so that you can be given credit for 
rarticipating. 
Please enter your current age. 
I 
Please enter your gender. 
I 
Please carefully read the text below before moving on to the next 
page. 
The following is a brief excerpt from an article that appeared on OJ/Industry 
Watch, a website run by a former oil executive dedicated to news regarding the 
petrochemical industry. 
We all know about the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill back in 2010, even ifpeople don't 
think about it very much these days. It was a huge environmental catastrophe, and 
consumers and producers of oil also felt the shock. The cleanup is still going on, and the 
ocean is probably not going to recover for many years. 
Now I've heard people talk about the cleanup and how that went, but why did the spill 
happen in the first place? The U.S. government and BP tell us that the oil rig 
unexpectedly hit a pocket of methane during deep drilling operations. The methane 
travelled up the drill to the surface, where it exploded and caused a fire that eventually 
destroyed the rig and led to the spill. 
There are some problems with this story, though. For example, reporters were barred 
from taking detailed photographs of the site of the incident until well after the wreckage 
sank, so we don't have any hard evidence that the damage was consistent with an 
accidental methane explosion. What's more, right before the spill, the investment firm 
Goldman Sachs suddenly sold off most of their stock in BP. This was a very unusual 
move, and as we all know, the higher-ups at Goldman Sachs are unusually well-
connected with government and industry. 
Was the destruction of the oil rig deliberately engineered by agents of the U.S. 
government? 
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Please read the following statements regarding the oil spill and rate how 
much you agree with each. 
The oil spiJI was either an accident or the result of negligence. 
To what degree do 
you agree with this 
statement? 
Strongly Somewhat Slightly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree 
r r r 
Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree 
r r r 
There was a plot to create the oil spill. 
To what degree do 
you agree with this 
statement? 
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
r r r r r 
The oil spill was intentionally planned and carried out. 
To what degree do 
you agree with this 
statement? 
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
r r r r r r 
Some information about the oil spill is being intentionally covered up. 
To what degree do 
you agree with this 
statement? 
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
r r r r r r 
